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Preface
COIN, the International Workshops in Coordination, Organizations Institutions and Norms in
Multiagent Systems, is about open multiagent systems and how one can bring governance to
them. In COIN the focus is on social rather than individualistic aspects of agency. In particular,
COIN workshops are concerned with multiagent systems that show the following features: (i)
Agents engage in collective activities where other agents need to be involved in order to achieve
individual or group goals. (ii) The systems are open in the sense that agents may enter and
leave the system at will, and neither the system nor participating agents may know which agents
will be active at some point. (iii) Agents are heterogenous and respond to different principals.
(iv) Agents are autonomous, they act on their own interest and may be malevolent or incom-
petent. (v) Agents are ”opaque” to the system because the system has neither control of their
decision-making nor access to their internal state. (vi) In some cases, the systems are hybrid:
containing humans as well as software agents. The main challenge, in this context, is how to
endow the multiagent systems with mechanisms that facilitate the pursuit of those collective
activities. The COIN workshops series is a meeting point for a community that recognises the
role played by coordination, organizations, institutions and norms in facing that challenge of
regulating open MAS.
COIN@AAMAS2015 is the nineteenth edition of the series and the fourteen papers included in
these proceedings demonstrate the vitality of the community and will provide the grounds for
a solid workshop program and what we expect will be a most enjoyable and enriching debate.
We would like to thank the program committee for the fantastic effort they put in the
reviewing process, and the authors for submitting their papers.
May 4, 2015
Istanbul
Pablo Noriega
Murat Sensoy
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A Cognitive Framing for Norm Change  
 
Cristiano Castelfranchi 
 
ISTC-CNR GOAL Lab Italy 
cristiano.castelfranchi@istc.cnr.it 
 
 
Abstract. Norms are within minds and out of minds; they work thanks to their mental 
implementations but also thanks to their externalized supports, processing, diffusion, and behavioral 
messages. This is the normal and normative working of Ns. Ns is not simply a behavioral and 
collective fact, 'normality’ or an institution; but they necessarily are mental artifacts. Ns change 
follows the same circuit. In principle there are two (interconnected) loci of change with their forces: 
mental transformations vs. external, interactive ones. Ns change is a circular process based on a loop 
between ‘emergence’ and ‘immergence’; that is, changes in behaviors presuppose some change in 
minds, while behaviors causal efficacy is due to their aggregated macro-result: acts that organize in 
stable choreographies and regularities build (new) Ns in the minds of the actors. More precisely the 
problem is: which are the crucial mental representations supporting an N conform (or deviating) 
behavior? And which kinds of ‘mutations’ in those mental representations produce a change in 
behavior? I will focus my analysis on Social Norms, in a broad sense. 
 
Keywords: Norm change; Normative mind; Normative Agents. 
 
 
1. Premise: Situated normative cognition  
 
I will discuss the internalized/externalized nature and working of Norms (Ns) and its impact 
on N change. What I have in mind is a hybrid society (humans and AI-Agents interacting 
together) with “norm sensible Agents”. On the one side the Agent mediating and supporting 
human interaction, exchange, organization should be able to understand human conduct in 
terms of Ns and to monitor and support that; on the other side Agents should be themselves 
regulated by true Ns (not just pre-implemented binds, executive procedures, but real 
deontic representations with the mission to regulate their decisions and conducts) and able 
to violated them in the right situation. 
The analysis and typology that I will propose (that will not be complete and fully 
systematized, but just in fieri) is focused on Social Norms (SocNs), in a broad sense, 
covering various kinds of.1 Of course here I will put aside legal Ns (where there are 
institutional and legal ways for N change) although I think that several of the mechanism 
that I try to enlighten for SocNs also hold for legal ones.  
Norms are in minds and out minds; they work thanks to their mental implementation but 
also thanks to their externalized supports, processing, circulation, and dynamics. This is the 
normal and normative working of Ns. Also because usually a N is a strange relation 
between a practical, effective, externalized object (the conduct of X; however 
mentally/internally regulated) and a cognitive artifact: a written "table of law", a symbolic 
representation, a (verbal or non-verbal) message that has to pass into minds. This double 
face of N (cognitive and behavioral, both internal and external) is intrinsic. Ns are not 
simply a behavioral and collective fact, a "normality" or an institution; but they necessarily 
are mental artifacts [22], [13]. A N impinges on us and works thanks to its mental 
representation, (partial) understanding, and specific motivations. However, as we just said, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 From politeness to customs, from moral norms to Ns and rules in organizations, associations, communities of practice 
with their "rules". For a systematic analysis of social norms and discussion about the general theory see [6], [5], [35], 
[12], [31]. 
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they are not just a mental fact: this serves to determine and control the actors' conducts and 
to build shared practices, scripts, messages and collective effects. 
Our claim is that also Ns change follows the same circuit. In principle there are two 
(interconnected) “loci” of change with their forces: mental transformations vs. external, 
interactive ones. Of course, they are interrelated since the mental changes determine 
behavioral changes, which determine collective new dynamics. Vice versa, behavioral 
changes that we observe will change our mind and our norm conception or repertoire. In 
other terms it is both a process of 'emergence' [42] and 'self-organization' and a process of 
'immergence' [14], [21] and mentalization: a feedback from behavior and collective 
structure/phenomenon back to the individual minds layer. Not just a bottom-up and top-
down, and an inside-outside and outside-inside process, but a real 'loop': virtuous or vicious 
circles of Ns change or confirmation or instauration.  We need the same dynamics in 
normative Agents, able to learn and evolve SocNs, and to read the behaviors of others in 
these terms for monitoring it or adjusting to it.  
It would also be relevant to consider that there is no just one and unique normative role for 
actors with its specific mental attitudes (beliefs, goals, expectation, ..). We are not only 
'subjects' to the N (prescribing us certain behaviors and mental states), we also have to play 
the role of ‘watchman’ and 'punishers' of the others [11], [30]; a fundamental role in N 
script and for the maintenance of the social order. We have to play the role of 'issuers' too: 
(either explicitly or implicitly) proclaiming Ns, prescriptively informing about them, 
explaining and reminding us them (for example parents towards children). I will put aside 
here these different normative minds and roles2, although I believe that the role of a 
normative ‘watchman’ will be very relevant for Agents. 
What we will try to do in this work is to examine: (a) some of the main mutation 'events' in 
particular internal to the subject’s normative minds; but also (b) as individual conducts 
become signs (cues) and/or messages (signaling), and change the others and the collective 
emergent conducts, so becoming public phenomena and institutions. Also the other way 
around; I will give some hints about that: (c) how acts that organize in stable collective 
conducts build Ns in the minds of the actors [6] but not just as regularity to conform to, but 
us expectations and "prescriptions" from the others [23], [19]. 
 
 
2. Roots of Ns into minds 
 
Ns as “norms” are based on the possibility to be violated, not obeyed. Otherwise they are 
not “norms” but physical barriers or ties and chains. They are devices for the control of 
“autonomous” agents that decide what to do on the basis of their beliefs, reasoning, and 
goals. Ns not only presuppose (accept) but also postulate a freedom in the addressees.  
Our main claims are the following ones: 
 
> A N is not just aimed at regulating our conduct, at inducing us to do or not to do a given 
action; it is aimed at inducing us to do that action for specific motives, with a given 
mental attitude (belief, goal, expectation). The ideal-typical Adhesion (see 3.2) to a N is 
for an intrinsic motivation, for a "sense of duty", recognition of the authority, because it 
is right/correct to respect Ns, etc.; and only sub-ideally one should respect for avoiding 
external or internal sanctions (see below). Also normative education goes in this 
direction [18]. 
 
> We agree with Bicchieri’s theory that an “empirical expectation” and the perception of 
the existence of a “normal” diffused behavior is not enough for creating a real N in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I will also do not examine the other crucial phenomenon in Ns evolution: the introduction of a completely new N, 
and its issuing or negotiation. I will mainly focus on adherence or violation (and their reasons) in N changing, 
adaptation, or extinction. 
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“normative” sense (to use Kahaneman’ terminology [37]). A merely “descriptive” N is 
not “injunctive” [40]; a N implies for us a prescriptive character: it is for inducing us to 
(not) do something. There is a social pressure: expectation and prescription. 
 
> As we said, our object is "norms" in the "normative" (prescriptive) meaning/sense, not in 
the "normality" (descriptive or statistic or standard sense). However there is an 
important and bidirectional goal-relation between N in normative sense and N in 
normality sense: 
a) Normality-N creates and becomes a Goal for the actors and even a normative-N (a 
prescription, something "due"), in order to conform, to be like the others. This 
conformity is either a need of the individual or a need (and request/pressure) of the 
group, or both. 
b) Normative-N creates a statistical normality-N, a normal conduct in the community, if 
it is respected: N conformity is "normal". Moreover: 
 Normative-N has the goal and the function to be respected and thus to create a 
normality-N, a normal behavior (at the individual, internal level this helps it also o 
become an automatic response, just an habit); 
 If normative-N doesn't become/create a normality-N it is weakened and perceived as 
less credible and less binding [6], [22]. 
 
> In order to perceive a social practice as a N we have to guess, presume, or understand 
some "end" in it: the protection of the interest or rights of somebody, of the community; 
from that a deontic "should", an obligation. Not conforming is an harm, is noxious, not 
just something irregular, strange. I'm at least frustrating your prescription to maintain 
regular practices; you count on that and plan to regulate your behavior on that; so I'm 
upsetting and betraying you, not just amazing you. I'm harming social order, and the 
natural 'suspension' of uncertainty, the assumption of normality: a fundamental good  
[32]. 
 
> Ns have to be "impersonal" and depersonalized (and perceived as such) on both sides: the 
issuer's and the addressee's side. It is not a conflict between you and me; it is not "my" 
personal request (for me, for my desires, etc. for my personal will that you have to 
adopt); and it is not a request to "you". The message is: 
"I do not talk, monitor, sanction, in my name"; "I'm not addressing to you "ad 
personam", but as an instance of a class, a member, a citizen, ... like any other in the 
same conditions". Also for that "You have no reasons for rebelling". 
 This really is a crucial point in the perception of Ns as Ns; thus it is something that must 
be signaled in some way (for official Ns: uniform, role symbols, specific documents, 
etc; for Social Ns by collective practice or attitude or explicit messages)) or at least 
contextually presupposed and assumed in the script. 3 
 
> As we said, Ns are social devices controlling behaviors through minds [14] but in a 
specific way; through a partial understanding. They require (for their existence and 
effectiveness) their explicit mental representation, their (partial) understanding and 
recognition “as Norms”; specific cognitive representations and motivational processes 
(“Cognitive Mediators”: [22], [24]); differently from other social phenomena like 
social functions, that can be played by social actors even without understanding - and 
even less intending - them [16]. Not necessarily the agent supporting the N in some role 
has as his/her mental goal (“intends”) G1 and G2; these are the goals (and functions) of 
the N not of the individuals. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The fact that Ns are always relative to a “class” of subjects, not just to one specific person and it holds “for all the 
values of X” is one reason why the violation has not an individual meaning. X the violator is just “one of all/many”, is 
a representative, an “example”; that’s why his (bad) behavior can be a (bad) “example”; and the impact of the behavior 
is more that “individual”: It is not longer true that “for any value of X, X has to, will do, and does action A”.  
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> Ns have to build in us an "ought", a "duty", "you have to"; with a rather constrictive 
feeling, a negative "frame", an avoidance orientation (even when it elicits "you have to 
do this action"). And this "ought" is a non-technical "ought", not instrumental to and 
planned for a given outcome/goal. This entails a process of Adhering without sharing 
the ‘instrumental’ nature of the N, and without (necessarily) understanding /adopting its 
‘function’ or end. My ‘plan’ is different from the authority’s ‘plan’. Citizens are not real 
"cooperators" but "subjects". They have to "alienate" their own powers and products 
[18]. 
 
 
3.  N internalization 
 
Anyway, all this requires a specific “translation” of Ns into the minds of the addressees 
such that they recognize a N as such, and – on the basis of various motives – decide 
whether to conform or not to it. Let’s sketch the basic constituents of Ns internalization in 
our theory [24], [18]. Ns are based on a specific process of Goal-Adoption or better 
Adhesion; since they have the nature of an “imperative”.  
 
3.1 Goal Adoption and Adhesion  
 
Ns induce new goals through "adoption". Goal-Adoption is how an autonomous agent is not 
an isle but becomes social, or better pro-social 4; that its s/he does something for the others; 
puts her/his autonomous goal-pursuing (intentional action), her/his cognitive machinery for 
that, and her/his powers and resources, into the service of the others and of their interests. 
What is needed is the architecture of a social Agent able to import goals from outside (and 
to influence other agents by giving them goals and relying on him/her) but remaining 
‘autonomous’. S/he is able to arrive to set up an intentions not only from her own 
endogenous ‘desires’, but also from imported goals. 
Goal-Adoption means that: 
X believes that Y has the goal that p and comes to have (and possibly pursue) the Goal 
that p just because he believes this.  
“I do something ‘for’ you” (which doesn't mean ‘benevolence’!); I want to realize this 
since and until you wants/ needs this; because it is your goal. 
Of course there are different kinds of Goal-adoption, motivated by different reasons: merely 
selfish and instrumental, like in exchange; altruistic; or strictly cooperative, for a common 
goal. Ns prescribe a specific motive for accepting the injunction: in Bicchieri view’s a 
“normative expectation”, for us also the recognition of the expectation/prescription by the 
others and their the authority (see below). 
A stronger form of G-Adoption is Adhesion: when I adhere to your (implicit or explicit) 
‘request’ (of any kind: prey, favor, order, law, etc.). In other words, you (Y) have the goal 
that I adopt your goal p, that I do something (action a of X) realizing that goal, and I adopt 
your goal p or of doing a, (also) because I know that you expects and wants so.  
In Adhesion one of the reasons for Adopting the goal of the other is that the other wants so: 
-She also has the (meta-)goal that we adopt her goal; 
-We adopt her goal by adopting the meta-goal.  
In a sense, there is a double level of adoption (a meta-adoption): I know and adopt your 
goal that I adopt. Moreover, in case of Adhesion there is a (presupposed) agreement 
between X and Y about X’s adoption, X doing something as desired by Y. Other forms of 
adoption (like help) can be unilateral, spontaneous, and even against Y's desire. Ns require 
from us not just adoption but adhesion. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Not to be used as synonym of "altruistic", "benevolence", etc. 
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3.2 Normative Adhesion 
 
Adhesion obviously presupposes specific beliefs into the mind of the agents (and this is the 
first aim of the N: to be conceived/perceived as such). In particular the recognition of the N 
as a N, in force on me, and valid in that context. 
It is implied a ‘generalized’ G-Adoption where: 
-X believes that there is a goal impinging not directly on a single individual but on a 
class or group of agents:  
-if X believes to belong to that class,  
-she believes to be concerned by the norm, and  
-she instantiates a Goal impinging on her; adopts it. 
Having adopted the ‘generalized’ goal X doesn’t limits her mind and her behavior to this 
(self-regulation); she will also worry about the others’ behavior: 
- X is also able to have Goals about the others’ behavior: she adopts the Goal not to do 
but that for any z (DOES z A).  
-Given such an Adoption she has expectations (predictions + prescriptions) about the 
others behavior, and is not only surprised, but also ‘disappointed’ by their non-
conformity.  
Also because she is paying some cost for respecting the norm and the authority, for 
maintaining the prescribed social “order”, which is supposed to be a “common”. She wants 
the other be fair, reciprocates, contributes. 
 
3.3  Equity and spreading 
 
Conte and Castelfranchi [23] claim that the decision to conform to what is perceived to be 
an obligation plays a relevant role in its spreading over a population of cognitive agents. 
While the conventionalist view derives social norms from the spreading of conformity, in 
our view conformity is derived, so to speak, from the spreading of obligation-recognition 
and -adoption.  
“The very act of accepting an obligation implies and turns into enforcing it. The agent 
respecting the obligation turns into a supporter. Conforming leads to prescribing. The agent 
undergoing an obligation becomes a legislator. The more an obligatory behavior is believed 
to be prescribed, the more it will be complied with, and the more, in turn, its prescription 
will be enforced. Rather than acting only through a behavioral contagion or a passive social 
impact, the spreading of norms is affected by cognition in a variety of ways and attitudes: 
 (i) It leads to implementing effective conformity. When an autonomous agent recognizes 
a norm as a norm and decides to conform to it, the number of conformers will be 
increased, and the norm is more effective.  
(ii) Effective conformity contributes to the spreading of normative beliefs. The larger the 
number of conforming agents and the more likely the observers will form normative 
beliefs and the strength/certainty of the belief will increase.  
(iii) The spread of normative beliefs contributes to the spreading of normative actions.  
(iv) The spread of normative actions contributes to the spreading of normative 
influence. The larger the number of agents conforming to one given norm, and the 
more distributed will be the want that other agents will conform to the same norm. 
“This is due to: 
- An equity rule. People do not want others in the same conditions as their own to 
sustain lower costs - benefits being equal (this is, indeed, one the most probable 
explanations of the Heckathorn's [34] group sanction control: the more agents 
respect the norms, and the more likely they will be to urge others to do the same).  
- "Norm-sharing". Agents are likely to "share" the respected norms, that is, to believe 
that those norms are sensible, useful, necessary, etc. This is also a powerful self-
defensive mechanism (agents share the norms they happened to respect). Agents will 
defend the norms they share, implementing the number of agents who want those 
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norms to be respected.” [17].  
(v) The spread of normative influence contributes to the spreading of normative beliefs, 
and the whole process is started again in a circular way.  
 
The same cognitive mediation olds for an observed violation, deviance, and their crucial 
interpretations and meanings by the observer (see also Bicchieri & Mercier [7]). 
 
Also for Agents this might be relevant: do we want/need just agent doing as 
expected/ordered or agent able to violate but also able to conform to the norm as a decision 
and for specific deontic motives/reasons (N-Adhesion). Don’t want we to “share” norms 
(social, moral, legal) with our Agents? To really have a hybrid society regulated by values 
and norms? 
 
 
4. Internal Locus: kinds of N mutation within Subjects’ mind 
 
Let's identify the various though and 'reasons' of the 'subject' (S) for abandoning or 
violating a given N. We will distinguish between:  
(i) 'Unintentional’ effects; where changing or weakening that N (or Ns) is not the end or an 
end of S, and 
(ii) 'Intentional’ act; where S understands, expects, and intends to jerk the N. 
 
4.1 Unaware violations 
 
S does not realize that her behavior is an N violation. Mental conditions for such a conduct: 
- Ignorance of the N (beliefs); or 
- A mistaken interpretation or instantiation (beliefs): S does not realize to be a member 
of the set of the addressees of that N or that it does apply in those circumstances and 
context; or 
- No memory retrieval of the N in those circumstances, lack of attention, absent-
mindedness ((beliefs). 
The violation is unintended since it is fully unaware, but - given the observable behavior 
("bad example") - it equally injures the N. 
There are also extra-mental conditions facilitating or inducing such a "mistake". For 
example, the N and its local pertinence should have been appropriately and explicitly 
signaled, not given for obvious: "Please, do not park more than one car in our courtyard; 
this is our polite convention". 5 
 
4.2 Aware violations  
 
A) Without the goal of injuring/weakening the N 
 As we do not intend the supportive 'function' of our conforming to the N, equally we do 
not necessarily intend the destructive 'function' of out violating it. 
There are several reasons for dropping a N-goal, do not adhere to it and formulate a 
conform intention: 
 
a) Goal-conflict: the N-goal contrasts with another goal of the agent; 
Apart from the belief that the N is in conflict, what matters are the following parameters: 
- value of the goal based on the value of the meta-goal of respecting Ns; 
- value of the contender goal; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 An interpersonal example may be: X: "You can not go around in underwear!" Y: “But you had to say me that 
there were guests in our house!" 
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- value of the negative expected consequences of violation, including feelings 
associated to N-violation; and in particular the perceived threat: estimated probability 
and weight of 'punishment' and blame (beliefs). 6 
 A sub-case of (a) is a N-conflict: N contrasts with other Ns accepted by the agent (see below). 
 The decision to violate if I can an N that is not convenient for me now and here (not 
necessarily “in general”) can just be for my private interests. However, not necessarily the 
goal in contrast with the N is a private/personal one; it might be a goal formulate for efficiently perform S’s 
role or mission  [17]: violating for functional reasons, for an intelligent problem-solving in our work. 
 
b) N Application & Instantiation disagreement: S is aware of N but he contests to be a 
member of the set of the addressees or that it does apply to that circumstances and 
context. 
 
c) Material impossibility: S forms a N-goal but cannot comply with it (beliefs); the intention would be 
impossible (beliefs). 
As we said, a remarkable case of (a) – but in a sense close to (c) (in terms of not “material” but of “deontic” 
impossibility) – is: 
 
d) Norm conflict: the N I should apply and respect is in contrast (beliefs) with another N:  
- Either another social N (social Ns are not so coherent and non contradictory, especially in their 
application). For ex. the social N about our male group meeting for drinking beer implies the possibility 
or prescription to burp in public (just for funny and be deviant), while I would desire – due to my 
“education” – do not burp;  
- Or a conflict with legal or organizational N.  
In all these cases S will not conform to the N but she is not motivated by the aim of weakening it. For sure 
that violation (given the message to myself and to the stakeholders) weakens the N, 
however the agent’s intention is not necessarily this. 
 
(e) Expectation of not sanctions 
 Either because some reason in the others of not sanctioning; or just because I expect to 
not be detected, to hidden: “I will get away with it; they will not see me; nobody will 
know that”; or “They do not catch any violator, they never punish”7. Of course, these 
beliefs are relevant in particular for agent motivated to respect Ns just by the fear of 
sanction.  
 
(f) Indifference to sanction 
 There are cases and individuals where the fact that other people respect N and that 
there will be a negative judgment by the others (sometime even publically expressed), 
is not a sufficient reason for not violating: an important sub-kind of conflict. Consider 
for example a young guy sited in a waiting room where there are quite old waiting 
people standing up, and not giving up his seat to them, although he knows that he 
“should do” that, and that he is disapproved. Either there is in this guy (and context) 
indifference to the judgment and sanction from the others (goals), since “I do not care 
of these guys”, “who knows them?” “I will never meet them again..” (beliefs). Or 
there might even be a provocation attitude (goals): “Yes! I’m not like you, I do not 
care of you”, “I’m underbred, so what!?”. Or the attitude is “motivated” by an 
opposition specifically to the N, as a meaningless N: a value opposition (like in people 
violating the rule of giving priority to women). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This expectation should be part of what Bicchieri calls “empirical expectation” (“what we expect the other do”? 
However, we should distinguish between “to expect that the other conform” and “to expect that the others monitor and 
sanction”. Two different predictions based on different experiences that might also don’t be fully correlated.  
7 This is a change in our “empirical expectations” in Bicchieri & Xiao terminology [8]. 
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All these are (more or less sincere and not self-deceptive) beliefs and motives of the 
violator. 
Sometime we (unconsciously) find a new interpretation of framing of our action and 
circumstance, and of the N, in order to facilitate our violation. Consider the very famous 
and beautiful case of people “interpreting” the monetary sanction for the violation of the N 
as a fair, a price, and thus deciding to systematically violating it, and just pay what they 
have to pay [33]. Let’s rewrite in our mind as a tax what in fact would be a fine! But this 
morally facilitates our decision to violate. 
 
(g) Violation as epistemic act 
 I know and intend (in case) to violate, but my motive is to “see”: to see if that N is 
there or if I correctly understood it; or to see if the violation will be noticed/punished; 
to see your reaction. Even to see if you know that N, not in order that I know the N, 
but in order to know if you know it.8 
Of course, there are other kinds of assumptions and reasoning that induce or facilitate 
(intentional) N violation; in particular interpretations of observed deviant behaviors, 
changing our mind. We will see some of them below: the effect of external changes 
(observed deviant behaviors) on our mind and conduct. 
 
B) Aware violations with the goal of harming, breaking down the N 
Violation is not just intentional but motivating: I violate in order to violate (Ns or that N) 
 
(h) Violating for changing 
 Intentional and public violation of N for rebellion and opposition to that N, for 
rejecting and breaking it; to send a message to the others, to the “authority”. Like 
Gandhi that rips in a central place of Johannesburg in front of the police the special 
document obligatory of Indian people. The message (and belief) is “This N is 
discriminatory, unacceptable, unfair; it has to be abolished: rebel to it!”9 Notice that I 
can violate an N as unacceptable, not fair even if it does not directly damage me. 
 
 (i) Violation against stigma, for changing values, building our identity 
 I violate for provocation and rebellion towards stakeholders’ values and attitudes. 
There are two different cases. 
 A possible aim is to build our collective identity, to remark that “we” are different, not 
like you, and we do not want be part of you (like Punk’s provocation; or adolescent 
deviant attitudes). We are not In-group, but Out-group; it is an “exit” or secession 
move from your value and community.  
 Another possible aim is to change your value, to obtain respect. Like the provocation 
of the Gay “pride” and exhibition. Our aim is not splitting from you; on the contrary 
we want to be accepted, integrated, and respected; you have to change your 
conservative values and thus your social Ns on that. 
 
A crucial construct in human mind is the “sense of justice” and the related sufferance for 
iniquitous situations (not only harming us personally but even favoring us, or harming 
others: we can play the role of the victim, of the privileged guy, or of the stakeholder, but 
always with some discomfort) (“equity theory”), the need for equity (a “value” and a 
“motivation” 10). We can consider a given N with this perspective, by evaluating its “equity 
and justice”. This changes very much our disposition in obeying to it, or in 
supporting/defending it as punisher (§ 3.3). I feel “justified” in my violation; not a bad guy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 My behavior is like an exam question, where I in fact already know the answer but I want to know if you know it.  
9 This nice example is about a legal N, however similar examples exist also for social ones; like the “provocation” acts 
of courageous women in Arabic countries. 
10 For a rigorous cognitive notion of "value" and its strict link with evaluations, prescriptions and Ns see [38].  
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but a good guy; I do not feel guilty but proud of me.11 If I consider a given N unfair I can 
have a serious conflict between two internal values, intrinsic motivations: the sense of 
duty/obedience vs. the sense of justice. The conflict is within my own values.12 Sometimes 
this mental justification and motivation in terms of “sense of injustice” is just a convenient 
alibi (in front of the others, or in front of myself) for allowing my violation for personal 
advantages and desires (like the “sense of injustice” sometimes used for covering/hiding 
our envy). 
 
 (i) Violation to be noticed, to innovate 
 Sometime we violate a social Ns or consuetude’s just to emerge, to be noticed, and to 
be original; like women first wearing a bikini or a mini. These provocative guys 
(actually innovators that may create a new “fashion”, but not necessarily with this 
intention) are aware of and ready to cope with criticism and even insults. 
 Two examples about previous cases: I violate the norm that on the beach one cannot 
be nude, and (with other people) I use "topless"; so I create or converge a new use, 
imposing tolerance to the others (they can no longer blame and reproach me). Or I'm 
completely nude; but this is too disturbing, intolerable for that group, so this creates a 
scission of groups and places: you nudist must have tour own beach (and we will not 
come there!), but you cannot stay in "our" beach and be nude. If you become part of 
the new group and go to the nudist beach it become not just tolerate to be nude (the 
old N doesn't constrains you any longer) but there even is a new N of "being nude”. 
 Similar path for vegans: the want not just be permitted to refuse current food without 
objection, ridiculous, blame, but they are trying to build new Ns - based on new values 
- (“Do not eat animals!” etc.) on such a basis to criticize, blame the violator (although 
they are the majority, and make propaganda. Their aim is not just to build a separate 
culture and community, but also to change the practices and the Ns of the big 
community. 
 Notice that this kind of N change requires (and is grounded on and aimed at) a change 
of "value" which is first of all a specific mental object.  
 
(l) Against the authority as such 
 It is also possible to violate in order to rebel, but not against a given set of N that we 
want to reject or change, but against the normative authority A. To impair A, 
independently from the specific N. What maters is to violate; to show to myself or to 
my peer or to A that I do not respect A, do not submit: this is the message and motive. 
Like a “rebel” child that rejects any parents’ prescription or restriction to his desires; 
like some political movement or demonstration where what matters is to broken 
something, to do something prohibited, not what to broken and why. 
 The crisis of the authority (see  § 6.2) can be due to various assumptions and motives; 
like the fact that A is no longer credible, trustworthy, correctly and competently 
playing its role; so I do not want longer depend on and delegate to it. Or a crisis of 
identity and membership: I do no longer feel one of “you”. Or for a crisis of values 
grounding that A, I do not feel any longer morally “obliged”. And so on.  
 Again; it is not necessarily a matter of sanctions, power, and fear. 
 
 
5. External Locus: The others’ observed behaviors 
 
Which and how many observed changes in normative behavior are necessary for changing 
our conform conduct? Not necessarily we need diffused and spreading practices. Even a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Agents too should have some moral value and should be able at least to interpret our behavior and reasons in these 
terms, and possibly mediate our interaction caring of moral norms.  
12 This is Antigone tragedy. This also is Socrates’ message to us while taking the poison: respecting Ns and authorities 
(even when their decision is incorrect and harming us) may/should be a prevalent value. 
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single violation act or meta-violation (for example do not monitoring or punishing) can call 
into question a given N in my mind (for example, a single resounding act of euthanasia); a 
single provocation can be enough for discredit authority (see Gandhi’s example). 
To know that somebody has violated N is an important factor in the crisis of that N. 
However, this passes through our mind and its changes, and what matters is the 
interpretation we give of that behavior: accidental? Intentional? And why? And which are 
the consequences? 
 Let’s first see some examples/kinds of assumptions and reasoning that induce or 
facilitate (intentional) N violation; in particular interpretations of observed deviant 
behaviors, changing our mind: 
 
 (h) Interpretations of observed deviant behaviors 
> “If he (they) is doing that me too I can do so! It is not fair that he does that and I 
cannot!” 
> “If he (they) is doing that it means (it is a sign) that it is permitted/possible: there 
is not a N or is no longer in force here” 
> “If he (they) is doing that it means (it is a sign) that this is the right way; what 
we have to do (he expects that I do so)”.13 Actually this is an intentional action 
entailing a violation, but not intentional as violation.  
> “In fact he is right! He is courageous. It is correct to violate this N!” (Thanks to 
his violation behavior I change my value-attitude towards N; this goes in the 
direction of N criticism). 
 
5.1 A single bad example 
 
The impact of an external, observable deviating behavior does not depend only from the 
number of violators: the many the violators the more impaired the N. 
A single guy’s deviant behavior can be sufficient for a large impact. It depends on the 
network, on the number of stakeholders and – of course – on his/her role and influence  
It is also important the fact that (a) not all violations are equivalent, although behaviorally 
identical; and (b) that sometimes a single deviating example (not a multitude) be enough 
for; but of course it depends on its visibility and significance and interpretation. The single 
violation of a leader is not the same of the one of a follower; the violation a well-known 
person is not like the violation of an anonymous person, and so on.  
The number of violator is of course a relevant factor because one principle for the strength 
of our persuasion is the number of converging sources or examples. But also the single’s 
reliability - as model or authority – and prestige has a precise impact on the degree of our 
persuasion.  
 
5.2 The others (deviant) behaviors as messages 
 
Since minds are typically read off behavior “it is impossible not to communicate” about our 
minds even those prescribed by a specific role. Our behaviors or their traces inevitably 
“signify” our mental attitudes. And we use our everyday behavior or its traces (practical 
actions not “expressive” ones or conventionalized gestures) on purpose to send this 
information to others, for signaling. This is a special form of communication crucial for 
human social coordination, and conventions and institutions establishment via “tacit” 
negotiation and agreement, not to be mixed up with gestural or other forms of non-verbal 
communication [41].14 
Also N maintenance or innovation “circles” (observation-interpretation-change-action-
observation- and so on) (§ 6) works thanks to the fact that a cognitive agent “reads” the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This case and the previous one change our “normative expectation” in Bicchieri & Xiao [9] terminology. 
14 On the relevance of Norm-signaling, and also of explicit communication, not just of punishment, see also [2] 
[3]. 
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others’ conducts, and they signify/inform about the existence, respect, or violation of Ns 
[3]. Thus a violation conduct may acquire either the communicative function or the 
communicative intention of impairing the N or of explaining my reasons. Demolition or 
establishment of SocNs is mainly based on such a kind of not explicit communication, 
negotiation, and tacit agreements. 
This factor contributes to the explanation of a crucial issue. As remarked by Christine 
Cuskley15 "frequency and stability exhibit an interesting relationship in language: the more 
frequent a linguistic construction is, the less it tends to change over time." In my view this 
might be generalized to behaviors, and in particular to normatively regulated behaviors. 
Also linguistic constructions are "norms" and "rules" for people aimed at using that 
language; just a sub-case (with its specific additional dynamics). "Despite the evident 
relationship between frequency and stability, it is still unclear what specific social and 
cognitive factors underlie this relationship." As for social Ns, I would say that part of these 
factors is rather clear: the more diffused a (normative) behavior, the greater the probability 
to be observed and imitated/learned (a very strong and repeated "message"!), and thus not 
just to spread around but to be "reinforced" in its prescriptive character. Moreover, the 
more it is diffused the greater the absolute number of necessary "exceptions" and 
"violations" for its change or elimination. Thus the more widespread the more stable. And 
vice versa: the more stable in time and people, the greater the probability to be diffused and 
repeated (frequency). And so on. 
 
 
6. Collective destruction/construction: Emergence-Immergence Cycles 
 
On the basis of this analysis of internal mutations and their behavioral consequences, let’s 
focus on the description of the internal-external, mental-behavioral, individual-collective 
loops, and on the description of the phases of Ns change (vicious) ‘circles’ (Fig. 1).  
 
 
Fig.1 Internal-external cycle 
 
 
6.1  External   Internal circles  
 
Obviously – as for the “external” observed events (single or regular) – what matters is the 
Intentional Stance interpretation, the ascribed mind and reasons. I observed an individual 
violation by S or by W (not blame, no sanction); is it by accident, ignorance, or lack of 
attention? Or was it intentional? And “why”? Was S just egoist and self-maximizing, or is 
he violating because disagrees about the N or for invalidating the A? As we saw in § 5 there 
are various possible interpretations and effects. And about norm ‘watchman’ role: was he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Christine Cuskley "Frequency and stability in linguistic rule dynamics", Invited seminar at ISTC October 2014. 
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indulgent because lazy or corrupted or familiar with S? Or was he thinking the N doesn’t 
apply in that circumstance or was bad and unfair?  
The effect on my mind and on my view of the N in the various cases is very different. The 
external event impact depends on our subjective interpretation of it. 
That’s why also a very clear collective behavioral regularity is not always and 
automatically interpreted (and complied) as a N. There are “vicious” and “virtuous” circles, 
from the point of view of normative behavior. Both, the vicious one (that is, violation, 
behavioral messages, N impairment, and collapse) and the virtuous one (N emergence, 
implicit negotiation, establishment, and maintenance) are due to the same internal-external 
cycle (fig. 1).  
There is also a very interesting self-referential feedback: the violating or conforming 
subject is observing his/her own behavior, and interpreting it, and confirming or changing 
his/her beliefs and preferences and feelings (as we saw in § 4.), and so on. Our behavior 
signifies a lot to us, and we send (intentional or unintentional) messages to ourselves. Also 
because, if I act on the basis of some implicit, presupposed, assumptions or choices, and the 
action is successful (good results), this automatically reinforces the presupposed mental 
conditions for that act, and increases the probability to take the same path next time. 
 
6.2 The crisis of N authority 
 
A nice example of a multilayer vicious circle between normative behavior and norm-related 
mental attitudes is the crisis and discredit of the "authority". To work well authority 
requires not only respect/submission for authoritarian strength, threats, coercive power 
(credible sanctions), but "prestige" or more precisely "authoritativeness". That is, A's 
"credibility". An A requires trust for its role; without trust it cannot work. Information 
authority, source of knowledge must be "credible" in strict sense: it has to be perceived 
(evaluated and felt) as "competent" in that domain and honest, not cheating for some 
private interest. Analogously the norm-A must be "credible" and trustworthy, its Ns should 
be perceived/given as the right one (from a technical and a justice point of view) and not 
due to private interests. If the A is authoritative, I accept its information or prescription, 
without need for prices or threats, without conflict, rebellion: I have a generalized adoption 
disposition; in a sense I obey for intrinsic motivations. 
However this authoritativeness can collapse, and A have a crisis of credibility, be 
discredited and no longer "automatically" respected. Which are in Individual Mind changes 
that might start (or reinforce) this process? 
(a) I no longer believe that A or its behavior is respectable, that A is authoritative, 
credible; thus  
(b) I do not adopt its prescription/N, I start do not conform to (decision);  
(c) this feedbacks, and reinforce my belief about violability of N and my right to violate, 
and - since my deviating behavior can be observed –  
(d) it discredits the A in the others’ eyes; diffuses the same evaluation about A (and 
probably also its perceived capacity or right of sanctioning), builds a "collective 
belief"16  
(e) it infects, diffuses deviating behaviors; but this spreading of the evaluations and of the 
deviating behaviors  
(f) confirms and reinforce my perception of A, of that N, and my behavior; and so on.  
The collapse of A’s authoritativeness is a mental and behavioral, and internal and external, 
and individual and collective, fact.17 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Not in the sense of a "collective mind" but in the more basic sense of a collective of minds; many minds sharing 
certain assumptions and infecting each other. 
17 It is clear that such an internal/external dynamics of Ns change might be fully simulated only with cognitive 
Agents in MAS.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
Three issues.  
 
> As we said, Ns are based on the possibility to be violated, not obeyed. They are devices 
for the control of “autonomous” agents that decide what to do on the basis of their 
beliefs, reasoning, and goals. Ns not only presuppose (accept) but also postulate a 
freedom in the addressees. Is this just a not so good but unavoidable feature? Or 
violability in this regulating device of social conduct has some advantages? N 
“violation” usually has a negative connotation, since to “violate” is an evil in itself (as 
harm at a general and meta-level, of order, authority, trust; as we explained). However – 
actually – not only it can be morally justified and even noble and courageous, but also it 
plays a key function. It is one of the mechanisms and pressure for N change, adaptation, 
and evolution18 [16].19 
 
> I’m no sure that the current theory and definitions of social norms (see for example 
[35], [6]) fully captures some of the aspects we have discussed 20. For example, there 
are social norms (not only legal ones) that are still there even if systematically violated 
by a large part of people. The norm is still in force since it is perceived as such by that 
people, although they violate it. They actually know/decide to “violate” it, and in a 
sense that N still “regulates” their conduct. For example, in several part of Italy it is 
very frequent that people throw papers on the street or do not collect the excrements of 
his dog; however, they know (and even agree) that this is bad, not “correct” (N 
violation), but since it is tiring do not do so, and since a lot of people does the same… Is 
that N “in force” in this group? Yes: everybody knows what one “should” do. In our 
view a social norm to be there doesn’t require to be a behavioral norm, a stable practice. 
It is sufficient that the large part of the group knows it, reminds and considers it, 
although regularly or frequently violating it. It is perceived as a N, taken into account in 
the individual cognitive process and mentally shared in the group, although ineffective 
on the conduct. It is a strange N state: an still in force but ineffective N. We shouldn’t 
forget that first of all a N is into the (shared) mind of the agents; this is its 
presupposition. 
Of course it is fully true – coherently with Bicchieri’s theory – that:  
(i) On the one side the norm not only is ineffective but is probably in “decadence”, 
close to disappearing also from the mind of people, for example for the 
learning process of the new guy or for the mental automatization of the bad 
practice without no longer considering/perceiving that you are violating.  
This is reasonably a possible and rather typical intermediate step in the path of 
N extinction: N respect and sanctioning; bad practices but the N is still 
considered as such; non longer taken into account as a N, no longer impinging 
on us. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This obviously shouldn’t be an excuse for the selfish violator just for his own private interests (although – as 
Adam Smith has explained – even this guy plays his social function, beyond his personal motives). 
19 I worry about the rigorous computational (intelligent) coordination and surveillance on human work and 
organization. At least in "critical states" we need violations, although not foreseen in the program; but just 
opportunistic and reactive to a given contingency. 
20 For example, the synthetic motto of Bicchieri for synthesizing the spirit and working of social Ns “Do the right 
thing: But only if others do so” could create some misunderstanding. This might be the mental rule, the 
prescription that the individual gives to himself in front of a N (it can explain his conformity or violating behavior) 
but is not the prescription of the N: the N says, prescribes, just “Do the right thing!” Ns want to be obeyed and 
respected in any case; this is their imperative. I may decide or be leaning to respect this absolute imperative only 
“if”, under certain condition, but the “normative expectation” also by the others doesn’t say “only if the others do 
so”. 
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(ii) On the other side, it is true that the fact that several guy systematically violate 
that N encourages ignoring it, to consider that it is possible and not so terrible 
to violate it. We live in a rude world and we adapt/belong to it.21 
 
> Agents are relevant in two ways: for modeling the complexity of such a dynamic and 
immergent/emergent process, by Agent-based Social Simulation; but also because we 
need non-passive normative and moral agents in Hybrid Societies where Artificial 
Intelligences (Agents, robots,) will work and cohabit with humans. In particular N 
change processes (internal and external) should be present in both MAS with cognitive 
Agents, and in Hybrid Societies. We have even to allow and exploit violations of rules 
and practices in organization, coordination, and work, but only when it is the case and 
by understanding “why” (reading behavior and mind) [17]. Actually there is a strong 
and advanced tradition in AgMAS on Agent architecture for Ns, in N based MAS and 
organization, in MAS simulation of Ns efficacy22, however – in my view – we still need 
some advancements in theoretical modeling of cognitive and collective aspects of Ns 
dynamics. This work is a partial attempt in this direction.  
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Abstract. Norms are an efficient way of controlling the behaviour of
agents while still allowing agent autonomy. While there are tools for pro-
gramming Multi-Agent Systems, few provide an explicit mechanism for
simulating norm-based behaviour using a variety of normative represen-
tations. In this paper, we develop an artefact-based mechanism for norm
processing, monitoring and enforcement and show its implementation as
a framework built with CArtAgO. Our framework is then empirically
demonstrated using a variety of enforcement settings.
1 Introduction
Multi-Agent Systems are often used as a tool for simulating interactions between
intelligent entities within societies, organisations or other communities. This
Agent-based Simulation is useful for studying social behaviour in hypothetical
situations or situations that may not be easily reproduced in the real world. The
entities being simulated, human or otherwise, are represented by programmable
intelligent agents, which must present reactive, pro-active and social behaviour
[1].
When working with social simulations, we must consider that agents should
be free to act in their own best interest, even though their actions might produce
negative effects to other agents. For this reason, rules are established to ensure
that certain actions, which would otherwise harm the society’s performance, are
prohibited. These rules, referred to as “norms” in multi-agent environments,
allow agents to reason and act freely, while still being subject to punishment in
the event that a norm is violated [2]. Agents are able to reason whether following
a norm brings more positive results by avoiding the penalties associated to its
violation. Some mechanisms [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10] exist that makes reasoning
about norms possible. In order to simulate norm-based behaviour, a structure
must be defined that allows the specifying of norms in the form of prohibitions
and obligations. Once these norms are active, agent interactions shall be observed
by a monitoring mechanism and analysed by a norm-enforcing agent, which will
then punish agents caught violating norms.
Although there are multiple frameworks for simulating agent-based behaviour,
such as MASSim [11] or the agent programming languages Jason [12] and JADE
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[13], relatively less attention has been focused on frameworks for norm-based be-
haviour simulation [14, Chapter 1]. In this paper, we aim to bridge this gap by
developing a scalable norm processing mechanism that performs monitoring and
enforcement in multi-agent environments. Our contributions are a mechanism
to monitor agents’s actions in an environment, described in Section 4.4 and a
mechanism for norm maintenance and enforcement, described in Section 4.5. In
Section 5 we show empirical results of applying our mechanism to a Multi-Agent
System.
2 Multi-Agent Simulation
When intelligent agents [1] share an environment, competition between them
becomes inevitable [15]. This idea becomes clear when we think of multi-agent
systems as societies. Each person in a society has their own goals and plans to
achieve them, and it is in their best interest to do so by spending as little effort as
possible. Take for an example a person interested in eating an apple and another
interested in selling one. For the buying person, its goal is to acquire the apple
from the seller for the lowest cost possible, preferably with no cost at all. For the
seller, the goal is to sell the apple for as high a price as affordable by the buyer,
maybe even higher than that. Now, considering that in this hypothetical world
no notion of ethics is known yet, the buyer soon realizes that instead of paying
for the apple he wants to eat, he could simply grab it and eat it on the spot.
Competition between agents is often intended when working with agent-based
simulations, as we desire to see how agents perform under such circumstances.
However, to prevent the system as a whole from descending into chaos, rules must
be established in order to control agent interactions while still allowing them to
be autonomous. Nevertheless these rules must be limited to directing agents,
rather than restraining them, otherwise, much of the benefit from autonomous
agents is lost. When rules are set, agents that disregard them are subject to
punishment for potentially harming the environment. In our buyer/seller system,
we could establish a rule that guarantees items sold at shops must be paid for. If
one is caught stealing, it will need to pay for the seller’s injury. By doing so, we
allow the buyer to reason about the advantages and disadvantages of obeying
rules, letting it decide on an appropriate action plan. In multi-agent systems, we
refer to these rules as norms.
Usual mechanisms for controlling agent interactions include interaction mod-
els, used by simulators such as NetLogo [16], MASON [17] and Repast [18];
strategies, commonly used in Game Theory; and regimented normative systems,
such as Moise [19]. The disadvantage of these methodologies is that agents are
constrained to the rules of their environment. They are not allowed to break
rules because the system is rule compliant by design, also known as the regi-
mentation approach [20]. However, unlike environmental constraints, perfectly
enforcement (regimentation) for social norms is both undesired, because it pre-
vents agents from occasional violations for the greater good, and unrealistic, as
it is not achievable in the real world.
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3 Normative Scenario - Immigration Agents
To facilitate explanation and exemplification of our approach, as well as to high-
light its capabilities, we present the scenario that was used to test our solution.
This scenario helps understand what norms are and how they control interactions
in an environment. First, we present a short story that connects the environment
to its agents, then we outline the norms that constrain them.
In a fictional emerging nation1, an immigration program was started by the
government to accelerate development through the hiring of foreigners. Besides
landed immigrants, visitors are also welcome to the country, since money from
tourism greatly boosts local economy. At the border, immigration officers are
tasked with the inspection of immigrant’s passports. The foreigner acceptance
policy is quite straightforward, and immigrants with valid passports and no
criminal records are to be accepted immediately, while John Does and refugees
are to be outright rejected. It is believed that the more immigrants accepted, the
better. Each officer’s responsibility is to accept as many immigrants as possible,
while still following the guidelines that were passed to them. Each accepted
able worker nets the officer 5 credits, which eventually turn into a bonus to the
officer’s salary. There are no rewards for rejecting immigrants. It becomes clear
that the bonus each officer accumulates depends entirely on chance, and some
officers may accumulate more than others, if at all. As such, some officers might
feel inclined to accept immigrants they should not, only to add to their personal
gain.
To ensure officers act on the best interests of the nation only, an enforcement
system is introduced to the offices at the borders. Among the officers working
in the immigration office, one is responsible for observing and recording the
behaviour of those working in booths. This officer is known as the “monitor”.
His job is to write reports about what the officers do and send these reports to
another officer, known as the “enforcer”. The enforcer then reads the reports
that are passed to him and look for any inconsistencies, such as the approval
of an illegal immigrant. As this represents a violation of a rule, or norm, the
enforcer then carries out an action to sanction the offending officer. The penalties
for approving an illegal immigrant are the immediate loss of 10 credits and
suspension of work activities for up to 10 seconds. Considering that immigrants
arrive at a rate of 1 per 2 seconds, in a 10-second timespan 5 immigrants would
have arrived at a given booth, meaning that a violating officer potentially loses
25 credits. Added to the other portion of the sanction, the potential loss rises
up to 35 credits.
The enforcement system, however, is not cost free. Each monitor and enforcer
has an associated cost and it is within the interests of the nation to spend as
little as possible with such a system. Therefore, the government wants to know
how intensive the system must be to cover enough cases of disobedience so that
officers will know violating norms is a disadvantage rather than an advantage.
1 Inspired by the game “Papers, please”: http://papersplea.se
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There are two norms that can be extracted from this scenario. These defined
in Examples 1 and 2, which are detailed in Section 4.2, where we describe the
mathematical representation of norms in our system. These norms concern the
stability of the immigration program by assuring valid immigrants are accepted
and discouraging corrupt officers to accept those who should not be.
Example 1. “All immigrants holding valid passports must be accepted. Failure
to comply may result in the loss of 5 credits.”
Example 2. “All immigrants holding passports that are not valid must not be
accepted. Failure to comply may result in the loss of 10 credits and suspension
from work activities for up to 10 seconds.”
4 NormMAS Framework
In this section, we develop our normative monitoring and enforcement framework
for agent simulation. We start by reviewing the agent approaches that underpin
our framework in Section 4.1. We follow with the formalisation of the norms
processed in our system in Section 4.2, as well as the way actions are represented
in the environment in Section 4.3. With the formalisation in place, we proceed
to explaining the monitoring and enforcement systems in Sections 4.4 and 4.5,
respectively.
4.1 Jason and CArtAgO
In order to show the feasibility of the mechanism proposed in this paper, we use
two programming approaches: agent-oriented programming and environment-
oriented programming. The former is provided by the Jason interpreter [12],
while the latter is achieved with the Common Artifact infrastructure for Agents
Open environments (CArtAgO) [21].
Jason provides us with a means to program agents using the AgentSpeak
language [22] in a Java environment. Agents are built with the BDI [23] archi-
tecture, and so their behaviour is directed by beliefs, goals and plans. Beliefs are
logical predicates that represent an agent’s considerations towards its environ-
ment. Predicates such as valid(Passport) and wallet(50,dollars) indicate
that the agent believes the given passport variable is valid and that his wallet
currently contains 50 dollars. In AgentSpeak variables start with an upper-case
letter, while constants start with lower-case.
Goals are states which the agent desires to fulfil, and these can be either
achievement goals or test goals. Achievement goals are objectives or milestones
that agents pursue when carrying out their duties. To represent these in AgentS-
peak, the goal’s name is preceded by the ‘!’ character. Test goals, on the other
hand, are questions an agent may ask about the current state of the environment.
These can be identified by a ‘?’ preceding the goal’s name.
To achieve these goals, agents need to perform sequences of actions that
modify the environment towards the desired states. This sequence of actions
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is referred to as a plan. A plan is not necessarily composed solely of actions,
however, it can also contain sub-plans. This allows complex behaviours to be
built, creating flows of actions that vary and are influenced by agent beliefs and
perceptions.
As with any other programmed system, multi-agent systems must be tested
before being effectively deployed to their end environments. To do so, test envi-
ronments can be programmed for agents to be observed and any faulty behaviour
addressed before release. Jason allows the programming of test environments in
Java language, by providing an interface between agents and the programmed en-
vironment. These environments, however, are centralised, and so they are meant
for small systems or specific test scenarios. This hinders scalability, which is an
important aspect to consider when working with complex, more realistic sce-
narios or simply more robust structures. To address this limitation, we use the
CArtAgO framework for environment programming.
In CArtAgO, environments are seen as composed by different artefacts. These
artefacts represent objects in the environment through which agents interact
with one another indirectly. E.g. a table in an office, which an agent may put re-
ports on and from where another agent may pick these reports up to read them.
The environment then becomes an abstraction, composed of different artefacts,
which may be introduced to or removed from the environment whenever conve-
nient. In our work, this allows us to create artefacts specifically for monitoring
and enforcement tasks. These normative artefacts are then shared between nor-
mative agents so that more monitors and enforcers may be added to the system
as it scales up.
4.2 Norms
In order to keep competition between agents manageable, norms are established
to direct agent behaviour so that an environment’s stability is maintained. This
is achieved by specifying obligations and prohibitions [6]. Here, obligations are
behaviours that agents must follow in a given context to comply with the norm,
and prohibitions behaviours that jeopardise the environment’s stability, and so
must be avoided. Violating prohibitions is just as harmful as violating obliga-
tions, hence both cases must be addressed when detected. We expect that, when
agents are punished for transgression, they are able to learn not to misbehave.
Examples 1 and 2, in Section 3, correspond to an obligation and a prohibition,
respectively.
While norms in the real world are expressed in natural language, they must
be translated to a multi-agent environment so that agents are able to reason
about them. This requires the extraction of necessary information related to a
norm and composition of a mathematical representation. Agents should not have
to reason how or why a certain norm came to be, but rather what the norm is
about and what are the consequences of violating it. The format can also be
extended to include other important information, such as the sanction function
associated with a norm’s violation, or the conditions for automatic activation
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and expiration of the norm [6]. In this paper, norms as specified according to
the tuple of Definition 1.
Definition 1. A norm is represented by the tuple N = 〈µ, κ, χ, τ, ρ〉, where:
– µ ∈ {obligation, prohibition} represents the norm’s modality.
– κ ∈ {action, state} represents the type of trigger condition enclosed.
– χ represents the set of states (context) to which a norm applies.
– τ represents the norm’s trigger condition.
– ρ represents the sanction to be applied to violating agents.
Using Definition 1, we can proceed to formalising the norms from our exam-
ple. We can formalize the first norm of our scenario from Example 1, as shown
in Example 3.
Example 3. 〈obligation, action, valid(Passport), accept(Passport), loss(5)〉
The process can be repeated for Example 2. By identifying the context of a
norm, it is possible to define it solely with predicates and atoms, as shown in
Example 4, below.
Example 4. 〈prohibition, action, not valid(Passport), accept(Passport), loss(10)〉
4.3 Action Records
Similarly to norms, actions must also be stored as tuples containing essential
information. Actions captured by monitors must only be accessed by agents
of the enforcer type, and therefore only the pieces of information that can be
associated with norms are deemed essential. These are: what was done; who did
it; and under what context it was done. Example 5 shows how a monitor reports
its observations to an enforcer:
Example 5. “Officer John Doe approved Passport #3225. The passport was
known to be valid.”
From this report, we can extract the following details:
Example 6. 〈johndoe, approve(Passport), valid(Passport)〉
In this example, an officer approves the entry of an immigrant holding a valid
passport. The next report reads:
Example 7. “Officer John Smith approved Passport #2134. The passport was
not known to be valid.”
From this report, we can extract the following details:
Example 8. 〈johnsmith, approve(Passport), notvalid(Passport)〉
As such, we define Action Records:
Definition 2. An Action Record, stored within the Action History, is repre-
sented by the tuple: R = 〈γ, α, β〉, where:
– γ represents the agent executing the action;
– α represents the action being executed by the agent γ; and
– β represents the agent γ’s internal state at the moment of execution.
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4.4 Monitoring System
The monitoring system has two roles: capturing agents’s actions and forward-
ing reports, employing a producer/consumer mechanism. An action is captured
whenever any agent successfully executes an action. In CArtAgO, this means
that each operation executed successfully is saved to the Action History. This
function is agent independent and thus it is implemented directly in the simu-
lation engine’s architecture. In our framework, we use an adapted agent archi-
tecture for Jason agents acting in CArtAgO environments and extend it so all
successful actions are stored in a separate data structure referred to as the Ac-
tion History. Should an action fail for any reason, it is ignored by the capturing
system.
Art:Reporting
Interface
Ag:MonitorArt:Monitoring
Interface
Monitoring System
sendReport
action
readAction
+actionAvailable
poll
Fig. 1. Monitoring System Sequence Flow.
For these actions to be analysed, they must be sent to an enforcer agent
in the form of a report. To achieve that, we use producer/consumer dynamic,
in which an agent is tasked with continuously providing information through
a channel, while another agent consumes this information. With this in mind,
we can identify four components that are necessary for this set-up: a Producer,
a Consumer, a channel for communications and the information itself. In our
context, the role of Producer is given to the Monitor Agent; the role of Consumer
is given to the Enforcer Agent; the communications channel is an interface called
“Reporting Interface”; and the information that transits through this channel
are reports containing the actions executed by agents. This process is illustrated
in Figure 1.
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Monitoring tasks are not cost-free, and monitoring costs grow with its in-
tensity [24]. For this reason, it must be possible to adjust monitoring intensity
so that enforcement can be performed effectively at a cost considered affordable
by the society. Adjustments can be made either by configuring the monitor’s
enforcement intensity (inducing some desirable probability of reading actions)
or by creating monitoring strategies. In this paper, we use a purely probabilistic
strategy to study the general behaviour of our simulation.
The Action History is a queue-like data structure that stores captured
actions, from which monitors gather the information that is sent to the norm
enforcers. Actions are stored in the format discussed in Section 4.3 and are
removed from the queue as soon as a monitor attempts to read them, regardless
of the monitor’s success when doing so. This represents the chance a violation
will go unpunished.
4.5 Enforcement System
Art:Normative
Interface
Ag:EnforcerArt:Reporting
Interface
Enforcing System
sanction
violation
detectViolation
report
readReport
+newReport
Fig. 2. Enforcement System Sequence Flow.
The enforcement system represents the Consumer entity in the normative
mechanism’s Producer/Consumer scheme. An enforcer agent connects to the
Reporting Interface and awaits the arrival of new reports to analyse. The arrival
of new reports is perceived by the enforcer, and in our implementation this
perception is mapped to the +newReport signal. Once the report submission is
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perceived, the enforcer accesses the Normative Interface in search of currently
activated norms and checks for any possible violations by the reported action.
During the violation detection routine, the perception of violations is also
mapped to a signal, represented in the sequence diagram of Figure 2 as the
+violation event. When a violation is perceived, it falls to the enforcer to
apply associated sanctions. The sanctioning step is the last in this process, and
it starts as soon as detection finishes.
In order to sanction violating agents, the normative mechanism must be able
to recognise them. It does not make sense to be told “John has approved an
invalid passport. He violated a norm.” if we do not know who John is in the
first place. Therefore agents must be registered to the normative system prior
to execution of their designed plans, similar to how people are registered for
government issued IDs. In CArtAgO, this is accomplished through an operation
in the Normative Interface that adds the agent’s ID to a list, so that they may
be found when needed. The ID they are registered with should be the same that
appears in Action Records.
Normative Base When norms are created, they must be stored within the
system so that they may be accessed by an enforcer attempting to detect vi-
olations. The Normative Base structure holds all the norms that exist in the
system, active or not. Every time a norm is created, it is stored in a list struc-
ture with a unique identification. Norms may be activated or deactivated through
the Normative Interface. Every time a norm is created, activated, deactivated or
destroyed, agents connected to the Normative Interface perceives the event.
Detecting Violations The detection operation runs for each action report
received by an enforcer agent. Each action read is verified against the normative
base, along with the context under which the action was executed. Since it is
possible for an action to violate more than one norm, we utilize a list structure
to take note of all violations detected so they will be properly addressed at a
later time. At first, no norm is seen as violated and thus the list is empty. A
norm is only added to the list when all verification steps finish with the variable’s
isV iolated value set to True. The procedure for detecting violations can be seen
in Algorithm 1 and is explained further.
Detection of violations can be achieved in two steps: context analysis and
trigger condition analysis. Context analysis is about making sure that the ac-
tion’s execution context is the same as the one predicted by a norm. If it is, then
there is a possibility of violation and further analysis is required. Otherwise,
violation is considered an impossibility and the routine carries on. Formally, we
define the norm’s context as χ and the acting agent’s belief-base as β. Hence, the
context analysis returns True value if χ ⊆ β. Algorithm 2 is used for comparing
sets of predicates. It checks if all the predicates defined in context χ are present
in the agent’s belief-base β, one by one. If a predicate in χ is negated (e.g not
valid(Passport)), then the algorithm checks for its absence in belief-base β in-
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stead. This is to reflect how not operator works in Jason. If the trigger condition
is satisfied, the routine returns True value, and False otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Violation detection algorithm.
1: function DetectViolation(〈γ, α, β〉)
2: V ← [ ]
3: for each n = 〈µ, κ, χ, τ, ρ〉 ∈ ActiveNorms do
4: if ContextApplies(χ, β) then
5: if ConditionApplies(κ, τ, α, β) then
6: if µ = prohibition then
7: V ← V ∪ {n} . Violation detected! Adds to the list of violated norms.
8: else
9: if µ = obligation then
10: V ← V ∪ {n} . Violation detected! Adds to the list of violated norms.
11: for each n ∈ V do
12: SignalViolation(n, γ)
A trigger condition of a norm can be either an action that was executed or a
state the agent has reached. This is specified by the norm’s trigger condition type
and directs the way in which the detection algorithm executes. If we are working
with an action trigger, then we must compare the action that was executed with
the one specified by the norm. However, if we are working with a state trigger,
then two contexts must be compared: the agent’s belief-base and the norm’s state
trigger condition. These are compared using the context analysis algorithm of
Algorithm 2. The pseudo-code for the trigger analysis procedure can be seen in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 2 Context comparison sub-routine.
1: function ContextApplies(χ = [l1, ..., ln], β = [l1, ..., ln])
2: Require count(χ) ≤ count(β)
3: for each p ∈ χ do
4: isPresent← False
5: checkAbsence← False
6: if p is of the form ¬φ then
7: p← φ
8: checkAbsence← True
9: for each l ∈ β do
10: if l = p then
11: isPresent← True
12: break
13: if checkAbsence = isPresent then
14: return False
15: return True
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When both context and trigger conditions are satisfied, we need only verify
whether the norm is an obligation or prohibition to conclude if it was violated
or not. A prohibition means that a certain action or state is undesired under
the given context. If all the conditions up to now have been met, we conclude
that said undesired state has been reached and the norm was violated. On the
other hand, an obligation requires the flow specified by the norm to be followed
strictly, and if this is the case, we conclude that the norm was complied with.
By negating our conditions, we also negate its results: if in a prohibition context
the conditions were not met, then we would be home free; if they are not met
while in an obligation context, however, we would have just violated it.
Algorithm 3 Trigger condition analysis sub-routine.
1: function ConditionApplies(κ, τ, α, β)
2: if κ = action then
3: return τ = α
4: return ContextApplies(τ, β)
Their modality notwithstanding, every norm that is violated is added to a
list that is processed when all norms have been verified. Sanction functions are
then executed and agents perceive their punishments. Penalties can be brought
directly upon agents through perception or carried out by a third party, while
records on agent transgressions can be maintained in a separate structure for
greater consistency.
5 Evaluation
In order to test our solution, we programmed agents using Jason and deployed
them in a CArtAgO environment following the scenario described in Section 3.
To visualise the difference between compliant and non-compliant behaviours, two
types of agents were used: the normal type and the corrupt type. The normal
type is programmed to approve only those passports that are truly valid, whereas
the corrupt one will approve passports indiscriminately for his own personal gain.
By making it so, we can more easily tell the effectiveness of the norm enforcing
mechanism. Therefore, the following results were expected:
– Corrupt agents attain more credits when under lower monitoring intensity.
– Standard agents maintain an average quantity of credits through all simula-
tions.
– At some point, corrupt agents should start performing poorly due to higher
monitoring intensity. This marks the point at which monitoring can change
the environment.
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We ran 35 simulations for 11 different values of monitoring intensity. Intensity
values range from 0 to 100, with a step value of 10. Each simulation was run for
10 minutes. In this timespan, with our set-up, around 1048 immigrants attempt
to cross the border. In what follows, we refer to an agent’s obtained credits, or
their performance measure, as their utility. We use that measure in the graph
of Figure 3, which illustrates how the environment’s monitoring intensity affects
the utilities of corrupt agents 1 and 2. The monitoring intensity is the probability
as a percentage of a monitor to read an agent’s action. A value of 100 means
that all actions are read, while a value of 0 means no actions are read by the
monitor. We notice that, as the intensity of the monitoring mechanism increases,
the utility of corrupt agents decreases to the point where performing badly and
not performing at all yield the same utility, whereas normal agents maintain
their average utility. This allows us to conclude that, for a monitoring intensity
value of 40 or more, following norms is a better decision than the contrary.
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Fig. 3. Utility of corrupt agents is affected by monitoring intensity.
The data used to plot the graph of Figure 3 can be seen in Table 1. Values
for µ and σ represent the arithmetic mean and standard deviation, respectively.
These were calculated to show that utility values for normal agents are near
constant. The µ values for corrupt agents show that, at the end of the simu-
lation, their average performance is worse than those of normal agents, due to
their constant violation of norms. A high σ value for these agents shows that
their performance suffers between simulations. We can then see that through
the analysis of recorded agent actions and successful identification of violation
occurrences, violating agents are punished by the enforcement system and have
their utilities affected.
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Table 1. Agent Utilities × Monitoring Intensity.
Intensity officer1 officer2 corrupt officer1 corrupt officer2
0 65,3285 66,3714 130,6571 130,7000
10 64,5871 66,5714 103,3000 106,2285
20 65,4428 65,0142 86,8000 87,9571
30 65,3142 64,8714 73,7571 75,6571
40 65,7857 65,1857 59,0571 57,8142
50 65,6714 65,7714 54,3285 53,1857
60 65,1571 65,1714 38,7714 38,4571
70 65,0142 65,6571 27,6428 27,3714
80 64,7857 64,9571 19,2285 19,3428
90 65,0714 66,1714 13,7857 13,8142
100 66,7571 65,8000 1,4714 0,0285
µ 65.3559 65.5948 55,3454 55,5051
σ 0.5569 0.5705 38,4836 39,1996
6 Related Work
There are multiple tools available for programming multi-agent environments,
few of which provide mechanisms for norm specification. These tools range from
programming libraries to model-based simulators. To name a few, NetLogo [16]
and its distributed version HubNet [25] are of the model-based type and al-
low users to work with educational projects and, to some extent, professional
ones. Other tools include MASON [17] and Repast [18]. MASON is a simula-
tion library developed in Java that provides functions for modelling agents and
visualising simulations as they run. As for Repast, it uses interaction models
much like NetLogo does, although it is meant for professional use and thus offers
more alternatives for agent programming. One final example worth mentioning
is MASSim [11], which promotes multi-agent research and is used in the MAS
Programming Contest2 [26]. This one, however, provides only the tools related
to the contests. Although it is possible to develop custom agents for operation
within the simulator, the practice is not encouraged by its developers.
Building a full-fledged norm-based behaviour simulation engine is not a triv-
ial task, and the “Emergence in the Loop” (EMIL) [27] project built a set of
tools to accomplish this objective. A toolset which includes an extension of
the BDI architecture that is capable of simulating the processes referred to as
“immergence” and “emergence” of norms [28]; and an integration with multi-
agent modelling tools such as NetLogo [16] and Repast [18]. In this way, agents
are modelled in one of these environments and then simulated using the EMIL
agent architecture. It is a very powerful tool for studying social behaviour in
autonomous agents, since agents can reason about norms and, together, create
conventions of what kinds of behaviours must be avoided or followed. EMIL’s
approach to normative simulation is more focused on agents and their experience
2 https://multiagentcontest.org
COIN@AAMAS2015
29
14 Stephan Chang, Felipe Meneguzzi
with norms. This contrasts with our approach in that we are more focused on
norm monitoring and enforcement tasks, and little is said about these matters in
the EMIL literature. We also consider the environmental aspects of Normative
Multi-Agent Systems, which is why we employ CArtAgO in our implementation.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we constructed a mechanism of norm processing and enforcement
in a multi-agent environment. We show its feasibility with an implementation
using Jason [12] and Cartago [21] technologies. By keeping track of agent ac-
tivities and analysing actions against a normative base, it is possible to detect
violations and enforce norms through the sanctioning of violating agents. With
this framework, it is possible to evaluate different implementations [6,29,30,31]
of normative behaviour. Statistics collection can also be customised so that re-
sults may be compared between simulations.
CArtAgO allows us to build environments in a distributed manner, therefore
providing scalability for realistic simulation scenarios or complex multi-agent
systems. The philosophy behind CArtAgO, which sees the environment as the
composition of artefacts through which agents interact, also aided in the frame-
work’s construction. Artefacts are modular, they can be attached or detached
to a multi-agent system seamlessly. Meaning that artefacts can be created to
suit an agent’s or group of agents’s specific needs, and agents may connect only
to those artefacts that are related to their designs. We took advantage of those
features to build the interfaces for the monitoring system to access the Action
History and Normative Base structures.
As future work, we aim to build improvements and extensions to the frame-
work, such as: a mechanism to be added to the normative system that allows
activation and expiration of norms following predefined conditions; agent ar-
chitectures that can learn from normative environments, and with that avoid
penalties by violation or minimising performance loss when violations are in-
evitable [6]; enable agents to learn about the enforcing intensity and use that
information to their advantage [24]; and the introduction of agent hierarchies to
control normative power [32].
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Abstract. Organization is an important mechanism for improving per-
formance in complex multiagent systems. Yet, little consideration has
been given to the performance gain that organization can provide across a
broad range of conditions. Intuitively, when agents are mostly idle, orga-
nization offers little benefit. In such settings, almost any organization—
appropriate, inappropriate, or absent—leads to agents accomplishing the
needed work. Conversely, when every agent is severely overloaded, no
choice of agent activities achieves system objectives. Only as the overall
workload approaches the limit of agents’ capabilities is effective organi-
zation crucial to success.
We explored this organizational “sweet spot” intuition by examining the
effectiveness of two previously published implementations of organized
software agents when they are operated under a wide range of condi-
tions: 1) call-center agents extinguishing RoboCup Rescue fires and 2)
agents learning network task-distribution policies that optimize service
time. In both cases, organizational effect diminished significantly outside
the sweet spot. Detailed measures taken of coordination and cooperation
amounts, lost work opportunities, and exceeded span-of-control limits ac-
count for this behavior. Such measures can be used to assess the potential
benefit of organization in a specific setting and whether the organization
design must be a highly effective one.
1 Introduction
Organization is an important mechanism for improving performance in com-
plex multiagent systems [1–6]. Designed agent organizations provide agents with
organizational directives that, when followed, reduce the complexity and uncer-
tainty of each agent’s activity decisions, lower the cost of distributed resource
allocation and agent coordination, help limit inappropriate agent behavior, and
reduce unnecessary communication and agent activities [7–9].
When agents are mostly idle, agents can acomplish needed work whether
or not they are well organized. This does not mean that effective organization
does not affect how efficiently the agents work together, only that unorganized
and even misorganized agents have sufficient time and resources to accomplish
system objectives when lightly loaded. Conversely, when every agent is severely
overloaded, no choice of agent activities achieves system objectives. In this sit-
uation, effective organization can help agents be more efficient while failing to
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2achieve objectives fully, but whether they are well organized or not, the system
is unable to perform acceptably. Only as the overall workload approaches the
limit of agents’ capabilities does organization play a significant role in system
performance.
2 Organizational “Sweet Spot”
We first explored this organizational-impact conjecture empirically using an
previously implemented and described system of organizationally adept BDI1
agents [11–13] operating in a well-instrumented and highly parametrized exper-
imental platform adapted from the fire-extinguishing portion of RoboCup Res-
cue [14]. Organizationally adept call center agents direct fire brigade resources
under their control to extinguish fires in important buildings as quickly as pos-
sible. There are no fire-brigade bases in the adapted RoboCup Rescue environ-
ment, and brigades typically move directly from fire to fire, remaining deployed
if they become briefly idle. The objective is to minimize the total importance-
weighted damage to buildings. A call center can use its fire brigades to execute
plans to achieve its own goals of extinguishing building fires, and it can request
temporary use of fire brigades from other call centers when necessary.
Our goal was to learn how the relative performance of previously evaluated
agent organizations in this multiagent system changed when operating in en-
vironments well outside the conditions typically studied. Whether the existing
agents and organization designs in this system were the best possible was not
a concern, as better candidates would affect only the magnitude of the relative
performances and not their qualitative characteristics. Some observations were
intuitive, but there were also surprises, and we believe this to be the first sys-
tematic study of organizational impact in a multiagent system over such a broad
range of conditions. We ran and analyzed thousands of controlled and repeatable
simulation experiments involving dynamic environments in which new fires oc-
cur at various city locations throughout the entire duration of an experimental
scenario. In such settings, call-center agents have an ongoing (but potentially
changing) firefighting workload in which following organizational guidance offers
potential advantages over unguided, reactive local decision-making.
Observation 1: Sweet-spot behavior ⇒ Figure 1 shows, as the firefighting
workload increases, the performance benefit provided by call center agents that
have been given an effective organization design that specifies a responsibility
region for each call center (Org) relative to call-center agents operating without
any responsibility-region directives (No Org). Call centers give priority to fighting
fires in their responsibility regions when such regions are provided. Each of the
four call centers controlled six fire-brigade resources. Performance attained in
each of the 320 simulation runs is a raw score of the inverse importance-weighted
fire damage in the city. We observed that the performance benefit achieved
by organization (the raw score improvement) was greatest when the average
1 Belief-desire-intention model of agency [10]
COIN@AAMAS2015
34
3firefighting workload on brigades was near their capacity to fight important fires
(approximately 2.2 fires per timestep). All figures illustrate trends as workload
(e.g., ignition frequency) is varied. Trend lines are fit using a local linear model,
with shaded regions representing a 95% confidence level in the fit. For example,
each trend line in the firefighting experiments fits 320 separate simulation runs
(drawn as individual dots).
Fig. 1. Relative Score Achieved by Orga-
nization
Attenuation of organization benefit
outside the sweet spot is a form of phase
transition behavior. The transition oc-
curs as the workload approaches the
limit of agents’ capabilities. The effect
of phase boundaries has proved impor-
tant in satisfiability problems [15–17] as
well as to understanding problem dif-
ficulty in constraint satisfaction, num-
ber partitioning, and traveling salesmen
tasks.2 With multiagent organizations,
it is important to determine where on
the control complexity scale a system is
operating (how important using an ef-
fective organization is to system perfor-
mance) and more generally, when com-
plex multiagent systems are operating
within their organizational sweet spot. One may argue that organizations (mul-
tiagent or otherwise) will tend to be inevitably operated within the sweet spot
region due to real-world economics that limit capabilities and resources to the
minimum required to operate effectively.
Upon observing organizational sweet-spot behavior, we took a more detailed
look into what was occurring as workload changed that accounted for the benefit
attenuation.
3 Performance Factors
Why do we create agent organizations? One reason is that complex agent be-
havior becomes more structured and understandable through the definition of
roles, behavioral expectations, and authority relationships [18]. Additionally, or-
ganizational concepts can be used to help design and build agent based systems
2 For example, a typical phase-transition performance plot, such as Figure 4 in the
classic Kirkpatrick and Selman SAT phase-change paper [16] shows the performance
cliff that occurs at the phase boundary, which shifts laterally under different condi-
tions. If such a figure is redrawn as relative difference curves from a baseline condition
(such as the k=6/N=40 values in that figure), it reveals wide ”sweet spot” curves
similar to the curves shown in this paper. Relative plots highlight the span and mag-
nitude of performance differences near the phase change, and we consider them more
informative in highlighting sweet-spot regions than raw performance-value plots.
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4(organization-based multiagent system engineering). There is also a line of re-
search that addresses organizational membership in open agent societies (incen-
tives for organizational recruitment and retention and for the replacement of
agents that leave the organization). Recent work in open and sociotechnical set-
tings [19, 20] has this emphasis. Aligning agents’ individual goals and objectives
with those of the organization are among the issues addressed in that context.
Our focus here is on organizational control; specifically, the organizational per-
formance of the members (“how they do their jobs”), rather than on attracting
participants from an open pool of agents (“obtaining members for the enter-
prise”) or designing the agent system (“defining what the jobs (roles) are”). We
assume here that we have acquired the agents we need, that they all share the
organizational objectives (e.g., saving the most important buildings in the city),
and that they are competent in their ability to perform tasks necessary to attain
that objective. For example, there is no need to decide if an agent is able to play
some role in the organization [21]. Furthermore, there are no non-cooperative
agents trying to burn things down. Nevertheless, the cooperative agents some-
times do work at cross-purposes in attaining those objectives (such as all wanting
to fight an important fire). This can occur whether the agents are organized or
not, because agents have a limited local view of the situation. If unorganized
agents did not have the same shared objective as when organized, then some
performance gained through organization could stem from the changed objec-
tives. Our assumptions eliminate such a cooperative-objective bonus.
We distinguish between operational decision making, the detailed moment-
to-moment behavior decisions made by agents, and organizational control , an
organization design expressed to agents through directives (“job descriptions”)
that limit and inform the range of operational decisions made by each agent in
the organization. These directives contain general, long-term guidelines, in the
form of parametrized role assignments and priorities (e.g., prefer extinguishing
fires in region A over fires in region B), that are subject to ongoing elabora-
tion into precise, moment-to-moment activity decisions by the agents [22, 2, 4].
Ideally, following organizational directives should be beneficial when agent di-
rectives can be designed that perform well over a range of potential long-term
environment and agent characteristics.
3.1 Operational challenges
Without organizational directives, a call center must coordinate with other cen-
ters to avoid sending redundant fire brigades to the same fire (every call center
receives all fire reports) using a highest estimated utility protocol to resolve
conflicts. Coordination and retractions consume valuable time, delaying extin-
guishing operations. The designed organization only requires coordination if a
call center wants to fight a fire outside its responsibility region. When region re-
sponsibilities are inappropriate and do not match workloads, fire-brigade borrow-
ing requests from overloaded centers increase, again with a loss in performance.
When the design is appropriate, retractions are diminished at the risk of more
borrowing (as we will demonstrate when we discuss Figure 6) . Call centers must
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nity costs that are based on potential new fires and uncertainty in the duration
of fighting current fires. These are challenging decisions even when agents are
well organized.
The call-center agents are highly competent and can make skillful operational
decisions to extinguish fires without organizational guidance. Norms, functions,
protocols, etc., are implicitly represented in the plan templates used by these
call-center agents. Centers follow these norms (organized or not) and know how
to work together to fight fires and share fire-brigade resources.
Appropriately organized call-center agents, when operating in the sweet spot,
should function better than unorganized centers, which must consider of all po-
tential activities and explicitly coordinate them. The organizational complexity
in the firefighting system is quite simple. Each call center can perform only
two roles: 1) extinguishing fires by directing fire brigades to fight them and
2) loaning fire brigades to another call center. Perhaps counter intuitively, orga-
nizational design and control of split roles in homogeneous multiagent systems
is more challenging than assigning discrete functional roles to specialized agents
in heterogeneous multiagent systems because specialization reduces the space of
reasonable choices [8]. The organizational “simplicity” in the firefighting setting
means that observed organizational performance differences stem from a rela-
tively small set of organizationally-biased behaviors and are not obscured by
complex role and agent interactions.
3.2 Factors affecting organizational performance
We analyzed a number of general factors that influence organizational perfor-
mance. As these factors change, a designed organization may become highly
effective or less effective. In the discussion that follows, we provide an intuitive
description of each factor, why it is important, and how it can affect organi-
zational performance. We adjusted each factor individually while holding other
environmental settings constant in order to observe its effect on organizational
performance independent of the other factors. In total, we conducted a broad
analysis that included over 5000 simulation runs with over ten terabytes of simu-
lator output to determine how the general factors of coordination requirements,
cooperation benefits, lost opportunity, workload imbalance, and span of control
impact the effectiveness of organization. We begin with coordination.
Coordination Requirements Typically, complex tasks performed by multiple
agents require coordination, and often a well-coordinated system will perform
much better than a system where agents work at cross purposes from only their
local, selfish perspectives. In firefighting, coordination is necessary to ensure that
call-center agents share responsibility for extinguishing a building only when
necessary, and otherwise fight important fires independently (i.e., they do not
blindly work on the same fire when more utility could be gained by working on
separate fires).
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beliefs, desires, and intentions are communicated. The time required for agents
to communicate this information and reconcile it with information from other
agents can be significant, especially in cases where agents control resources which
must be held in reserve while an agent decides whether it wishes to pursue some
goal. Even more significantly, when agents take uncoordinated actions that in-
volve operating in the world, they must deal with the consequences of physically
moving resources and then withdrawing them (or having wasted them if they
are consumables) once they discover their actions are in conflict with those of
another agent. In our analyses, this has been the largest contributor to coordi-
nation “cost.”
The amount of coordination required is not organization-independent. Orga-
nizational directives influence agents to assume specific roles and responsibilities
pertaining to certain goals, and assume less responsibility for other goals. The
best-case organization for a specific situation would be a perfect partitioning of
responsibility regions so that agents select the fires for which they are responsi-
ble over those that are the responsibility of others. This ideal situation results in
minimal goal conflicts, where two agents needlessly pursue the same goal (e.g.,
extinguish the building at 5th and Madison). It is important to note that even
this organization is not coordination-free, but when each goal is managed and
committed to by the agent with the highest expected utility, the committing
agent is best suited for reaching out for assistance if necessary. In the context
of firefighting, this assistance comes in the form of lending and borrowing fire
brigades, an effective remedy for temporal workload imbalances. However, as we
will note shortly, excessive resource borrowing leads to inefficiencies in resource
provisioning and is often a sign of a more permanent resource imbalance. The
worst-case organization (in terms of coordination complexity) would influence
every agent to select the same goals (No Org configuration). We analyzed many
organization configurations to explore the full spectrum between these two ex-
tremes, where organization sometimes cannot prevent agents from selecting the
same goals, and at other times, is effective in preventing a goal conflict (which
we will also discuss later in conjunction with Figure 6).
This coordination phenomena occurs in firefighting because call centers need
to negotiate with other call centers about which fires to fight. In order to come
to a resolution for a contested goal, call centers need to compute and share their
expected utility with peers. The call center with the highest expected utility will
then be responsible for managing fighting the fire, and for borrowing fire-brigade
resources from peers if necessary. To investigate the effect of adjusting this coor-
dination cost, we adjusted the resolution period, during which call centers reserve
resources to fight a fire while waiting for and considering bids from other call
centers intent on fighting the same fire. Only after the resolution period has
elapsed will the call center with the highest utility commit to fighting the fire.
By increasing the resolution period, we increase the cost of coordination while
simultaneously making centers more “globally aware” of the utility expected by
other agents. By lowering the resolution period, we lower the cost of coordination
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from other centers. Figures 2 and 3, to be discussed shortly, show the effects of
“Low-Cost” (short) resolution and “High-Cost” (long) resolution times.
Fig. 2. Varying Coordination Require-
ments: Score Relative to No Org
Fig. 3. Varying Coordination Require-
ments: Cost Effects Relative to No Org
Observation 2: The performance separation of effective organization
increases with coordination requirements, without shifting the sweet
spot laterally ⇒ We analyzed several organizational designs: 1) a specific re-
sponsibility region for each call center (Org) and 2) all centers are responsibible
for the entire city (No Org). It seems reasonable to believe that when fires are
uniformly distributed, Org would perform best, minimizing goal conflicts while
still providing each agent with sufficient beneficial opportunities in its respon-
sibility region. In practice, this is generally true, however, we have found that
in cases where, when the conflict resolution period is very short (correspond-
ing to low coordination cost and more selfish agents), the directives supplied to
the organized agents do not improve on the No Org baseline. As coordination
cost grows, the performance of the organized agents (which need to coordinate
less frequently) improves increasingly on the No Org configuration (see Figures 2
and 3). Figure 3 shows the total retraction time relative to No-Org, which has the
most retractions. In both Figures 2 and 3, the 0- and 10-time-steps resolution
period results are relative to comparable 0- and 10-time-steps resolution No Org
baselines.
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performance between the Org and the No Org configuration is only statistically
significant within a small window, centered at about 2–2.5 fires per timestep.
Correspondingly, the scenario with high coordination cost (10-timestep resolu-
tion) achieves a prominent global maximum centered at this time window. From
this analysis, it can be seen that when coordination does not incur significant
costs, organization is not nearly as beneficial as in cases where coordination (or
the absence of needed coordination) is costly. At moderate workload levels, the
performance gains afforded by organization reach the maximum. When the sim-
plicity of the scenario does not require coordination, the performance of the Org
configuration and the No Org configuration are statistically indistinguishable.
Extremely overloaded work scenarios are marked by either statistically indistin-
guishable performance differences or diminished returns.
Fig. 4. Relative Score with Twice as
many Fire Brigades
Observation 3: Increasing call-
center capabilities by adding re-
sources results in a lateral shift
and widening of the sweet spot ⇒
The width and position of the sweet-
spot window is not fixed, as it depends
on the agent’s capabilities in servic-
ing goals at either end of the workload
range. Call centers become more capa-
ble when they have more fire-brigade
resources. Figure 4 shows the result of
doubling the number of fire brigades
controlled by each call center from
six to twelve. Now, the organizational
sweet spot occurs at a higher work-
load level: at approximately 2.7 fires per
timestep. In addition, the sweet spot is
wider as call centers can handle greater
task loads before the situation becomes hopeless.
By holding the conflict resolution period constant and varying the number of
call centers in the system, we see that coordination complexity is also a function
of how “well partitioned” the centers’ responsibilities are. In experiments with
four call centers, we can see that fewer goal conflicts arise in the Org case than the
No Org case. However, if we increase the number of call-center agents to twelve,
each with two rather than six fire brigades and responsibility regions that overlap
with two other centers, the environmental responsibilities are too precisely par-
titioned to handle temporal responsibility differences even if, on average over the
course of the run, each center’s responsibilities are roughly uniform. In Figures 5
and 6, this behavior is reflected in the fact that the number of goal conflicts
in the organized, 12-call-center configuration approach the number of conflicts
without organization. Correspondingly, the differences in performance between
the two configurations are significant. Any advantages to organization under the
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the 12-call-center scenario. This observation is consistent with the notion that
there is an “ideal” number of call centers given the centers’ capabilities and the
environmental conditions. We do not know for certain that a 4-center organiza-
tion is the best choice for the environmental conditions that we simulated, but
it is certainly better than a 12-center organization, as the 4-center organization
provides a better balance between the partitioning of responsibility regions and
coordination complexity [23].
Fig. 5. Varying the Number of Call Cen-
ters: Relative Score
Fig. 6. Varying the Number of Call Cen-
ters: Relative Goal-Conflict Rate
Workload Imbalance Organizational directives influence agents to assume
responsibility over particular goals and tasks. This reduces the amount of co-
ordination involved in meeting these demands, as there is some expectation of
which agent will perform or manage a task. In order for this organizational in-
fluence to improve performance, the per-agent workload that is suggested by the
organizational directives must be consistent with the distribution of tasks in the
environment. Otherwise, some agents have too little work and others have too
much. As such, highly beneficial tasks may go without consideration by under-
loaded agents while overloaded agents struggle to complete all of the tasks they
are responsible for. Workload imbalance occurs in firefighting when the distri-
bution of fires throughout the city is not consistent with the size of each of the
centers’ responsibility region. For instance, if 60% of fires occur in the northwest
corner of the city, a partitioning of the city into four equally-sized quadrants
would result in a significant average workload imbalance, with the call center in
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Fig. 7. Varying Workload Balance: Mean
Goal Benefit
Fig. 8. Varying Workload Balance: Rela-
tive Score
the northwest corner of the city having almost six times the workload of other
centers. In this setting, an appropriate organization would assign a much smaller
responsibility region to the call center responsible for the northwest corner of
the city, and expand the responsibilities of other call centers to make up the
difference in coverage.
Observation 4: The performance separation of effective organization
increases with increased workload imbalance ⇒ When workloads are im-
balanced in this way, call-center agents are not necessarily idle, but instead they
work on less beneficial goals. Thus, the penalty occurred by providing these call
centers with an inappropriate organization comes in the form of “lost oppor-
tunity,” where the agent could have performed much more beneficial tasks if
it had not been discouraged from doing so by organizational directives. Corre-
spondingly, Figure 7 shows that, as the organizational influences becomes less
appropriate, the mean benefit of selected goals becomes lower. A surprising ob-
servation shown in Figure 7 is that the No Org case has the highest mean goal
benefit of all of the configurations (but not the highest relative score). This is
due to No Org agents’ preference to selflishly commit to attractive goals which
other agents may already be working on, introducing additional goal conflicts
and coordination cost.
Observation 5: Extreme workload imbalance, high or low, causes orga-
nizationally guided performance to converge to non-organized perfor-
mance ⇒ On the other end of the spectrum, both Appropriate and Inappropriate
Org’s less beneficial goals result in a direct lowering of overall score. Figure 8
indicates that this behavior essentially lowers the Appropriate Org curve onto the
No Org curve, while still maintaining a window in the workload spectrum where
organization is especially advantageous.
Span of Control An important factor in determining if and how agents should
be organized is span of control. Simply adding resources (or performers) to a task
does not result in constant gain per added resource, and can even result in a net
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loss of utility. This phenomena is found in many real-world settings [23] where or-
ganizations attempt to scale the number of performers without correspondingly
scaling management capacity (e.g., hundreds of construction workers cannot be
managed by a single foreman). In the firefighting simulator, per-resource effec-
tiveness is diminished above a parameterized call center span-of-control limit.
Observation 6: Increasing the number of call-center agents beyond
what is necessary given their span-of-control capabilities adds coor-
dination requirements (to keep them out of each other’s way), de-
creasing the organizational benefit separation compared to a suitable
number of centers ⇒ Span-of-control limits are both important and ubiqui-
tous, since centralization is not generally tractable or realistic. When exceeded
in RoboCup Rescue firefighting, performance per brigade is attenuated, counter-
acting coordination reductions from centralization. Otherwise, one center could
handle all brigades.
We explored span of control using a configuration where a single call center
agent is responsible for managing all 24 fire-brigade resources in the system, but
with a span-of-control limit imposed after 6 utilized brigades. Then, we increased
the span-of-control capability of the center to 24 (no span-of-control-limit atten-
uation) to understand how the single call-center agent would perform with no
span-of-control limit. We compared these two cases with the baseline configura-
tion where the fire brigades are distributed evenly across four call centers, each
controlling 6 of them. Because no call center coordination is needed when there is
a single center, in cases where fewer than 6 brigades are needed to execute all of
the tasks in the environment, both of the single-agent configurations outperform
the multiagent configuration (Figure 9).
At a workload level of one fire per timestep, the limited resource effectiveness
incurred by the span-of-control penalty becomes more significant than the coor-
dination cost in the multiagent case. Further, since the single-agent case incurs
no coordination complexity, there is a noticeable peak in the single-agent configu-
ration without a span-of-control penalty, corresponding to the coordination-cost
peak discussed previously.
Fig. 9. Span of Control Analysis
Observation 7: Coordination re-
quirements that exceed an agent’s
span-of-control capabilities leads
to an inverted performance
curve ⇒ Figure 9 shows that the
sweet spot obtained when running
under the best case scenario of a
single call center with no coordination
requirements becomes a “sour spot”
when span of control is considered.
Intuitively, the sweet spot drops below
the No Org baseline in the region of
the workload spectrum where it is
important that fire-brigade resources
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are managed effectively. With span-of-control limits imposed, fire-brigade
effectiveness is diminished.
4 MARL Organizations
We next looked for sweet-spot behavior using another previously described and
implemented system involving agent organizations. This second system operates
in a very different setting: organizing agents that are learning task-assignment
policies that optimize service time for tasks arriving in a network [24, 25]. Tasks
arrive according to a Poisson distribution, and have variable difficulty (measured
as time units) governed by an exponential distribution. Every task is spawned
at some vertex v, augmenting agent v’s routing queue with the new task. Agent
v can then decide whether to work on a task locally, adding that task to v’s
work queue, or to forward the task to one of v’s neighbors. At every timestep,
task at the head of v’s work queue is decremented, indicating that it is one
timestep closer to being completed. Once the number of remaining timesteps
has reached 0, the task is removed from the queue and agent v may proceed
to complete the next task in the work queue. Agents receive the inverse of task
service time as a reward when a task is completed. To operate effectively in
this setting, agents must construct estimates of task service time given locally
observable state information such as the size of neighbor’s work queues and
historical completion times when forwarding tasks.
Fig. 10. Relative Performance of MARL
Organizations
In this domain, each agent is ei-
ther a subordinate or a supervisor. Su-
pervisors are responsible for transfer-
ring experiences between subordinates
that are experiencing similar environ-
mental conditions. Appropriate organi-
zations in this task allocation domain
are those that arrange supervisors in a
way that exploits similarities between
agents. If a group of subordinates fre-
quently experience the same environ-
mental conditions, a great deal of trans-
fer learning can take place. If subor-
dinate groups experience vastly differ-
ent environmental conditions, transfer
learning can occur less frequently, thus
not taking advantage of the benefits
that organization provides. As in fire-
fighting, an organizational arrangement
of supervisors that is appropriate given
a particular task distribution may be
inappropriate under a different task distribution, so the organization is only ef-
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fective if the actual distribution is consistent with the expectations assumed in
the designed supervisor arrangement.
We used a completely different agent implementation and environment sim-
ulator in exploring sweet-spot behavior in multiagent reinforcement learning
(MARL) organizations. For our experiments, we used a 100-agent lattice net-
work and considered two agent organizations. The first organization arranges 4
supervisors such that agents are assigned to supervisors based on their distance
from the border of the lattice. The second organization arranges 4 supervisors
according to quadrants of the lattice. Tasks are then distributed on the lattice
originating from the boundary. Under this model, the former organization is con-
sidered “Appropriate” since it partitions agents in a manner that maximizes the
similarity of agents in supervisory groups. The latter organization is considered
“Inappropriate” since it arranges agents in a way that prohibits effective expe-
rience sharing. Given this setup, we experimentally varied the difficulty of the
learning problem by increasing the mean of the Poisson distribution governing
task distribution on the range [0, 1], where 1 represents a very heavy task load
(averaging one task per time unit). One hundred values of λ were sampled uni-
formly along this range for each supervisory configuration, resulting in a total
of 200 runs. Evaluation was performed in terms of area under a learning curve
(AUC), modeled as an exponential moving average of system-wide task service
time. When the system converges more quickly to an optimal policy, the area
under this curve will be smaller. To characterize relative performance differences
across a wide array of problem difficulties, AUC was normalized relative to the
Inappropriate Org configuration.
Observation 8: The MARL system also has a sweet spot ⇒ Figure 10
shows more performance variability than occurred with firefighting, but a statis-
tically significant sweet spot arises around a per-agent task rate of 0.25 tasks per
timestep. At this workload, the Appropriate Org’s performance dominates the Inap-
propriate Org’s. Elsewhere, the two are statistically indistinguishable. The results
in the MARL domain are particularly clear. When tasks arrive so frequently that
agents cannot compute meaningful policies and the learning process diverges, a
supervisor structure that is highly effective in the sweet spot does not help in
transferring reasonable policies. On the opposite end of the workload spectrum,
when tasks arrive so infrequently that agents do not need to act intelligently in
order to service the requests in a timely manner, policy transfer is not important.
It is clear from this analysis that even with a completely different set of system
dynamics and agent behaviors, an organizational sweet spot exists.
5 Closing Thoughts
Although we have measured and analyzed agent-organization performance under
widely varying conditions using only two previously implemented and studied
systems (each operating in a different problem domain), we believe that the
qualitative behaviors we observed are general and apply to multiagent organi-
zations in any domain. We hope our observations encourage those working with
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more complex heterogeneous agent organizations to investigate and report their
performance over a wider range of conditions. Recognizing when a multiagent
system will be operating in its organizational sweet spot is helpful in deciding
how much effort should be spent in designing and using an agent organization as
well as for explaining situations where using an agent organization results in lit-
tle observed benefit (because the system is operating outside the sweet spot). We
have observed that coordination and cooperation amounts, lost work opportu-
nities, and span-of-control capabilities all contribute to sweet-spot performance
benefits.
Understanding a multiagent system’s organizational sweet spot is important,
not just for understanding organizational control opportunity and effectiveness,
but when considering if organizational adaptation might be worthwhile [26–28,
12]. Sweet-spot understanding is also important in open, sociotechnical settings
when designing an organization (and sizing that design appropriately) for agent
recruitment. Identifying where a multiagent system is operating in relation to
its organizational sweet spot is important to any discussion or analysis of orga-
nizational suitability, performance, or effectiveness.
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Abstract. Large and open societies of agents require regulation, and therefore
many tools have been developed that enable the definition and enforcement of
rules on multiagent systems. Unfortunately, most of them are designed to be used
by computer scientists and are not suitable for normal users with average com-
puter skills. Since more and more tools nowadays are running as cloud services
accessible to anyone (e.g. Massive Open Online Courses and social networks), we
feel there is a need for a simple tool that allows ordinary people to create rules and
protocols for these kinds of environments. In this paper we present ongoing work
on the development of a new programming language for the definition of proto-
cols for multiagent systems, which is so simple that anyone should be able to use
it. Although its syntax is strict, it looks very similar to natural language so that
protocols written in this language can be understood directly by anyone, with-
out having to learn the language beforehand. Moreover, we have implemented an
easy to use editor that helps users writing sentences that obey the syntax rules,
and we have implemented an interpreter that can parse such protocols and verify
whether they are violated or not.
1 Introduction
In open multiagent systems (MAS) where any agent can enter and leave at will and the
origin of the agents is unknown one needs a mechanism to regulate the behavior of those
agents. Just like in human societies, rules need to be imposed in order to prevent the
agents from misbehaving and abusing system resources. A good example is that of an
auction taking place under a specific protocol. An English auction protocol for example,
requires the buyers to make increasing bids, and stops when the auctioneer says so, after
which the buyer with the highest bid wins the auction. In a Dutch auction on the other
hand, bids are decreasing, and the first buyer to accept a bid wins the auction.
Many systems for the implementation of such regulatory systems have been devel-
oped, such as ANTE [6], MANET [27], S-MOISE+ [16], and EIDE [11]. They allow
users to define a set of rules and then impose those rules on the agents in a MAS (the
term ‘agents’ may here refer to software agents as well as to human beings). This en-
forcement of rules may happen either by punishing misbehaving agents, or by simply
making it impossible to violate them, which is called regimentation.
One common characteristic of these systems is that they are mainly designed with
computer scientists as their target users. They require knowledge of multiagent systems,
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programming languages and / or formal logic. For people with no more than average
computer skills they are unfortunately too complicated.
We expect however that agent technologies will become more and more common
in the near future, creating a demand for simple tools to maintain and organize such
systems and that can be used by ordinary people. We can compare this for example
with the evolution of web development. In the early days of the Internet, developing a
web page was considered an advanced task that would only be undertaken by computer
experts, and hence web development languages such as HTML, PHP and SQL were
developed to be used by professional programmers. However, as web pages became
more and more abundant and every shop, social club, or sports team wanted to have its
own web page, many tools such as DreamWeaver and WordPress were introduced to
make the creation of web pages a much simpler task. We strive for a similarly easy tool
for the development of multiagent systems.
A good example of where such a tool would be useful is the organization of online
classes, because teachers often want to put restrictions on their students. Teachers may
for example require that students only take a certain exam after they have passed all
previous exams. In this way teachers make sure they do not waste their time correct-
ing exams of students that do not study seriously anyway. Another example could be
the process of organizing a conference, where one requires authors to submit before a
deadline, or one requires the program chair to appoint at least 3 reviewers to each paper.
Also, one can think of a tool that allows users to set up their own social networks, with
their own specific rules, as suggested in [17].
Therefore, in this paper we present ongoing work on the development of a new
language to define protocols for multiagent systems. This language is so close to natural
language that it can be understood directly by anyone without prior knowledge of any
other programming language. We call this language SIMPLE, which stands for SIMple
Protocol LanguagE. Although it looks very similar to natural language, it has in fact a
strict syntax. Together with this language we also present two tools: an editor that makes
it very easy for users to write well-formed sentences, and an interpreter that parses the
source file and makes sure that the rules defined in it are indeed enforced. The fact that
the language comes with an editor is very important, because it enables the users to
write correct protocols without having to know the rules of the language by heart. In
fact, it even makes it impossible to write syntactically incorrect sentences.
We would like to stress that this language is not meant to program the agents them-
selves. It is only meant to program the organizational structure between the agents. That
is: it puts restrictions on the agents in their actions, but does not dictate entirely what
they ought to do; the agents still have the freedom to make autonomous decisions, as
long as these decisions comply with the protocol. The protocol written in this language
does not specify what the agents must do, but only specifies what the agents can do.
We have developed SIMPLE according to the following guidelines:
– The language should stay as close as possible to natural language.
– The syntax should remain strict: sentences must be well formed, and every well
formed sentence can only have one correct interpretation.
– Given a protocol written in this language anyone should immediately be able to
understand what it means, even if he or she has never seen our language before.
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– Users should be able to write a protocol in this language without having to spend
any time learning the language.
The only thing we require from the user is that he or she be familiar with the English
language. The language as presented here is only the very first version, and we plan to
extend it much further in the future.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we give a short overview
of previous work done in this field. Next, in Section 3 we explain the assumptions
that we have made about the set-up of any MAS to which our language is applied. In
Section 4 we describe the syntax rules of our language. Next, in Section 5 we explain
how our interpreter parses text files written in our language and enforces its rules upon
the agents. Then, in Section 6 we give two examples of protocols written in SIMPLE,
and for which we have tested that they are successfully parsed and enforced by our
interpreter. And finally, in Section 7 we describe the further extensions that we are
planning to add to our language.
2 Related Work
Regulatory systems have been subject of research for a long time and a number of
frameworks have been implemented that often consist of tools for implementing, test-
ing, running and visualizing protocols. Examples of such frameworks are ANTE [6],
MANET [27], S-MOISE+ [16], and EIDE [11]. A comparative study of some of those
systems has been made in [12].
ANTE [6] has been implemented as a JADE-based platform, including a set of
agents that provide contracting services. It integrates automatic negotiation, trust &
reputation and Normative Environments. Users and agents can specify their needs and
indicate the contract types to be created. Norms governing specific contract types are
predefined in the normative environment. Although ANTE has been targeting the do-
main of electronic contracting, it was conceived as a more general framework having in
mind a wider range of applications.
The MANET [27] meta-model is based on the assumption that the agent environ-
ment is composed of two fundamental building blocks: the physical environment, con-
cerned with agent interaction with physical resources and with the MAS infrastructure,
and the social environment, concerned with the social interactions of the agents. In the
MANET meta-model it is assumed that the normative system can be composed of three
structural components: agents, objects and spaces.
In the EIDE framework agents interact with each other in a so called Electronic
Institution. The agents are grouped in to conversations, which are called Scenes. The
institution has a specification that defines how agents can move from one scene to
another and defines a protocol for each scene. Within a scene the agents interact by
sending messages to one another. Each agent in the system has a special agent assigned
to it, called its Governor, which checks whether the messages sent by the agent satisfy
the protocol, and blocks them when they do not. The EIDE framework comes with a
graphical tool called Islander [10] that allows people to create institution specifications
in a visual manner. Protocols in Islander are represented as finite state machines, drawn
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as a graph in which the states are the vertices and the state-transitions are the edges.
Every message sent triggers a state transition.
In order to define rules and norms for multiagent systems, a vast amount of lan-
guages and logics have been proposed. It would be impossible to list all the relevant
work in this field here, so we just mention some of the most important examples. A
logical system to define norms and rules is called a deontic logic. The best known
system of deontic logic is called Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) [30]. Important refine-
ments of this logic are Dyadic Deontic Logic (DDL) [20] and Defeasible Deontic Logic
[25]. Furthermore, an extension of this taking temporal considerations into account was
proposed in [14]. In [22] A system to formalize norms using input/output logic was pro-
posed, while in [15] the authors provide a model for the formalization of social law by
means of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). In [19] the author proposes the use
of Linear Time Logic (LTL) to express norms. Other important approaches are based
on Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [23], on See-to-it-that logic (STIT) [4] and on
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [5]. Models for the verification of expectations in nor-
mative systems are proposed in [8] and [1], and in [26] the authors introduce the nC+
language for representing normative systems as state transition systems.
The above mentioned systems however mainly focus on the theoretical properties
of regulatory systems. Work that is more focused on the actual implementation of such
systems is for example [21] which proposes a model to define rules in the Z language,
while in [3] the authors propose the use of Event Calculus for the specification of pro-
tocols. A programming language designed to program organizations, called 2OPL, was
introduced in [9]. Other important examples of languages and frameworks for the im-
plementation of norms and rules are described in: [29], [2], [28], [13], [18], and [7].
Although some of the above mentioned languages are more user friendly than oth-
ers, it still seems that they all require the user to be a computer scientist or at least
has some knowledge of programming, logic or mathematics. To the best of our knowl-
edge no work has been published on the specification of protocols that aims for truly
inexperienced users and tries to stay as close as possible to natural language.
There do exist a number of programming languages that claim to be similar to nat-
ural language such as hyperTalk1 and PlainEnglish2, but most of them still aim at real
programmers, albeit that they aim for beginning programmers. The only exception that
we know of, is a language called Inform 7 [24]. This is a language that in many cases
truly reads like natural language, but the main difference with SIMPLE is that it is de-
veloped for an entirely different domain. Inform 7 is a language to write Interactive
Fiction: an art form that lies somewhere in between literature and computer games.
We think that one of the main reasons that Inform 7 can stay very close to natu-
ral language, is that it is highly adapted to a very specific domain. This restricts the
possible things a programmer may want to express and hence keeps the language man-
ageable. We have taken a similar approach: our language is only intended to be used
as a language for implementing protocols for multiagent systems, and although it could
possibly be useful for other domains too, we restrict our attention to this domain.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HyperTalk
2 http://www.osmosian.com
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3 Basic Ideas
We assume a multiagent system in which agents exchange messages according to some
given protocol. These agents may be autonomous software agents, or may be humans,
acting through a graphic user interface. The agents are however not in direct contact
with one another. Every message any agent sends first passes a central server that veri-
fies whether the message satisfies the protocol. If a message does not satisfy the proto-
col, then it is blocked by the server and it will not arrive at its recipients. Note that this
is a form of regimentation. In this paper we will not consider any forms of punishment,
and assume protocols are only enforced by means of regimentation. We assume that the
life-cycle of the MAS is as follows:
1. A user (the protocol designer) writes a protocol in our language and stores it in a
text file.
2. He or she launches a communication server, with the location of the text file as a
parameter.
3. The interpreter, which is part of the server application, parses the text file.
4. Agents connect to the server through a TCP/IP connection and send messages to
one another.
5. Every such message is checked by the interpreter. If it does not satisfy the protocol,
it is blocked. If it does satisfy the protocol it is forwarded to its intended recipients.
6. The agent that intended to send the message is notified by the server whether the
message has been delivered correctly or not.
The text file is not compiled, but is directly parsed by the interpreter, so the language is
human-readable and machine-readable at the same time.
Protocols written in SIMPLE have a closed-world interpretation: every message is
considered illegal by default, unless the protocol specifies that it is legal. In order to
determine which messages are legal, we use a system based on the notion of ‘rights’
and ‘events’, meaning that an agent obtains the right to send a specific message if a
certain event has (or has not) taken place. The assignment of such rights is determined
by if-then rules in the protocol.
We currently assume agents can send messages following one of these two patterns:
– (‘say’, x)
– (‘tell’, y, z)
in which the sender can replace x, y and z by any character string (we will see later that
the ‘tell’ message has the interpretation that the value filled in for z will be assigned
to a variable of which the name is the string filled in for y). The current version of the
language does not yet allow users to specify the recipient of a message, so for now we
assume that any message is always sent to all the other agents in the MAS. We plan
this to change in future versions of SIMPLE. Also, we expect that future versions will
support more types of messages.
The interpreter keeps a list of rights for each agent in the MAS. A right is a tuple
of one of the two following forms:
– (‘say’, v)
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– (‘tell’, w)
We say that a right (‘say’, v) matches a message (‘say’, x) if and only if x is equal to v,
or v is the key word ‘anything’. A right (‘tell’, w) matches a message (‘tell’, y, z) if and
only if y equals w. For example: if the agent has the right (‘tell’, ‘price’) then it matches
the message (‘tell’, ‘price’, ‘$100’). A message is considered legal if the agent sending
the message has at least one right that matches the message. Whenever the interpreter
determines that a message is legal, it stores a copy of that message, together with the
name of its sender, in the interpreter’s event history.
One concept that we have borrowed from EIDE is the concept of a role. The rules in
the protocol never refer to specific individuals, because we assume that at design time
the designer cannot know which agents are going to join the MAS at run time. Instead,
the protocol assigns rights to agents based on the roles they are playing. Every agent that
enters the MAS (i.e. connects to the communication server) must choose a specific role
to adopt, from a number of roles that are defined in the protocol. An auction protocol for
example, could define the roles buyer and auctioneer. The protocol could then define a
rule saying that a buyer can only make a bid after the auctioneer has opened the auction.
4 Description of the Language
A protocol is written as a set of sentences that look like natural language, but follow
a strict syntax. Although in this paper we will often start sentences with a capital, this
is not necessary, as the language is entirely case-insensitive. Like in natural language,
the end of a sentence is marked with a period. Unlike most other programming lan-
guages, variable names are allowed to contain spaces. Another important property of
this language, as we will see at the end of this section, is that it is impossible to write
inconsistent protocols.
Definition 1. A role definition sentence is a sentence of the form:
This protocol defines the role r1 (plural: r2).
Where the protocol designer can replace r1 and r2 by any character string. The string
r1 is called the singular role name and r2 is called plural role name.
For each role in the protocol there must also be exactly one such role definition sentence.
For example:
This protocol defines the role buyer (plural:buyers).
Definition 2. A role constraint sentence is a sentence of one of the following forms:
– There can be any number of r.
– There must be at least x r.
– There can be at most x r
– There must be at least y and at most x r.
– There must be exactly x r.
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Where x and y can be any positive integer with y < x and r is a plural role name from
one of the role definition sentences, except in the case that x=1, in which case r must
be a singular role name.
The following sentence is an examples of a role constraint sentence:
There must be at least 2 buyers.
For each role in the protocol there must be exactly one such role constraint sentence.
The interpreter makes sure that these role constraints are not violated. That is, when an
agent tries to connect to the communication server with a role for which there are al-
ready too many participants, the connection will be refused. If there are not yet enough
participants for every role, then every message is considered illegal. In other words: the
agents can only start sending messages to one another when there are enough partici-
pants for every role.
The main idea of the language, as explained above, is that rights are assigned to the
agents by means of if-then rules. An example of such a rule could be:
If the auctioneer has said ‘open’ then any buyer can tell his bid price.
In order to precisely define which sentences are well formed we first need to introduce
a number of terms, namely: quantifiers, identifiers, conditions, and consequences.
Definition 3. A quantifier is any of these keywords: no, any, every, a, an, the, that
Definition 4. An identifier is a sequence of characters of one of the following forms:
– q r
– no one
– anyone
– everyone
– he
Where q can be any quantifier and r can be any singular role name. Identifiers of the
form no r as well as the identifier ‘no one’ are called negative identifiers. All other
identifiers are called positive identifiers.
Definition 5. A past-event condition is a string of characters of one of the following
forms:
– id has said ‘x’
– id has told x
– pid has not said ‘x’
– pid has not told x
where id can be any identifier and x can be any character string, and pid can be any
positive identifier. A past-event condition is called negative if it contains the keyword
‘not’ or if it contains a negative identifier. A past-event condition is called positive
otherwise.
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A past-event conditions is a specific type of condition. Other types of condition are
defined later. The idea behind this is that a positive past-event condition is considered
true if there is any message in the event history that matches the condition. For example
the condition any buyer has said ‘hello’ is considered true if there exists a message in
the event history of the form (‘say’, ‘hello’) which was sent by an agent playing the role
buyer. A negative past-event condition is considered true if there is no message in the
event history that matches the condition.
Definition 6. A right-update consequence is a string of characters of one of the fol-
lowing forms:
– pid can say ‘x’
– pid can tell x
where pid can be any positive identifier and x can be any character string.
A right-update consequence is a specific type of consequence. Other types of conse-
quences are defined later on.
We can now construct sentences (‘rules’) of the form If A then B, where A is a
conjunction of conditions and B is a conjunction of right-update consequences. We say
that a rule is active if all its conditions are true. Then the idea is that an agent has the
right to send a specific message if and only if there is an active rule with right-update
consequence that matches that message.
Identifiers are used inside conditions and consequences to determine to which set
of agents these conditions and consequences apply. We would like to remark that the
quantifiers ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘any’ and ‘the’ all have exactly the same meaning, so the language
contains some redundancy. However, we do consider it very useful to have all of them
in the language because they help the protocol designer to write more natural sentences.
For example, if an auction protocol contains only one auctioneer it makes much more
sense to talk about ‘the auctioneer’ than about ‘any auctioneer’.
Also note that we have included the quantifier ‘that’. This quantifier refers to any
agent that was also referred to by the last quantifier earlier in the sentence. For example,
suppose that a buyer called Alice says ‘hello’ and then a buyer called Bob says ‘hi’, then
the condition:
any buyer has said ‘hello’ and any buyer has said ‘hi’
is true. However, the condition:
any buyer has said ‘hello’ and that buyer has said ‘hi’
is false, because ‘that buyer’ refers to the same agent as the one that said ‘hello’ (which
is Alice). This second condition would only be true if the messages (‘say’ ‘hello’) and
(‘say’ ,‘hi’) had been sent by the same agent. Likewise, we have included the identifier
‘he’, which refers to the same agent as the last identifier that appeared earlier in the
sentence. For example:
If any buyer has said ‘hello’ and he has said ‘hi’
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We may not want the rights of an agent to depend only on past events, but also
on values of variables. Variables in SIMPLE are called properties. A property can
be assigned to the protocol, or can be assigned to individual agents. For example, an
auction may have a property ‘highest bid’ and each buyer may have a property ‘bid
price’ to represent the price he or she has bid. If we have for example properties ‘the
price’ and ‘the account balance’ then we can say things like:
If the price is lower than the account balance then any buyer can say ‘buy’.
If the price is higher than 10 then the auctioneer can say ‘sold’.
Properties can be added to a protocol by including property initialization sentences.
Definition 7. A property initialization sentence is a sentence of one of the following
forms:
– Initially, x is v.
– Every r has a x, which is initially v.
– Every r has an x, which is initially v.
where x can be any character string, v can be any character string, number, or identifier
and r can be any singular role name.
For example:
Every buyer has an age, which is initially 0.
Definition 8. A property condition is a clause of one of the following forms:
– x is v
– x is not v
– x is higher than n
– x is lower than n
where x can be any character string, v can be any string, number or identifier, and n
can be any number. The string x is called the property name, and v and n are called
the value.
Note that the current version of SIMPLE supports three types of properties: strings,
numbers and identifiers. The type of a property is determined implicitly. That is: if the
parser of the protocol is able to interpret the initial value of a property as a number, then
the property is considered to be of type number, and likewise for identifiers. In all other
cases the property is considered a string.
Definition 9. A property-update consequence is a clause of the form:
– x becomes y
– x is v
– x is increased by n
– x is decreased by n
where x and y can be any character string, v can be any string, number of identifier,
and n can be any number.
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Definition 10. A current-event condition is a string of characters of one of the follow-
ing forms:
– id says ‘x’
– id tells x
where id can be any identifier and x can be any character string.
In order to change the values of properties (either assigned to the protocol or to an
individual agent) we can use property-update rules.
Definition 11. A property-update rule is a sentence of the form:
– When x then z.
Where x is a current-event condition and z is a conjunction of property-update conse-
quences.
Examples of property-update rules are:
When any buyer says ‘bid!’ then his bid price is increased by 10.
When the auctioneer says ‘sold’ then the last bidder becomes the winner.
Note that the clause x becomes y means that the value of property y is overwritten with
the value of property x. This can be understood as follows: suppose we have a property
called Carol’s sister and a property called Bob’s wife. Furthermore, suppose that Carol’s
sister is initialized to the value ‘Alice’. Then the clause Carol’s sister becomes bob’s
wife means that the value ‘Alice’ is copied into the property Bob’s wife. Note that when
a property is assigned to an agent we use the key word ‘his’ to refer to the agent that
owns the property. To be precise: it refers to the last agent that appears earlier in the
sentence. So in the above example, ‘his bid price’ refers to the property named ‘bid
price’ assigned to the agent that said ‘bid!’.
Another way that values of properties are updated is when a message of type (‘tell’,
x, y) is sent. In that case the value y is assigned to a property with name x. For ex-
ample, whenever an agent sends the message (‘tell’, ‘the price’, 100), the value 100 is
automatically assigned to a property with the name ‘the price’. The protocol does not
need to contain any property-initialization sentence for such a property.
Definition 12. A right-update rule is a sentence of the form:
– id can always say v.
– id can always tell v.
– If x then y.
– If x then y, as long as w.
where id is an identifier, v can be any character string, x and w are conjunctions of
past-event conditions and/or property conditions and y is a conjunction of right-update
consequences (the conditions in w are also referred to as constraints).
COIN@AAMAS2015
58
Note that we allow such a rule to have no conditions at all, so that it is always active. In
that case the protocol designer needs to include the keyword ‘always’ after the keyword
‘can’. Also note that right-update rules are written in past tense, while property-update
rules are written in present tense. This is because they are interpreted in a fundamentally
different way, which we will explain in Section 5. Furthermore, we see in this defini-
tion that right-update rules may contain so-called constraints. A constraint is similar
to a property condition, but is written at the end of the sentence, and indicated by the
keywords as long as.
If the auctioneer has said ‘open’ then any buyer can tell his bid price, as long as
his bid price is higher than the current price.
A rule containing constraints is considered active if and only if all its conditions and
constraints are satisfied. The difference between constraints and conditions, is that con-
straints refer to property values inside the consequences, whereas other conditions may
only refer to past events or properties that do not appear inside the consequences. This
distinction means that the truth of a condition is independent of any message, and there-
fore can already be determined before a specific message is sent, while the truth value
of a constraint on a message X can only be determined after the participant has sub-
mitted message X , when the interpreter is verifying whether message X is legal. In the
example sentence above for instance, the constraint says that the bid price told by the
buyer, must be higher than the current price. This can of course only be checked when
the buyer is telling his bid price, and not before.
Furthermore, we would like to remind the reader that right-update consequences can
only have positive identifiers. This is important, because it means that a consequence
can only give rights to an agent, but not take them away. Nevertheless, we can still make
agents lose rights, but we do that by using negative conditions, rather than negative
consequences. Take for example the following rule:
If the auctioneer has not said ‘sold!’ then any buyer can say ‘bid!’.
Here, every buyer initially has the right to say ‘bid!’, but loses that right once the auc-
tioneer says ‘sold!’, because the condition becomes false (assuming there is no other
active rule that gives the buyer the right to say ‘bid!’ ). The big advantage of only allow-
ing positive consequences, is that this makes it impossible to write inconsistent rules.
An inconsistency would mean that there is one rule that specifies that you can do some-
thing, while another rule says you cannot do that. This is serious problem that one often
encounters, for example in law. However, since we only allow positive consequences,
this could never happen in our language.
Lemma 1. A protocol written in SIMPLE is guaranteed to be free of inconsistencies.
Proof. The proof is easy: in our language an agent has the right to do something if and
only if there is an active rule with a consequence that gives this right to the agent. This
can never lead to inconsistencies: either such a rule exists or not.
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Fig. 1. Two screen shots of the SIMPLE editor. Users write sentences simply by selecting avail-
able options, and they can only write free text whenever the syntax rules indeed allow that. There-
fore it is impossible to write malformed sentences.
5 The SIMPLE Interpreter
We will now describe the software component that interprets and enforces the protocols.
Whenever an agent tries to send a message, this message is first analyzed by the
interpreter. The interpreter verifies if the agent sending the message indeed has the right
to say that message and, if so, updates its internal state and forwards the message to the
other agents connected to the server. If the sender of the message does not have the right
to send that message he or she is notified that the message has failed. The message will
in that case not be forwarded to the other agents and the internal state of the interpreter
is not updated. In fact, we consider this message as not sent.
The internal state of the interpreter is defined as a list of all messages that have
so far been sent successfully (the event history), a table that maps the name of each
property to the current value of that property, a table that maps the name of each agent
in the MAS to the role it is playing, and a table that maps the name of each agent in the
MAS to a list of rights for that agent. Every time an agent tries to send a message, the
interpreter follows the following procedure:
1. The list of rights of that agent is made empty.
2. For each right-update rule in the protocol, the interpreter verifies if its conditions
are true:
– If the condition is a property condition then it checks whether that property
currently has the proper value to make the condition true.
– If the condition is a past-event condition, the interpreter tries to find an event in
the event history that matches the condition. If such an event is indeed found,
then the condition is considered true.
A rule for which all conditions are true is labeled as ‘active’.
3. For each right-update consequence in each active rule, the interpreter checks whether
the identifier matches the sender of the message and, if yes, adds the right corre-
sponding to this consequence to the sender’s list of rights. If this consequence has
any constraints assigned to it, they are stored together with the right.
4. After all the rights of the sending agent have been determined the interpreter verifies
whether any of them matches the message that the agent is trying to send.
5. Next, if the agent indeed has that right the interpreter checks whether its constraints
(if any) are satisfied.
6. If the sending agent has the proper right, and all its constraints are satisfied then
the interpreter determines if there are any property-update rules in the protocol
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for which the condition matches the message. If yes, the properties in the rule’s
consequences are updated accordingly.
7. Finally, if the agent has the right to send the message and its constraints are satisfied,
a copy of the message is stored in the event history, together with the name of the
sender, and the message is forwarded to all other agents in the MAS.
It is important to note here that property-update rules and right-update rules are
treated in a different way. To be precise: to verify whether a past-event condition is
true, the interpreter compares the condition with all messages in the event history. Since
messages are never removed from the event history this means that whenever a past-
event condition becomes true, it remains true forever. For example, when a buyer says
‘hello’ then the condition any buyer has said ‘hello’ becomes true, and remains true
forever. For negative conditions exactly the opposite holds: the condition no buyer has
said ’bye’ is initially true, but as soon as a buyer says ’bye’ it becomes false, and will
stay false forever.
The current-event conditions on the other hand are only considered true at the mo-
ment that the corresponding message is under evaluation of the interpreter. That is, the
condition when a buyer says hello is considered to be true only while the interpreter
is evaluating the message (‘say’, ‘hello’) sent by some agent playing the role of buyer.
As soon as the interpreter handles the next message this condition is considered false
again. The reason for this is that we consider that when you obtain a right, you keep
that right for an extended period of time, until one of the negative conditions in the rule
becomes false. Updating of a property on the other hand, is a one-time event that only
takes place at the moment a certain message is sent.
6 Examples
We here provide two examples of protocols. Both have been tested and are correctly
executed by the interpreter.
English Auction Protocol:
This protocol defines the role buyer (plural:buyers).
This protocol defines the role auctioneer (plural:auctioneers).
There must be exactly 1 auctioneer.
There must be at least 2 buyers.
Initially, the highest bidder is no one.
Initially, the winner is no one.
Initially, the current price is 0.
Every buyer has a bid price which is initially 0.
If the auctioneer has not said ‘close’ then he can say ‘open’.
If the auctioneer has said ‘open’ then the auctioneer can say ‘close’.
If the auctioneer has said ‘open’ and the auctioneer has not said ‘close’ then any
buyer can tell his bid price, as long as his bid price is higher than the current price.
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When a buyer tells his bid price then his bid price becomes the current price and
he becomes the highest bidder.
When the auctioneer says ‘close’ then the highest bidder becomes the winner.
Dutch Auction Protocol:
This protocol defines the role buyer (plural:buyers).
This protocol defines the role auctioneer (plural:auctioneers).
There must be exactly 1 auctioneer.
There must be at least 2 buyers.
Initially, the price is 1000.
Initially, the winner is no one.
If no buyer has said ‘mine’ then the auctioneer can tell the next price, as long as
the next price is lower than the price.
When the auctioneer tells the next price then the next price becomes the price.
If the auctioneer has told the price and no buyer has said ‘mine’ then any buyer
can say ‘mine’.
When a buyer says ‘mine’ then he becomes the winner.
7 Future Work
We consider that the language as it is, is still too limited to be of real practical use. We
here list the shortcoming that we consider most important and that we plan to fix in the
near future, as well as other improvements that we are considering.
Firstly, we will add the possibility to specify the recipient of a message. Currently
every message is sent to all other agents in the MAS, which makes it impossible to send
confidential information. This means we will allow to write sentences such as:
If the auctioneer has said ‘welcome’ to a buyer then that buyer can say ‘hello’ to
the auctioneer.
Secondly, we would like the protocol designer to be able to express that a certain event
must have taken place a certain number of times. For example:
If a buyer has told his bid price more than 5 times...
Thirdly, we would like to add more types of messages. and maybe even allow the pro-
tocol designer to define message types. That would make it possible to use certain
domain-specific verbs. We could even take this a step further and allow the protocol
designer to define new data types. Defining new types of objects is typically something
that Inform 7 can handle well, so we may draw some inspiration from that language.
Furthermore, we will add a system that determines at run time, whenever an agent tries
to send an illegal message, which conditions first need to be fulfilled before the agent
can indeed legally send that message. In this way the system can explain to the user
why he or she made a mistake and will help the user to understand new protocols. In
order to make the language more flexible and expressive, we will delve into literature
about linguistics and apply some of its principles to our language. Finally, we are also
considering the possibility to add support for model checking to our framework.
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Abstract. The ability to exhibit social behaviour is paramount for
agents to be able to engage in meaningful interaction with people. In fact,
agents are social beings at the core. That is, agent behaviour is the result
of more than just rational, goal-oriented deliberation. This requires novel
agent architectures that start from and integrate different socio-cognitive
elements such as emotions, social norms and personality. Current agent
architectures however, do not support the construction of social agents
in a structured, modular and computational- and design-efficient man-
ner. Inspired by Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA), in this paper we
propose MaaS (Mind as a Service) as a modular architecture for agent
systems that enables the composition of different socio-cognitive capa-
bilities into a running system. Depending on the characteristics of the
domain, agent’s deliberation will require different social capabilities. We
propose to model these capabilities as services, and define a ‘Delibera-
tion Bus’ that enables to design deliberation as a composition of services.
This approach allows to define deliberation cycles that are situational and
dependent on the available components in order to cope with the com-
plexity of social and physical environments in parallel. We furthermore
propose a Service Interface Descriptor language to encapsulate service
functionalities in a uniform way.
1 Introduction
The potential of artificial intelligent systems to interact and collaborate not only
with each other but also with human users is no longer science fiction. Health-
care robots, intelligent vehicles, virtual coaches and serious games are currently
being developed that exhibit social behaviour - to facilitate social interactions,
to enhance decision making, to improve learning and skill training, to facilitate
negotiations and to generate insights about a domain. In all these cases, the
ability to exhibit social behaviour is paramount for successful functioning of the
system.
We informally define social intelligent agents as systems whose behaviour
can be interpreted by others as that of perceiving, thinking, moral, intentional,
and behaving individuals; i.e. as individuals that can consider the intentional
or rational meaning of expressions of others, and that can form expectations
about the acts and actions of others [27]. In this light, functionalities required
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from social intelligent agents include the ability to reason about norms, beliefs
and culture-specific contexts, to display and understand emotions, to balance
between goal-directed and reactive behaviour, maintain a sense of identity, to
form expectations about the other’s acts and actions, etc. An important aspect
of social behaviour is the capability to integrate and to choose between different
types of behaviour, such as e.g. utility-based, mimicry or altruistic behaviours
based on the physical and social context.
In the last years, many systems have been developed which possess some of
these characteristics. In particular, work on Intelligent Virtual Agents and on So-
cial Robotics has delivered many promising results. However, we are still lacking
theories, tools and methodologies to guide and ground these developments. That
is, current approaches often result in ad-hoc, unstructured solutions. Success and
applicability are often more due to the expertise and art of the developers, rather
than on robust engineering principles. Moreover, in most cases, social aspects are
‘added-in’ on top of existing architectures, such as BDI, which does not allow to
model the rich inter-dependencies between social capabilities needed to generate
social behaviour [12].
The necessity to develop working real-world systems capable of exhibiting
social behaviour for the purpose of interaction and collaboration with people
requires engineering approaches to explore the full potential of social artificial
intelligent systems on a larger scale, mandates a new understanding of social
intelligent agents. Architectures, tools and methodologies are needed to realize
this potential and engineer applications with a high level of robustness and
quality. Only then can we reach certification guarantees acceptable by industry
and society.
In this paper, we introduce the vision of MaaS (Mind as a Service), a frame-
work to develop the ‘minds’ of social intelligent agents, based on the composition
of different cognitive modules, or services. In particular, we focus on the minds
of social intelligent agents, i.e. the representations and processes that enable
social behaviour. In the context of this paper, the concept of ‘mind’ should be
understood as an analogy of the human mind rather than as a faithful represen-
tation. We us the term ‘mind’ in order to stress the importance that in many
application this mind will be connected to a physical or virtual body of the
agent. It is important to notice that this approach should be seen as orthogonal
to current research focus on emulating the human brain, such as that taken by
the European flagship project “Human Brain”. In contrast to this project, our
aim is to develop synthetic models that exhibit behaviour that can be seen as so-
cial, and not understand the human brain in order to emulate its computational
capabilities.
MaaS combines a service-oriented architecture with formal specification lan-
guages to verify behaviour. In this position paper, we outline the MaaS approach,
present the grounding theories on which MaaS is based, and discuss its main
challenges. The work presented here should be seen as a first proposal towards
a comprehensive theory and tools to build and analyse social intelligent agents.
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2 Related work
Understanding social behaviour is the first step towards building social minds [7].
Social intelligence is defined as an aggregate of different capabilities, including
awareness, social beliefs and attitudes, and the ability to change [6, 16]. In his
book, “The Society of Mind” Minsky explores the notion that the mind consists
of a great diversity of mechanisms: every mind is really a rich and multifaceted
society of structures and processes, different for every individual as result of
genetics, millennia of human cultural evolution, and years of personal experience
[23]. Societies of Mind are composed of agents with specific functionality that can
be combined together to perform functions more complex than any single agent
could, and ultimately produce the many abilities we attribute to minds. Despite
the great popularity of this work, there have been few attempts to implement
the Society of Minds theory, especially due to the fact that Minsky presents his
ideas at different level of abstraction and provides few handles for construction
of minds. In its main objective, that of providing a modular, compositional and
adaptable architecture for intelligent systems, MaaS takes a similar view of mind
as that proposed by Minsky and can be seen as providing a principled engineering
framework to develop systems similar to the Society of Minds. However, the basic
concepts behind MaaS and the Society of Minds are quite different.
Decision-making processes are influenced by individual and social sources [22].
Social influences are often described in terms of social rules that are followed,
such as ‘obey your parents’ or ‘mimic the behaviour of your peers’. Individual
influences are usually expressed in terms of personal goals or utilities and lead
to ‘rational’ decision rules. The social sciences describe many mechanisms or
schemas used by humans to link these capabilities (e.g. salience, priming, mo-
tivation and regulation), determine how decisions are made and generate com-
plex social behaviour [1, 15]. Similar processes occur in human-agent interaction
because social signals (like emotional expressions) produced by computational
agents are processed by humans in a similar manner as signals which are pro-
duced by humans [32].
Computational cognitive models, such as ACT-R [3] and SOAR [9] produce intel-
ligent behaviour by employing quantitative measures, which means that different
factors take the same form in the deliberation process. This makes it difficult to
manage, control and vary different socio-cognitive aspects because these cannot
easily be isolated in the decision rules. Moreover, once models get larger they
lack transparency to link observed behaviour to the implementation. Existing
architectures used to construct virtual agents and intelligent game characters,
such as FAtiMA [11], GRETA [21] or CIGA [31] can achieve fairly realistic be-
haviours that are computationally efficient, but are generally developed for a
very specific domain of application. Given this domain-oriented focus, their re-
sults are not easily reusable in applications that require slightly different social
aspects. I.e. sometimes norms play a major role in a training application while in
health care applications emotions might take precedence. Moreover, the focus of
these approaches is geared to the visualisation of the behaviours by the virtual
characters in terms of e.g. gestures, or facial expressions.
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Recently Kaminka and Dignum et al [18, 12] discussed the many challenges
of designing the social behaviour of agents. In this paper, we propose an ini-
tial architecture to build agents that can meet those challenges. MaaS takes a
modular, service-oriented approach to build social intelligent agents, resulting
in flexible and adaptable deliberation. Nevertheless, existing cognitive models in
AI are often too simplistic, mostly suitable for well-defined problem domains,
platform- or domain-specific, or computationally too complex [29, 20, 9].
Deliberative agent models, such as BDI [33], have formal logic-grounded se-
mantics, but often require extensive computational resources to deal with social
contexts, or use game-theoretic rules that are too simple to capture many of
the rich interactions that take place in real-world scenarios [5]. BDI does use
different modules for beliefs, desires and intentions. However, these are geared
towards individual influences on decision making. These models thus lack an
explicit representation for social influences. One can represent all these social
influences in the beliefs or goals of an agent, but that leads to the same objec-
tion as against the cognitive models; the rules become convoluted and different
aspects cannot easily be managed separately.
Other decision-theoretic approaches often used are(PO)MDPs - (Partially
Observable) Markov Decision Processes, which capture many of the facets of
real world problems, but unrealistically assume that whatever system is solving
the MDP knows at every point what state it is in. Moreover, (PO)MDPs do not
scale well and lack the modularity needed to analyse the results of large models
[4].
The Subsumption Architecture [8, 30] takes a reactive perspective, through
an hierarchy of task-accomplishing behaviours (simple rules) without necessar-
ily a central control. Lower layers correspond to ‘primitive’ behaviours and have
precedence over higher (more abstract) ones. This architecture is simple in com-
putational terms, but is conceptually obscure due to its ‘black box’ character.
In an attempt to balance different aspects, and improve the separation of
concerns, AOSE (Agent-Oriented Software Engineering) addresses adaptation,
concurrency, and fault-tolerance issues [28, 13] of the development of agent sys-
tems. However, most current AOSE approaches see agents as an application
layer software component operating on middleware platforms to gain access to
standardised infrastructures. Specifically, such approaches provide syntactic con-
structs to represent domain knowledge and agent functionalities but lack the for-
mal semantics to reason about agent behaviour at higher levels of abstraction, in
terms of socio-cognitive concepts. This leads to results that are not generalizable
to other frameworks and applications.
3 The MaaS Vision
As discussed in the previous section, many approaches exist to model different
aspects of social intelligence. Our proposal is not to develop yet another model,
but enable to integrate different models into working software systems, with vari-
able levels of precision and realism. We therefore aim to build social intelligent
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systems as a modular, service-based architecture which enables formal verifica-
tion and conceptual clarity while making possible the integration of different
reasoning architectures.
The ‘Mind as a Service’ (MaaS) architecture proposed in this paper, repre-
sents social intelligent agents as a composition of software services, each designed
to implement a specific socio-cognitive functionality. MaaS systems behave in
human-like fashion by integrating individual considerations and social influences
in their decision making process, and taking into account situational differences.
This approach follows recent literature suggesting that rational behaviour re-
quires the input from different socio-cognitive abilities [2].
This approach is based on three pillars. Firstly, models for social delibera-
tion and interaction should be grounded in existing proven psycho-sociological
theories, but also be computationally sound and sufficiently ‘light’ to be easily
be embedded and reused into avatars, robots or other intelligent systems. By ex-
pressing algorithms in logical terms, explanation and synthesis of socio-cognitive
behaviour is possible [24]. This view is orthogonal to the current AI research fo-
cus on emulating the human brain1, in such that our aim is to develop synthetic
models that exhibit behaviour that can be seen as social, and not understand
the human brain in order to emulate its computational capabilities.
Secondly, development of a computational platform to build MaaS as a com-
position of socio-cognitive services. This platform will allow to build modular
socio-cognitive deliberation architectures and to analyse the consistency of dif-
ferent compositions in terms of accuracy of real world behaviour. Given the
explicit formal representation of MaaS models this allows for introspection of
the drives of an agent’s behaviour. By applying Service-Oriented Architecture
(SOA) principles [14], the resulting systems are scalable and flexible, as services
can be replaced by other services, and the system includes only those services
required for its aims. Through composition, new services can be created from a
set of existing services. Moreover, each socio-cognitive function can be modelled
in many ways, resulting in several services for the same socio-cognitive ability
with different levels of complexity and realism, which can be interchanged de-
pending on the requirements of the application. MaaS services can be addressed
in a uniform way through a standard interface that is platform- and domain-
independent.
Thirdly, methodology to develop MaaS that can be embedded in artificial
interactive systems. This methodology provides guidelines for domain analysis,
evaluate the socio-cognitive functionalities required for interaction and their level
of realism, construct and compose the relevant socio-cognitive services, and eval-
uate results. The use of the methodology and framework will be evaluated in the
development of prototypes for three case studies.
Ultimately, we aim to develop a complete framework that integrates formal
theory, software development tools, and methodology to build artificial minds
in a structured, compositional way. Through this framework, social intelligent
1 Such as is advocated e.g. by the Human Brain Project
(https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/)
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agents can be build that are modular, flexible, adjustable and verifiable. This
aim leads directly to the following challenges that we face for the realisation of
MaaS:
Modular: requires definitions and models to represent different theories (de-
scribing socio-cognitive capabilities) and verify the resulting computational
models. To address this challenge we propose a meta-modelling approach to
specify socio-cognitive capabilities.
Flexible: Each application domain requires different abilities at different lev-
els of precision. Our approach to this challenge is twofold: 1) we provide
procedures and guidelines to identify relevant socio-cognitive modules given
the requirements of an application domain, and 2) we define uniform inter-
face descriptions that enable the composition and encapsulation of different
socio-cognitive models.
Adjustable: Which socio-cognitive capabilities are needed, at which level of
realism and computational complexity, and how to integrate the different ca-
pabilities into a deliberation mechanism, is dependent on the characteristics
of the domain. MaaS should provide an extendible library of socio-cognitive
services. We aim at a plug-and-play mechanism to combine these services in
many ways resulting in different decision-making paradigms (e.g rational or
behavioural models of decision making).
Verifiable: To judge the appropriateness of the behaviour of a MaaS system,
computational theories and tools are needed to analyse the composed effects
of social capabilities. By specifying formal representations of socio-cognitive
theories we will be able to use formal model-checkers to verify whether a
MaaS satisfies some desired properties.
3.1 The MaaS development process
In order to integrate different models in a structured way we follow a Model-
Driven Engineering (MDE) approach [19]. This enables to develop models that
make sense from the point of view of a domain expert, and that can serve as a
basis for implementing systems. Formal models of socio-cognitive functions are
the basis for the meta-models which can then be used to generate generic service
models, similar to a Platform Independent Model (PIM) used in MDE, which
are refined into specific conceptual designs realizing the functional requirements
and characteristics of the application domain. PIMs are used as a blueprint to
develop and compose software services. Through the Deliberation Bus (section
4.2) these services are composed into an operational MaaS that can be embedded
in social intelligent artefacts that interact with people, such as Embodied Virtual
Agents (EVAs) or other avatars or cognitive robots. This process is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Finally, the resulting MaaS systems can then be embedded in social intelligent
artefacts that interact with people. The MaaS process outlined above, is depicted
in Figure 3.
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Fig. 1. The MaaS development process
3.2 Development Environment
Our aim is to develop MaaS system can then be embedded in interactive soft-
ware environments, such as game characters, virtual assistants or robots. To
this extent, we are developing MindBuilder, a computational platform to design
and implement MaaS as service compositions, that integrates logical specifica-
tion languages for socio-cognitive capabilities and the formal algorithms to check
their behaviour, and the MindBuilder platform and methodology for the speci-
fication, integration, simulation and reuse of MaaS as a composition of services,
and a methodology to analyse and develop MaaS systems for specific application
domains taking into account ethical, social and technical considerations.
The objective is to generate computational models of socio-cognitive capa-
bilities through a semi-automatic transformation of the formal models described
above. MindBuilder, illustrated in Figure 2, includes the following functionali-
ties:
– develop formal models of social sciences theories to be used as basis for
socio-cognitive software services;
– compose services into MaaS systems using uniform service interfaces;
– provide library capabilities to store and search for services.
– verify the behaviour of MaaS systems, using simulation and model checking;
Resulting MaaS systems can be embedded in different interactive platforms
to provide social intelligence capabilities.
The MindBuilder methodology supports the identification of the socio-cognitive
capabilities required for the domain, and their level of realism, guides the devel-
opment of domain-specific versions of existing models and services, and defines
the parameters for analysis of results using simulation.
3.3 Example Scenario
To illustrate the MaaS vision, we describe its possible application to develop a
virtual coach for children with overweight, JOGG. The socio-cognitive capabili-
ties required by JOGG include the ability to show emotions, and to understand
norms and values. E.g. the virtual coach should express happiness when the
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user has successfully performed a task, should be persuading when suggesting a
course of action, should monitor norms, such as the obligation to exercise daily,
or the prohibition to snack too often, and enforce values such as privacy, but
should also be able to decide when to break a norm, for example violate the
norm of privacy and notify a doctor if the health of the user is perceived to be
very poor.
Different social science theories exist to describe and analyse these socio-
cognitive abilities. To name just a few, emotions can be described using e.g. the
OCC model [26], or by simple rules that relate happiness to the fulfilment of
one’s goal, and norms can be modelled using e.g. deontic logics [34], or by the
normative theory of Kahnemann [17]. The MaaS methodology will support the
analysis of the domain to determine which base sociological theories are the most
suitable, and what level of realism is required.
The MindBuilder Library may already contain services implementing these
theories, or new services should be specified using MindBuilder Design. The re-
quired services are then tailored to the case, e.g. specifying specific norms on
physical activity and nutrition, relevant values such as privacy, and suitable
emotional expressions in the given cultural context of use. Using MindBuilder
Composition component, services are composed into a MaaS. In order to deter-
mine the most adequate compositions, and which level of detail and realism of
socio-cognitive services is required, MindBuilder Simulation is used to analyse
different MaaS configuration options. Different configurations representing dif-
ferent deliberation mechanisms can be checked, e.g. to determine the effect of a
norm on the emotion of the MaaS and vice-versa, to check how norm violations
affect values, or to determine the effect of e.g. mimicry or goal-orientation as
basis for the MaaS deliberation. The resulting MaaS can then be embedded in
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an app to be used to support the user control their weight and maintain an
active lifestyle.
4 MaaS Deliberation
Social deliberation in MaaS results from the integration of different socio-cognitive
capabilities, modelled as software services. In order to realise the MaaS vision,
we need both the means to describe these services in a uniform way (Service In-
terface Description), and the ways to combine them into meaningful deliberation
(Deliberation Bus).
4.1 Service Interface Description
In order to ensure service integration into MaaS systems in a robust, resilient,
dependable and scalable manner, we need to develop interfaces between services,
and to identify and represent quality of service expectations. A service-oriented
approach enables to separate service implementation from service specification.
Service Interface Descriptors (SID) will describe the functionality offered by a
service, independently from its implementation. As such, services can be seen as
black boxes, where operational details are abstracted by the SID. Other services
rely on SID to call the service.
As in Situation Calculus, we model the domain world as progressing through
a series of states, as a result of various actions being performed within the world.
A social state is defined as a set of fluents (properties whose truth changes over
time). These fluents represent physical situations (agent is in place X), emotional
aspects (agent is happy), relational aspects (agent A is friend of B), and other
issues pertinent to the situation. A socio-cognitive service is then a transition
from one (social) state to another. I.e., services take a state as input and result
in an alteration of that state, that is a change in the value of some of the state
fluents. SIDs describe which fluents are modifiable by the service, under which
circumstances (i.e. fluents describing the preconditions for using the service).
A service-oriented approach enables to separate service implementation from
service specification. We use Service Interface Descriptors (SID) to describe the
functionality offered from a service, independently from its implementation. As
such services can be seen as black boxes, encapsulated by SID. Other services
rely on the SID to call the service. SIDs indicate which fluents are modifiable by
the service, under which circumstances (i.e. fluents describing the preconditions
for using the service).
Each service acts over a specific set of fluents. Several services may be active
at the same time, and can call each other to perform some desired change. For
example, in the scenario presented above, for the virtual coach JOGG to propose
a possible activity to the user, it will employ services to determine the possible
activities, to adapt its emotional expression (which calls a service to determine
the user’s current emotional state), to decide on the most appropriate way to
propose those activities to the user (based on the user’s culture, personality, and
on holding norms of behaviour), and so on.
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Quality of Service MaaS systems have different requirements concerning the
socio-cognitive capabilities needed and the desired level of realism. Although all
aspects will play a role in both decisions their relative importance is different.
E.g. decisions on buying more organic products in the supermarket are mostly
based on culture and personality, while and decisions buying cars might be more
status driven. This characteristic demands design models that are scalable and
can be flexibly adapted to the varying requirements of quality and scale of dif-
ferent use-cases.
The service-oriented approach taken in MindBuilder enables to specify and
select services with different levels of precision and computational complexity
to execute similar functionality. I.e., depending on the specific demands of an
application domain, a socio-cognitive service for normative reasoning can, for
example, be based on a temporal-deontic logic [34] or on Ostrom’s ‘ADICO’
model [10]. Given the use of uniform Service Interface Descriptors, one can be
replaced by the other in a MaaS system, resulting in a more or less rich normative
reasoning as indicated by requirements of a given domain.
The quality of a service is described by the service’s capability to handle
fluents. That is, differences in quality of services are related to which fluents can
be handled by the service, and how those fluents are perceived. Assuming an
expressive domain representation language, many details can be given about a
situation, however not all services are able to handle all the details. This results
in different levels of complexity and realism for interchangeable services. Con-
sider for instance, services that analyse the emotion of an user. Rich services can
take into account vision, audio and biologic sensor information, while a simple
emotion service is only able to take into account input from a dropbox ques-
tion to the user (“How are you feeling? Choose from the following X options”).
Obviously, the result of different emotion-services will be more or less detailed
depending on the service option used. However, not all applications require the
richer version.
4.2 Deliberation Bus
It is well-known that neither purely reactive nor purely deliberative techniques
are capable of producing the range of behaviours required of intelligent agents
in dynamic, unpredictable, domains, and specially when interaction with people
is needed. I.e. real-time interaction requires both extensive reasoning as well as
fast reaction. Therefore, socio-cognitive services have different expectations in
terms of time and reaction rate, which demands the integration of goal-based
planning and reaction over diverse temporal and functional scopes. At the heart
of a MaaS we propose a Deliberation Bus consisting of a central deliberation bus
to connnect and synchronise different services, and of memory and time man-
agement units. Besides socio-cognitive services, the Deliberation Bus also links
to sensing and actuator services. These are dependent on the actual system or
artefact in which the MaaS is embedded. The Deliberation Synchronisation Bus
specifies and implements the communication between services using SID, and
takes care of the synchronisation of the different service processes. We use the
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term ‘bus’ to stress the fact that we do not assume a fixed deliberation cycle but
rather parallel communication between services depending on the situation. In
order to allow a uniform quantization of time throughout the model, yet permit
different rates of reaction for services, it becomes necessary to interleave sensing
and planning. The time management unit allows multiple state updates to occur
during deliberation, while keeping in synch with an evolving world. The Delib-
socio-cognitive services 
actuator 
 services 
sensor 
 services 
deliberation synchronisation bus 
memory timer 
Fig. 3. Abstract Deliberation Bus Architecture
eration Bus architecture (cf. Figure 3) integrates deliberation and reaction in
flexible and efficient ways. Existing deliberation paradigms such as goal-oriented
(BDI) or reactive (Sense-Plan-Act) can be represented in the Bus, which is how-
ever expressive enough to specify many other deliberation possibilities.
4.3 Service meta-models and verification
Deep theoretical understanding of specific functionalities for social interaction is
a pre-requisite to their use in artificial social intelligent systems, yet there is an
awareness that current formalisms are not able to deal with the representation
of social functionalities and their interrelations in a way that enables verifica-
tion and proof. Nevertheless, formalisms abound that deal with specific aspects
of reasoning, such as decision-making, norms, or emotions. However, such mod-
els are quite disparate and integration is not well understood. Our proposal is
to start from existing logical formalisms to represent and reason about social-
cognitive behaviour and develop formal interpretations of existing social science
theories of social behaviour.
There is a long tradition in AI to use logical theories to provide insights
into the reasoning problem without directly informing the implementation. The
use of logical formalisms as a tool of analysis and knowledge representation, is
at the basis of AI research [25]. We will use existing formalisms for different
aspects of social behaviour (emotions, norms, culture, personality, ...) as a basis
to develop formal theory and algorithms to specify social intelligent systems in a
compositional way integrating different theoretical formalisms for socio-cognitive
behaviour. To enable the integration and combination of different models we are
exploring a meta-modelling approach.
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Model checking is a well-known technique to verify properties of a formal
model. An attractive feature of model checking is that it can be used to identify
behaviours in which the properties do not hold, potentially generating insight
in how certain problems can be solved. Well-known limitations of model check-
ing include its inappropriateness to deal with infinite state spaces and branch-
ing/alternative time, and it enables only the verification of the model and not
validation the process used to transform social science theories into the formal
representation. Moreover, the main challenge in model checking is the state ex-
plosion problem that can occur if the system being verified has components that
make transitions in parallel. However, the scale and complexity of the formaliza-
tions that are required for social behaviour are reaching beyond the traditional
techniques of philosophical logic. We will explore the combination of logical
methods with simulation models to enable the development of a more compre-
hensive and adequate theory of practical social reasoning than what pure logic
can achieve. Simulation results can identify ‘interesting’ situations that can sub-
sequently be formally checked by model checkers or theorem provers to verify
whether the system satisfies certain desired (formal) properties. Simulations pro-
duce possible behaviours of the system, which enable to understand the meaning
of the abstractions and see whether it corresponds to the system requirements.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the ‘Mind as a Service’ (MaaS) architecture. In-
spired by SOA, we propose to build social intelligent agents as a composition
of software services, each designed to implement a specific socio-cognitive func-
tionality. We are at the initial stages of this research, which we are sure has
the potential to realise a new paradigm for agents. This paper aims to high-
light the main features and challenges of MaaS. We are currently developing a
software environment to build and deploy social minds. This platform, Mind-
Builder, enables the specification, composition, simulation and reuse of MaaS,
and provides functionalities for a) Design: design services constructed using
meta-models based on those formal representations using a uniform interface
structure; b) Composition: specify Deliberation Bus models to compose services
into MaaS systems with different deliberation models; c) Simulation: simulate
and verify the behaviour of those MaaS systems; d) Library: provides library
capabilities to store and search for services. The impact of the resulting systems
on the people interacting with them is potentially very high. It is therefore cru-
cial to consider the ethical impact of social intelligent systems. We believe that
realistic technical solutions are needed before we can fully address the moral and
ethical issues inherent to artificial systems that provide care, change behaviour,
and interact with vulnerable people across all age-groups. User participation and
near-realistic experimentation environments are needed to explore and evaluate
technical results and their ethical consequences in a controlled non-evasive way.
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Abstract. Existing approaches for the verification of normative systems
consider limited representations of norms, often neglecting collective im-
peratives, deadlines and contrary-to-duty obligations. In order to capture
the requirements of real-world scenarios, these structures are important.
In this paper we propose methods for the specification and formal ver-
ification of complex normative systems that include contrary-to-duty,
collective and event-driven imperatives with deadlines. We propose an
operational syntax and semantics for the specification of such systems.
Using Maude and its linear temporal logic model checker, we show how
important properties can be verified for such systems, and provide some
experimental results for both bounded and unbounded verification.
1 Introduction
The specification and verification of properties of normative systems is an impor-
tant consideration for the design of complex distributed systems [1, 5]. Motivated
by the need to capture the requirements of real world scenarios, research on the
specification of normative systems has explored conditional [15], event-governed
(e.g. activation/expiration condition) norms [13], collective imperatives [8, 11],
imperatives with deadlines [6], and contrary-to-duty (CTD) norms [15]. A fur-
ther focus has explored mechanisms for the analysis of systems of norms for
the purpose of identifying and resolving conflicts between norms and plans [16].
Although such analyses are of benefit, for safety critical systems it is important
to analyse the interactions between normative constraints and agents’ actions
as a system evolves. For these reasons the use of model checking [3] techniques
to analyse liveness and safety properties of norm-governed systems has been
explored [1, 5, 7]. To date, however, this research has focussed on restricted rep-
resentations of norms such as labelling states or transitions as compliant/non-
compliant. A˚gotnes et al. [1], for example, study the complexity of this model
checking problem for different robustness-related properties; e.g. whether a cer-
tain property is guaranteed in the event of a subset of agents violating a norm.
The focus of this paper is on how to efficiently apply model checking to anal-
yse properties of normative systems specifications with richer representations of
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norms. In particular, we consider event-governed conditional norms, deadlines
for the fulfilment of obligations, and contrary to duty and group imperatives.
The contributions we claim are as follows: (i) We propose a norm specifica-
tion language that is sufficiently expressive to capture all the features discussed
above, namely co`ir3; (ii) a Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) [12] for a
monitoring component that, given a description of the environment, keeps track
of activation, expiration, fulfilment, and violations of norms; and (iii) a reali-
sation of this component using the Maude [4] rewriting logic framework, which
allows us to perform formal analysis of normative systems specifications. A par-
ticular challenge is that representing time explicitly (in order to reason about
temporal deadlines) makes the problem undecidable. For these reasons we ex-
plore both the use of bounded model checking and model abstraction to obtain a
finite Kripke structure for unbounded model checking. We present some results
of both these approaches in an example domain that motivates the requirements
for us considering such a rich representation of norms.
2 Motivating Example
Consider a coalition of agents of the sea-guard, consisting of a set of Unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and boats. Their goal is to monitor and in-
tercept unauthorized boats trying to access a restricted area. The norms that
guide the behaviour of the coalition are: (1) At any moment at least one member
of the coalition must monitor the area. Moreover, we prefer having UAVs moni-
toring the area over helicopters. We assume that only helicopters and UAVs are
capable of monitoring. (2) Whenever an unauthorized boat enters the area, a
member of the coalition must intercept it before a certain deadline expires. (3) If
no one intercepts the boat, then at least one member of the coalition must send a
report to head-quarters before a certain deadline expires. These are all examples
of collective imperatives: they require at least one member of the coalition to
act. Norm 3 is also a CTD obligation that is activated in the event of a violation
of the obligation 2. Moreover, norms 2 and 3 require the agents to perform an
action before a certain deadline (a liveness property), while norm 1 requires that
at any given moment someone is monitoring the area (a safety property).
3 CO`IR Norm Specification
We now introduce a formalism for representing norms that satisfies our require-
ments, which we call co`ir. We allow for the definition of obligations with dead-
lines and prohibitions and we assume that everything that is not prohibited is
permitted. Compliance with norms is evaluated against a knowledge base KB
that is dynamically updated to represent the environment and the observable
properties of the agents acting within it. We rely on the closed-world assump-
tion, which we believe to be reasonable in a verification setting. We include
3 co`ir is the Scottish Gaelic for obligation.
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〈constTerm〉 = 〈strTerm〉 | 〈numTerm〉 ;
〈term〉 = 〈constTerm〉 | 〈varTerm〉 | 〈predicate〉 ;
〈predicate〉 = 〈functor〉 "(" 〈term〉 { "," 〈term〉 } ")" ;
〈binding〉 = "BIND( " 〈varTerm〉 "," 〈term〉 ")" ;
〈violationCond〉 = "VIOLATION-OF(" 〈numTerm〉 "," 〈strTerm〉 ")" ;
〈formula〉 = 〈predicate〉 | 〈binding〉 | 〈violationCond〉 | 〈formula〉 "/\" 〈formula〉
| 〈formula〉 "\/" 〈formula〉 | "IN {" 〈formula〉 "} FILTER" 〈boolExpr〉 ;
〈constant〉 = "false" | "true" ;
〈existsPattern〉 = "EXISTS {" 〈formula〉 "}" ;
〈equalsCond〉 = "EQUALS (" 〈term〉 "," 〈term〉 ")" ;
〈temporal〉 = "TEMPORAL (" 〈numTerm〉 ")" ;
〈violated〉 = "VIOLATED" ;
〈compareOp〉 = "=" | ">" | "<" | "<=" | ">=" ;
〈count〉 = "COUNT(" 〈varTerm〉 "IN{" 〈formula〉 "})" 〈compareOp〉〈numTerm〉 ;
〈boolExpr〉 = "NOT" 〈boolExpr〉 | 〈violated〉 | 〈count〉 | 〈boolExpr〉 "/\" 〈boolExpr〉
| 〈boolExpr〉 "\/" 〈boolExpr〉 | 〈existsPattern〉 | 〈equalsCond〉 | 〈constant〉 ;
Fig. 1. EBNF grammar for the COIR language.
the description of previous violations in the knowledge base. These can then be
used to activate CTD norms. An issue that has been discussed, for example,
by Dignum et al. [6] is whether an obligation with a deadline should persist
or be deactivated after a violation; i.e. after the deadline has expired without
the obligation being fulfilled. co`ir supports the specification of either of these
alternatives. By default obligations don’t expire when violated, but, thanks to
the fact that violations are represented in KB, it is always possible to specify the
expiration condition as being triggered by a violation of the current instance.
3.1 Syntax
A norm ndi is defined as a tuple 〈idi,modi, acti, expi, goali, ddli〉 where: idi is a
unique identifier; modi ∈ {O,F} specifies whether the norm is an obligation with
deadline or a prohibition; acti (activation condition) describes a pattern that,
when matched in KB, causes a norm instance to be detached; goali represents
the situation that needs to be brought about (for an obligation) or avoided (for
a prohibition); expi (expiration condition) is a condition that, when met, causes
the expiration of the instance; and the deadline for the fulfilment of the norm
(ddli) can be temporal or symbolic and is defined only for obligations.
Fig. 1 shows the EBNF grammar of the operational language used to rep-
resent the components of a norm specification. functor and strTerm are identified
by strings that start with a letter, numTerm by numbers and varTerm by strings that
start with a ? character. ?actTime, ?violTime, ?tick, ?this-id, ?violated and ?flag are re-
served terms. The description of the environment, KB, consists of a set of ground
predicates; i.e. predicates with no varTerm. Intuitively, a boolExpr represents a con-
dition that is evaluated against KB returning a boolean result, while a formula is
a pattern with a set of variables that is evaluated by returning the set of substi-
tutions that make the pattern match a subset of KB. In a norm description, acti
is represented by a formula, while expi, goali, and ddli are boolExprs.
The formula VIOLATION-OF(n, s) is matched when there is a violation of norm
n and is used for the activation of CTD obligations. The meaning of the pa-
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rameter s will be explained in Section 4. The meanings of EQUALS, EXISTS and the
usual boolean operators are intuitive. TEMPORAL(n) is evaluated to true if a temporal
deadline has expired, while VIOLATED can be used in expi and returns true if the
instance being evaluated has been violated. COUNT ( v IN { f }) > n evaluates to
true if the number of different assignments of the variable v that matches the
pattern f is higher than the number n.
3.2 Representing collective obligations
We now discuss how our formalism allows us to represent different types of
collective obligations [11]. In contrast to Tinnemeier et al. [14], we allow goali,
expi, and ddli to include variables that have not been bound at activation time.
Through the use of the patterns EXISTS{fi} and NOT EXISTS{fi} we are able to express
existential and universal quantification on these variables. Inspired by Norman
and Reed [11] we discuss some common patterns of collective obligations and
show how they can be expressed in our language (See [8, 11] for discussions
of responsibility in collective obligations). In order to ease the presentation, we
assume that agents are organized in groups, group membership is represented
by predicates of the type memberOf(agent,group), and an agent’s performance of an
action by perform(agent,action).
Joint distributive obligations are obligations where all the members of group
g are responsible for all the members of the group performing the action a. This
can be expressed by an obligation where:
acti = memberOf(?add,g)
goali = NOT EXISTS {IN {memberOf(?ag,g)} FILTER NOT EXISTS {perform(?ag,a)}}
goali is met when there is no member of g that hasn’t performed t; i.e. when
all the members of g have performed a. As a result, if any of the members of
the group don’t perform the task, all the members will be responsible for the
violation. Alternatively we could consider the group as an entity to be responsible
for the fulfilment of the obligation by specifying the activation condition as:
acti = BIND ( ?add , g )
and referring to the group as ?add in the goal. Note that if a group has no
members, such an obligation would be trivially fulfilled. It might be appropriate
to add the constraint EXISTS{memberOf(?add,g)} in acti or in goali.
Joint collective obligations specify that all the members of a group g are
responsible for at least one member of the group performing the action a.
acti = memberOf(?add,g)
goali = EXISTS{ memberOf(?ag,g) /\ perform(?ag,a)}
4 CO`IR Semantics
We define the semantics of co`ir through a Structural Operational Semantics
(SOS), a framework for the description of the semantics of programming and
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specification languages. SOS consists of a set of transition rules that generate a
transition system whose states are called configurations. Transition rules are of
the form P
C→C′ meaning that, whenever P holds, a transition from the configura-
tion C to C′ is applicable. We use SOS to describe how the active norm instances
and violations are updated every time we detect a change in KB.
In formalising these semantics we assume two functions that evaluate formula
and boolExpr; these will be summarised below. We define a substitution θj ∈ Θ
as a set of assignments [v/c] where c is a constTerm and v a varTerm. Formulae are
evaluated by means of a function match : 2P × Q → 2Θ, where P is the set of all
predicates, Q the set of all formulae, and Θ the set of all substitutions. Intuitively,
match(KB, f) returns all the substitutions θi such that f · θi is entailed by KB.
Boolean expressions (boolExpr) are evaluated by means of a function eval : 2P ×Θ×
E → bool where E is the set of all boolExpr and bool ∈ { true , false }. A norm instance
[idi, θj , at] is detached at time at for each substitution θj ∈ match(KB, acti). Then
eval(KB, e, θj) is used to evaluate expi, goali, and ddli. The addressee of the norm,
identified by the value assigned to ?add in θj , is responsible for complying with
the obligation (reaching a state where eval(KB, goali, θj) = true before the deadline)
or with the prohibition (avoiding states where eval(KB, goali, θj) = true until the
prohibition expires).
A further issue to address prior to detailing the transition rules of our opera-
tional semantics is that of “duplicate activations”. Consider a simplified version
of norm 3 from Section 2. We specify its activation condition as follows:
type(?add,coalition) /\ type(?boat,unBoat) /\ type(?area,rArea) /\ inArea(?boat,?area)
In other words, an instance of the obligation to send a report should be
detached when an unauthorized boat is in the restricted area. Intuitively, if the
same boat remains in the restricted area for more than one consecutive instant
of time, we don’t want the coalition members to send more than one report.
However, if the boat exits and then re-enters the area, we would expect the
coalition to be obliged to send another report. Formally, if we denote by KBt the
state of the knowledge base at time t, we capture this distinction by activating
an instance of a norm ndi, associated with a substitution θj, at an instant of
time t whenever θj ∈ match(KBt, acti) and θj 6∈ match(KBt−1, acti); i.e. when we
find a substitution such that acti goes from “unmatched” to “matched” in two
subsequent instants of time. To do that we keep record of the instances [idi, θj , at]
such that the acti was matched in the previous instant of time.
Following Dennis et al. [5], in order to enforce an order of execution among
the transitions of the operational semantics, we organize the reasoning cycle in
three stages: (A) Deactivate instances for which the expiration condition holds
or the obligation has been fulfilled; (B) Check for violations of active obligations
(if the deadline has passed, but the goal has not been achieved) and prohibitions
(if the state to avoid is achieved).(C) Check for the activation of new norms and
update the list of previously matched instances.
In the following we denote by a1 : a2 : . . . a list of elements and we use  to
indicate the end of a list. Moreover, we assume that KB contains a predicate
cT(n), where n is a numTerm that represents the current time of the system and
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we denote by time(KB) the value n such that cT(n) ∈ KB. A configuration Conf
is defined as 〈KB, ∆, I,Π, Φ,Σ, r〉 where KB is the current state of the knowledge
base, ∆ is a list of norm descriptions, I is the list of active norm instances and Π
the list of previously matched instances, which, as discussed above, is needed to
avoid the problem of multiple activations. Φ is the set of violations detected in
the current reasoning cycle4, and a violation is represented as v = [idi, θ, t], where
t corresponds to the violation time. Σ is the stage of the computation and r is
a flag that is set initially to false, and changed to true if we need to loop again
through the reasoning cycle. This is necessary because, whenever we activate
a new instance (stage C), we need to check whether this is instantly fulfilled
or violated (A and B). Moreover, detecting a violation (B) could trigger an
expiration or an activation (A and C).
The initial configuration is 〈KB0, ∆, , , ,A, false〉, where KB0 describes the
initial state and ∆ the normative specification. We now illustrate the key rules
of the operational semantics. For each rule we include only the components of
the configuration that are involved in it.
Rule R1 applies when the first instance in I is such that its expiration con-
dition holds. In this case we simply remove the instance from the list. Similarly
another rule (not included) is defined for the case of a fulfilled obligation. Rule
R2 accounts for the case where the first instance in the list is a prohibition and
the expiration condition is not met. In this case we move the instance to the
end of the list, after the  symbol. We write a similar rule (not included) for an
obligation instance that it is neither fulfilled nor expired. Rule R3 represents the
end of stage A, which occurs when the first instance is .
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj , at] : I,A〉, ndi ∈ ∆,
eval(KB, expi, θj) = true
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj , at] : I,A〉 → 〈KB, ∆, I,A〉
(R1)
ndi ∈ ∆, modi = F, eval(KB, expi, θj) = false
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj , at] : I,A〉 → 〈KB, ∆, I : [idi, θj , at],A〉 (R2)
true
〈 : I,A〉 → 〈I : ,B〉 (R3)
Rule R4 detects violated obligations; i.e. obligations whose deadline has ex-
pired before the goal is satisfied. Since fulfilled obligations have been deleted in
stage A, we just need to check whether the deadline has expired. When we detect
a violation we update the violations list, add the violation description (denoted
by d([idi, θj , τ ])) to KB and we set the flag r to true since the violation predicate
might trigger the expiration condition of that instance. d([idi, θj , τ ]) consists of a
predicate v(idi,p(θj),τ) where p(θj) is a representation of the substitution in the
form of a predicate. In rule R5 if the first obligation in the list is not violated
we move it at the end of the list. Similarly we add two rules (not included) for
prohibitions, where we consider a prohibition to be violated if its goal condition
evaluates to true. Φ is included to avoid infinite loops. In fact, since rule R4 sets
r to true, detecting the same violation in each loop would cause infinite iteration.
4 We refer to the whole updating procedure as a reasoning cycle, while A, B and C
are the stages of a cycle.
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Rule R6, together with the condition [idi, θj , τ ] 6∈ Φ of rule R4 ensures that each
violation is detected only once for each reasoning cycle. Another rule similar to
rule R3 (not included) is defined for the end of stage B.
modi = O, [idi, θj , τ ] 6∈ Φ,
eval(KB, ddli, θj) = true, KB
∗ = KB ∪ d([idi, θj , τ ])
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj , at] : I, Φ,B, r〉 → 〈KB∗, ∆, I : [idi, θj , at], [idi, θj , τ ] : Φ,B, true〉
(R4)
nd.mod = O, eval(KB, ddli, θj) = false
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj , at] : I,B〉 → 〈KB, ∆, I : [idi, θj , at],B〉 (R5)
[idi, θj , τ ] ∈ Φ
〈[idi, θj , at] : I, Φ,B〉 → 〈I : [idi, θj , at], Φ,B〉 (R6)
Rule R7 checks for the activation of new instances of the first norm ndi in ∆.
Let τ = time(KB), for each θj ∈ match(KB, acti), we add a new instance [idi, θj , τ ] at
the end of Π (list Π2), while we add to I only those instances that are not in Π
(list I2). The substitutions of the instances added to I2 are integrated with the
assignment of the variables ?actTime and ?this-id which are needed to evaluate the
TEMPORAL and the VIOLATED conditions as we will show below. If we activate at least
one new instance we set r = true. By adding new instances at the end of Π, we
ensure that, at the end of the reasoning process, the instances added to Π during
the current reasoning cycle will be those after . Formally the pattern Π3 :  : Π4
identifies with Π4 all the instances added in the current step and with Π3 all the
instances added during the previous reasoning cycle. This is exploited in rule
R8, where, at the end of stage C, if r is equal to false, we end the reasoning cycle
(stage end) and discard Π3 and Φ. We define another rule (not included) for the
case where r is equal to true. In this case we move  at the end of ∆ and go back
to stage A. In rule R7, when we check if a new instance is not in Π, we consider
also instances added in previous loops of the current reasoning cycle. In this way
it is guaranteed that we do not reactivate the same instances in each loop.
I2 = 〈[idi, (θj ∪ θk), τ ] : . . . 〉 s.t. θj ∈ match(KB, acti) and eval(KB, expi, θj) = false
and θk = [?actTime/τ ] ∪ [?this-id/idi] and [idi, θj , τ − 1] 6∈ Π,
Π2 = 〈[idi, θj , τ ] : . . . 〉 s.t. θj ∈ match(KB, acti), r∗ = true iff (I2 6= ∅) or (r = true)
〈KB, ndi : ∆, I,Π,C, r〉 → 〈KB, ∆ : ndi, I2 : I,Π : Π2,C, r∗〉
(R7)
true
〈 : ∆,Π3 :  : Π4, Φ,C, false〉 → 〈∆ : ,Π4 : , , end, false〉 (R8)
With these transition rules in place, we now provide further details of the
match and eval functions for querying KB. We denote by θi[v] the value c assigned
by θi to the variable v. Given a formula f, f · θi denotes the formula obtained by
substituting, for each varTerm v with an assignment in θi, each occurrence of v in
f with θi[v]. Moreover we say that two substitutions θ1 and θ2 are compatible if
and only if there is no variable v that is bound in both the substitutions such
that its assigned values are different. Formally:
compatible(θ1, θ2) = true iff @ v, ([v/c1] ∈ θ1 and [v/c2] ∈ θ2 and c2 6= c1)
Let p denote a predicate, e a boolExpr, fi a formula, vi a varTerm, n and a numTerm, si
a strTerm and t a constTerm. We denote by s1.θk the substitution obtained by adding
the string s1 as a prefix to all varTerms in θk. Fig. 2 summarizes the semantics of
match and eval.
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match(KB, p) = {θi : p · θi ∈ KB}
match(KB, BIND ( v1 , t ) ) = {[v1/t]}
match(KB, f1 /\ f2) = {(θ1 ∪ θ2) : θ1 ∈ match(KB, f1)
and θ2 ∈ match(KB, f2) and compatible(θ1, θ2)}
match(KB, f1 \/ f2) = match(KB, f1) ∪ match(KB, f2)
match(KB, VIOLATION-OF(t1, s1)) = {s1.(θj ∪ [?violTime/vt]) : d([t1, θj , vt]) ∈ KB}
eval(KB, EXISTS { f1 }, θi) = false if match(KB, f1 · θi) = ∅; true otherwise
eval(KB, EQUALS ( t1 , t2 ), θi) = true iff t1 = t2. If t1 or t2 are varTerm, θi is used
to replace them with their assigned constant terms.
eval(KB, VIOLATED, θi) = true iff there exists a vt such
that d([t1, θi, vt]) ∈ KB and θi[?thisId] = t1
eval(KB, TEMPORAL(n), θi) = true iff θi[?actTime] + n <= time(KB)
eval(KB, COUNT(v1 IN{f1}) > n, θi) = true iff |{θj [v1] : θj ∈ match(KB, f1 · θi)}| > n.
same for the other compareOp.
NOT, \/, and /\ have the usual meaning when applied to boolExpr
match(KB, IN { f1} FILTER e) = {θi : θi ∈ match(KB, f1)and eval(KB, e, θi) = true}.
Fig. 2. Semantics of match and eval
The construct TEMPORAL(n), where n is a numTerm, will be used to evaluate a tem-
poral deadline of n steps relative to the activation time of a norm instance. In
defining its semantics we assume that the variable ?actTime is bound in θj to the
activation time (see Rule R7 of above). The construct VIOLATION-OF(n, s) presented
in Section 3.1, can be used in the activation condition of a CTD norm to return
the description of a detected violation of a norm with id n. For a violation [idj , θj ],
with n = idj, it returns the substitution obtained by adding the prefix s to all the
variable names of θj. The prefix is added in order to allow the norm designer to
distinguish between variables bound by the substitution of the violation and vari-
ables bound by the activation condition, even when they have the same variable
name. The construct VIOLATED is used when we want to ask whether the current
instance has been violated (e.g. for the expiration condition of an obligation). It
is evaluated to true if KB contains the description of a violation of the instance
being evaluated. Note that, since, for each instance, we bind the activation time
in the substitution, VIOLATED is able to distinguish between violations of different
instances associated with the same pair (ndj , θj).
5 The Seaguard Example
We now show how we can capture the norms described in our motivating example
(Section 2) using the co`ir formalism. Norm 1 states that at any instant of time,
at least one agent must monitor the area. This may be captured by a prohibition
from achieving a state where no agent is monitoring the area (a safety property).
The fact that a UAV monitoring the area is preferred to a helicopter can be
represented by separating the norm in two as shown in Fig. 3 (nd1 and nd4).
Norm nd1 is a prohibition that is violated if no UAV is monitoring the area.
Norm nd4 is violated if neither a UAV nor a helicopter is monitoring the area.
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Therefore, a situation where a UAV is monitoring the area would comply with
both the norms, while having a helicopter monitoring would violate only nd1.
nd1 = 〈1, F , act1, false, goal1, false 〉
act1 = type(?add,coalition) /\ type(?ar,rArea)
goal1 = NOT EXISTS{ memberOf(?ag1,?add) /\ type(?ag1,uav) /\ monitoring(?ag1,?ar) }
nd4 = 〈4, F , act1, false, goal4, false 〉
goal4 = NOT EXISTS{ memberOf(?ag1,?add) /\ monitoring(?ag1,?ar) /\
( type(?ag1,uav) \/ type(?ag1,heli) ) }
nd2 = 〈2, O, act2, exp2, goal2, ddl2〉
act2 = IN{ type(?add,coalition) /\ type(?ar,rArea) /\ inArea(?ag1,?ar) } FILTER
NOT EXISTS{ type(?ag1,?type) /\ subType(?type,authAgent) }
exp2 = VIOLATED \/ NOT EXISTS { inArea(?ag1,?ar) }
goal2 = EXISTS{ intercepting(?ag2,?ag1) /\ memberOf(?ag2,?add) }
ddl2 = TEMPORAL(3)
nd3 = 〈3, O, act3, exp3, goal3, TEMPORAL(3) 〉
act3 = IN { type(?add,coalition) /\ VIOLATION-OF(2,v) } FILTER EQUALS(?add,?v:add)
exp3 = NOT EXISTS{ inArea(?v:ag1,?v:ar) } \/ EXISTS { intercepting(?ag2,?v:ag1) }
goal3 = EXISTS{ reporting(?ag2,?v:ag1) /\ memberOf(?ag2,?add) }
Fig. 3. Specification of norms nd1, nd2 and nd3.
Norms nd2 and nd3 capture the specification of norms 2 and 3 from our moti-
vating example respectively. An instance of the obligation nd2 is activated, for a
coalition, every time an unauthorized boat ?ag1 enters the restricted area ?ar. The
obligation is fulfilled if one member of the coalition ?ag2 intercepts ?ag1 before a
deadline of three time steps, while it expires if ?ag1 exits ?ar or the obligation is
violated. Obligation nd3 is activated by a violation of norm nd2, and is addressed
to the same coalition. It requires at least one member of the coalition to report
the unauthorized access.
6 Formal Verification
In this section we explore the problem of verifying properties of multi-agent
systems specified using co`ir. Firstly we discuss our implementation of the op-
erational semantics in Maude [4], a rewriting logic framework that allows us to
specify the semantics of a system by means of rewriting rules. We chose Maude
because its syntax for specifying rewriting rules is very close to that for SOS.
Moreover, by implementing our system in Maude, we obtain a specification which
is executable and on which we can perform formal verification using the Maude
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) model checker. In this way we can: (i) Validate
our normative specification; for example by verifying that a specified non compli-
ant behaviour always results in a detected violation; and (ii) Verify how robust a
multi-agent system is to violations; for example by verifying if a certain property
is guaranteed under certain compliance assumptions [1, 7].
We discuss the reasons why, by representing our model as explained in Sec-
tion 4, we obtain an infinite state model. We show how we can use the LTL
model checker to perform bounded model checking of the infinite state system,
and then show how we can modify our model in order to make the state space
finite and apply unbounded model checking.
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6.1 Maude Implementation
Maude modules can contain conditional equations: simplification rules used to
define data-types and language constructs and to specify how they are evaluated
by the system. Modules may also contain conditional rewriting rules: transition
rules that describe how the state of a system can evolve over time. We defined
the co`ir language (Fig. 1) and we implemented the match and eval functions.
We then implemented our operational semantics by means of an operator reason
that takes as arguments a configuration and returns the configuration resulting
from the application of the reasoning cycle. The reasoning process is described
by a set of conditional equations, which are a direct (syntactical) translation of
the rules of Section 4 into the Maude syntax. The dynamics of the system is
specified by a set of rules that follow the pattern:
crl C => reason( tick(C’, n) ) if condition .
where C and C’ are two configurations and the only component that can change
from C to C’ is the knowledge base. tick is a function that takes a configuration
C and an integer n as parameters and increases the time in C by n units. The
meaning of this rule pattern is that, at each step, after applying the changes in
the description of the environment, we invoke the reason operator to update the
list of active instances, previous matches and violations accordingly. The Maude
model checker, given one initial state i, and a set of transition rules T , generates
a Kripke structure containing all the states that are reachable from i.
6.2 Bounded Model Checking
Properties of a norm-governed multi-agent system can be verified using the
Maude LTL model checker. In order to do so we need to define a labelling
function λ, specifying the set of atomic propositions q ∈ Q that hold in some
state s ∈ S [4, Chap. 13]. We denote by ((s |=λ q) = true) the fact q holds in s and
by ((s |=λ q) = false) the fact that q doesn’t hold in s. The state of a multi-agent
system is represented by the configuration Conf of the monitoring component.
Let Q be the set of all predicates as defined in Fig. 1. Equations 1-4 defines λ.
〈KB, ∆, I,Π, Φ,Σ, r〉 |=λ p = true if p ∈ KB. (1)
〈KB, ∆, I,Π, Φ,Σ, r〉 |=λ violated(n) = true if ∃ θj , τ s.t. : d([n, θj , τ ]) ∈ KB (2)
〈KB, ∆, I,Π, Φ,Σ, r〉 |=λ violated(n, t) = true if ∃ θj , τ s.t. : d([n, θj ∪ [?add/t], τ ]) ∈ KB (3)
〈KB, ∆, I,Π, Φ,Σ, r〉 |=λ p = false otherwise . (4)
Equation 1 makes it possible to use the predicates of KB as atoms of LTL
properties. Equations 2 and 3 define properties about the normative state of a
configuration, allowing us to query the model checker for states where a certain
norm has been violated (optionally specifying an addressee).
The principal requirement to make the LTL model-checking decidable is for
the transition system to have a finite number of reachable states. However, the
fact that we represent time explicitly in KB means that the state space is infinite.
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One way of dealing with this is to limit the state space to the states reachable
in a fixed number of transitions, l. We can do this, for example, by modifying
the specification of the system so that all the conditional rewriting rules that
increase the time by n are applicable only to states where time(KB) < l−n. Ideally,
however, we want to be able to verify system properties in the unbounded case.
6.3 Unbounded Model Checking
In order to make the unbounded model checking problem decidable, we need to
remove any explicit reference to the current time from the semantics. We remove
the predicate cT(n) from KB and the references to activation and violation time
from instances and violations respectively (now represented as [idj , θk]). In order
to represent temporal deadlines, we take an approach similar to the one proposed
by Lamport [10]. When we activate an instance (Rule R7), instead of binding
?actTime, we add the assignment [?tick/n] in the substitution of instances of norms
that include a statement of type TEMPORAL(n). Rule R7 is substituted with:
I2 = 〈[idi, (θj ∪ θk)] : . . . 〉 s.t. θj ∈ match(KB, acti) and eval(KB, expi, θj) = false
and θk = isTemp(ddli) and [idi, θj ] 6∈ Π,
Π2 = 〈[idi, θj ] : . . . 〉 s.t. θj ∈ match(KB, acti), r∗ = true iff (I2 6= ∅) or (r = true)
〈KB, ndi : ∆, I,Π,C, r〉 → 〈KB, ∆ : ndi, I2 : I,Π : Π2,C, r∗〉
(R7*)
where isTemp(ddli) checks whether a deadline is temporal and, in that case,
returns the initialisation for the ?tick variable.
isTemp(ddli) =
{
[?tick/t] if ddli contains one and only one statement of the type TEMPORAL(t)
∅ otherwise.
We then modify the tick(C,m) operator so that, for each instance [idj , θk],
it will decrease all the values t such that [?tick/t] ∈ θk by a value equal to the
minimum of t and m. The semantics of eval(KB , TEMPORAL(n), θj) is then changed
to return true if and only if the ?tick variable reaches value zero:
eval(KB, TEMPORAL(n), θj) = true iff [?tick/0] ∈ θj .
In other words, for every instance of a norm with a temporal deadline, we
activate a timer that is decremented by a call to the function tick. The deadline is
considered expired when the timer reaches 0. Another consequence of removing
the explicit reference to the current time is that, without a reference to the
activation time, multiple instances or violations associated with the same pair
(ndi , θj) become indistinguishable. This leads to a number of problems at the
implementation level. Consider the example in Section 5. When the coalition
fails to intercept an unauthorized boat ub (violation of nd2), an instance of nd3
that binds to ub will be activated and included in the list Π. Subsequent violations
will bind to the same substitution in the activation condition of nd3, preventing
any new activation. In order to solve this problem we need to make sure that
every new violation of nd2 will match, for the activation condition of nd3, to a
substitution that is not currently in Π. We do this by adding a boolean flag in the
representation of the violation in the knowledge base. When the first violation
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of nd2 associated with θj is detected, its description is added to KB with the
flag set to false. At every subsequent violation associated with the same pair
(nd2, θj) we change the value of the flag. We update the semantics of match for the
construct VIOLATION-OF(t1, s1) to include the variable ?flag bound to the flag value
instead of the variable ?violTime. When, for example, the flag values goes from
false to true, the previous match for the activation of nd3 is deleted while the
instance with ?flag set to true gets activated. This mechanism guarantees that we
can activate at least one CTD instance per step for each pair (nd3, θj). Further, to
correctly interpret the VIOLATED expression, we need to check for a violation of the
current instance. Again, without relying on the activation time, we are not able
to distinguish between different violations associated to the same pair (ndi , θj).
We solve this by adding to the substitution θj of each instance [idi, θj ] a variable
?violated which is initially unbound. We modify Rule R4 (and the equivalent for
violated prohibitions) to set ?violated to true when a violation is detected, and
update the semantics of eval for VIOLATED as follows:
eval(KB, VIOLATED, θj) = true iff [?violated/true] ∈ θj (5)
As a result of these modifications, rule R4 becomes as follows:
modi = O, θk = θj ∪ [?violated/true]
[idi, θj ] 6∈ Φ, eval(KB, ddli, θj) = true, KB∗ = addV (KB, [idi, θj ])
〈KB, ∆, [idi, θj ] : I, Φ,B, r〉 → 〈KB∗, ∆, I : [idi, θk], [idi, θk] : Φ,B, true〉
(R4*)
where θk is the substitution obtained by setting the value of the ?violated flag
and addV updates the content of KB as discussed above:
addV (KB, [idi, θj ]) =

KB ∪ v(idi,p(θj),false) if v(idi,p(θj),f) 6∈ KB
∀f ∈ {true, false}
KB \ v(idi,p(θj),f) ∪ v(idi,p(θj),¬f) if v(idi,p(θj),f) ∈ KB
6.4 Model Checking Results
We implemented our scenario in Maude and ran the LTL model checker to verify
properties of the system for both bounded and unbounded cases.
Table 1 shows the results for bounded model checking5. The scenario imple-
mented includes a single UAV a Helicopter and two unauthorized boats and is
regulated by norms nd1, nd2 and nd4. In all these scenarios agents can perform,
according to their capabilities, at most seven actions: start and stop monitoring,
start and stop intercepting, start and stop reporting, and move to a different
area. We checked the following property, which asks whether a state where uav
does not monitor the restricted area area2 always results in a violation of nd1:
((¬monitoring(uav1, area2))→ violated(1))
To prove that this property is always true the model checker has to observe
the whole state space, giving us a worst-case scenario in terms of execution
time. We can see that both the execution time and the number of states increase
exponentially with the number of steps.
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Table 1. Model checking results: bounded steps
Step Limit
7 8 9 10 11
States 4647 12352 32336 81504 202007
Execution Time 10 s 29 s 78 s 3m 8s 8m
Table 2. Model checking result: unbounded
Part a: ddl2 = ddl3 = TEMPORAL (3)
cA uB nd1 nd2 nd3 nd4 States Time
2 2 X X 5250 20s Part b: ddl2 = ddl3 = TEMPORAL (1)
2 2 X X X 20012 2m cA uB nd1 nd2 nd3 nd4 States Time
2 2 X X X X 243994 1h,16m 1 2 X X X X 5717 40s
3 2 X X 19032 2m 2 2 X X X X 17653 5m
3 2 X X X 72327 15m 3 2 X X X X 75245 16m
3 2 X X X X 870165 25h
Table 2 shows the results for unbounded model checking in different scenarios.
cA is the number of coalition agents, uB the number of unauthorized boats,
while for each ndi , a X indicates that the norm was included in the scenario.
The scenario in row 2 (Table 2.a) is equivalent to that used to produce the
results in Table 1. Note that the execution time for bounded model checking at
10 steps is higher than the unbounded case. This is due to the fact that, since we
include the time value in KB, conceptually equivalent states are not recognized
because their time values differ, making it impossible for the model checker to
take advantage of optimizations that rely on state matching.
As we can see from Table 2.a, the scenarios where both nd2 and nd3 are enforced
are those with higher execution times. We believe this is due to an interaction
between temporal deadlines and CTD obligations: In fact nd3 is a CTD of nd2
and each of them has a temporal deadline of 3 steps. Values for the ?tick variable
range from 3 to 0 in instances of nd2 and, whenever nd2 is violated, the timer
for nd3 is initialized. Our intuition is confirmed by Table 2.b: by decreasing the
deadline to 1, we obtain significantly smaller state spaces and execution times.
We now show how model checking can be used to verify that our normative
specification is correct, by checking that non compliant behaviours are detected
as violations. Let’s consider a variation of nd2 stating that, in order to optimize
the allocation of resources, we want one and only one member of the coalition to
intercept the unauthorized boat detected in the restricted area. Intuitively we
would be tempted to express the norm with the following goal:
goal2 = COUNT ( ?ag2 IN { memberOf(?ag2,?add) /\ intercepting(?ag2,?ag1) } ) = 1
which holds true if the number of agents (?ag2) that are members of the coali-
tion and are intercepting ?ag1 is equal to 1. We can now use model checking to
verify whether this specification captures the meaning we intend. For example,
we might ask whether it is true that having two agents intercepting the same
boat results in a violation. We refer to area2 to be the restricted area, ub the unau-
thorized boat, and uav and heli the UAV and the helicopter respectively. We check
5 All tests ran on a Intel Core i5 2.7Ghz, 16 GB RAM.
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the following property, which says that having both uav and heli intercepting ub
always results in a violation of nd2.
((intercepting(uav,ub) ∧ intercepting(heli,ub) ∧ inArea(ub,area2))→ violated(2))
The model checker returns an execution trace that violates the property as
a counter example. In fact, if the uav and heli start intercepting at two different
instants of time, the obligation is fulfilled (and thus deleted) when the first agent
starts intercepting. We can capture the intended meaning with an obligation to
have at least one agent intercepting before the deadline and a prohibition from
having multiple agents intercepting the same boat.
We now show, with an example, how model checking can be used to verify
robustness-related properties. We want to verify whether compliance with nd2 and
nd3 guarantees that an unauthorized boat cannot enter and exit the restricted
area without being reported or intercepted. We denote by area1 and area2 an
unrestricted and a restricted area respectively. The following property says that
there is no path such that ub goes from area2 to area1 being neither intercepted
nor reported and without triggering a violation of nd2 or nd3.
¬♦(inArea(ub,area2) ∧ ♦inArea(ub,area1) ∧(¬violated(2) ∧ ¬violated(3) ∧
¬intercepting(uav,ub) ∧ ¬reporting(uav,ub) ∧ ¬intercepting(heli,ub) ∧ ¬reporting(heli,ub)))
The model checker shows as a counterexample a path where ub moves from
area2 to area1 before the deadline for it being intercepted, causing the expiration
of nd2. We thus verified that our normative system does not guarantee that the
specified critical situation will never occur, even if we consider only compliant
paths. If we want to make sure that, in a situation of compliance, a boat that
exits the area is at least reported, we can modify exp2, ddl2 and exp3 as:
exp2 = VIOLATED ; exp3 = false
ddl2 = TEMPORAL(3) \/ NOT EXISTS{inArea(?ag1,?ar)}
In this way, both the expiration of the temporal deadline or ub exiting area2
before being intercepted trigger a violation of nd2, thus activating an instance of
nd3. By applying model checking we can see that compliance with revised norms
nd2 and nd3 guarantees that the boat is intercepted or reported.
7 Discussion
The formalism we use to represent norms builds upon a number of approaches to
formalise norms for practical applications. For example Tinnemeier et al. [14] de-
scribe the operational semantics of a normative language with support for norms
with deadlines and CTD obligations. Hu¨bner et al. [9] adopt an SOS-approach to
formalise the norm lifecycle (activation, fulfilment, violation, etc.) for monitoring
the execution of norm-governed systems, which provides the underpinning for a
language (NOPL) for programming such systems. Alvarez-Napagao et al. [2] pro-
pose a semantics based on production systems for a norm monitoring component
that supports norms with deadlines. We complement this existing research by
addressing the issue of verifying temporal properties of such systems. co`ir also
permits the representation of collective imperatives, which are not considered in
existing models defined using semantics at the operational level.
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Existing research on the verification of properties of normative systems has
been focussing on restricted representations of norms, considering only variations
of conditional deontic logic, without considering deadlines, event-driven norms,
or collective imperatives. Dennis et al. [5], for example, integrate the ORWELL
normative language in the MCAPL verification framework in order to verify
properties of agents’ organisations. In ORWELL, however, norms are represented
through counts as rules, which label states as compliant or non-compliant by
saying that a brute fact counts as an institutional fact (e.g. a violation) in a
certain context. Our results (Table 2), show that, despite using a more expressive
representation, verification times are comparable to those reported by Dennis et
al. [5]. An alternative approach is that proposed by, for example, A˚gotnes et al.
[1], where transitions of a Kripke structure are labelled as compliant or non
compliant. It is then possible to use model checking to verify properties of the
system under different compliance assumptions. While such a labelling might be
expressive enough to represent the kind of norms captured by our formalism, it
is not clear how to compute it from a declarative normative specification.
We believe that this mismatch between formalisms used to specify and mon-
itor norms and those used to verify and analyse normative systems makes it
difficult to ensure that the norms being implemented satisfy certain desired
properties. Our work attempts to bridge the gap between norm specification,
monitoring and verification, by providing an executable specification that is ver-
ifiable through model checking.
For future research we plan to explore techniques to exploit domain symme-
tries in order to improve performances and to extend our model to allow agents
to issue imperatives at run-time.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed co`ir, a language for the specification of obligations
and prohibitions with support for common features of real world norms, including
deadlines, contrary to duty and event-based activation/deactivation. We showed
how, thanks to the fact that we allow existential and universal quantification over
variables, our formalism can be used to specify common patterns of collective
obligations. We then formalized how norms are to be interpreted by means of
an operational semantics which we then implemented in Maude. We discussed
how the fact that we explicitly represent time in our model leads to an infinite
state space, and hence proposed an abstraction of our model that preserves the
semantics and makes unbounded model checking decidable. We then used the
Maude LTL model checker to validate our normative specification and to verify
its robustness to violations.
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ABSTRACT. This paper discusses knowledge accumulation and diffusion 
mechanisms and their effect on social and institutional change in an artificial 
society. The focus of this paper is to model the role of knowledge keepers in the 
CKSW institutional meta-role framework. In literature this role has been asso-
ciated with helping to maintain social order by spreading social awareness and 
resolving disputes. In addition to outlining the model of a complex, adaptive, 
and self-sustaining artificial society, we examine in this context the societal 
mechanism of violence control. 
Keywords: Artificial social systems, Social Simulations, Institutions, Com-
plex Social Systems 
1 Introduction 
An increasingly popular approach for understanding complex social interactions in the social 
sciences is agent-based modeling and simulation [1–5]. Most of the works in this area take a 
specific perspective on the complex world of human societies and model phenomena related to 
that perspective in isolation from any other aspects of the society. However, agent-based mod-
elling affords the opportunity to see how multiple interconnected factors may interact and affect 
the overall outcome. 
This paper describes a model of primitive human communities with thousands of agents across 
multiple generations. Apart from representing an archetypical primitive society, the model 
affords measuring changes of social relationships of agents over time and their effects on socie-
tal wellbeing. Furthermore, it demonstrates how these modelled people dynamically adapt to 
different levels of resource availability or different demographic compositions. The model 
introduces a set of specific social interactions, such as mutual sharing, maintaining personal 
relationships, and keeping up with social reputation changes. We deem those to be applicable to 
primitive societies in particular in order to measure their long-term effect on the society’s struc-
tural makeup and socio-economic development.  
A notable feature of our model is its representation of generic roles that characterize some of 
the fundamental social activities in the society and how they are coordinated. In particular the 
generic role of the knowledge-keeper will be shown below to be a key element in the coordina-
tion of the society’s activities.  It is our belief that such generic agent roles, such as that of the 
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knowledge-keeper, are crucial aspects of inter-agent coordination and are as fundamental to 
social sustainability as organizational structures, such as norms and institutions. 
2 Background 
As discussed in [6], primitive communities can be considered to be a good starting point for 
modeling human interactions and societies’ structures. Agent-based models of such societies 
typically have agents operate according to simple rules that are derived from ethnographic field 
studies. We built our model based on the earlier extensive studies of primitive cultures that 
were initiated by Younger [6–10]. Younger’s work was based on his observations of pre-
contact Pacific Island societies, and they can serve as an archetype for pre-modern societies 
without advanced and explicit institutional structures. In order to structure both the society and 
internal agent’s structure we follow the CKSW approach of Purvis and Purvis [11, 12] that 
identifies four fundamental meta-roles of social interaction that are believed to be found in 
every society. The CKSW Meta-Role Model consists of four basic meta-roles: 
 C ‒ the Commander role. It characterizes leaders and those who are in charge of decision-
making and have access to coercive authority to control others. 
 K ‒ the Knowledge role. The Knowledge specialist role has the responsibility to create, 
maintain, control, and transmit institutional knowledge. Since its central feature lies in the 
management of knowledge, we refer to it as knowledge keeper in the remainder of the text. 
 S ‒ the Skill role characterizes know-how intelligence. Skilled people develop tools to en-
hance their operations, and so they have historically engaged in trade to exchange these 
tools with other groups. 
 W ‒ the Worker role represents the general working population which can use tools to en-
gage in productive activities. 
The reflection of the CKSW meta-role model in real human societies suggests that it can pro-
vide a natural structural scaffolding in agent-based models of artificial societies.  Its application 
to our model of an evolving primitive society is particularly suitable, since it allows us to model 
and retrace structural development of a society both on an individual level, an intermediate 
level (classes of agents that are primarily dedicated to a particular role), and a macro level (the 
overall structural outcome). The internal (individual level) CKSW element defines different 
types of agents with varying preferences in the light of similar opportunities. For example an 
individual with a relatively high K (knowledge)-value would be more able to use and exploit 
knowledge that becomes available. In earlier work of Jahanbazi et al. [13], covering social 
interaction in primitive societies, only the C and W meta-roles were included in the social mod-
el. In general, however when societies become more organized, it is natural for them to start 
keeping track of and managing knowledge of general value, thereby shaping their value sys-
tems and culture. For example, a K-specific aspect is the interpretation of the natural environ-
ment and phenomena. Thus special social roles with a focus on K-management have arisen in 
early past societies, such as the “medicine man” or priest that managed and interpreted 
knowledge.  Thus we believe that societies first emerged with C and W meta-role sectors (the 
most primitive societies) and then developed into societies with C, W, and K meta-role sectors.  
Only later were all four C, K, W, and S meta-role sectors present in more developed societies.  
The work presented here describes a model for early C-K-W societies that have agents that 
activate the C, K, and W meta-roles.  
Work on the part of other social scientists and agent-based modellers has investigated building 
artifical societies, but without the CKSW scaffolding. Each uses a different approach and 
different angle to define the complex world in their model. The model developed by [3, 14] 
shares our objective for developing a model which allows endogenous progression of 
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institutional development. There are many works which only focus on singular aspects captured 
in our model, for instance population dynamics [15–17], mate selection [18–20], kinship [21], 
leadership and governance [3, 6], institutions [3, 14], economic development [2, 5, 22] or even 
modeling the society’s history [23, 24].  
Due to the multifaceted nature of our model and limited space, we can only briefly introduce 
the various elements of the model as well as features relevant to the knowledge-keeper role in 
the upcoming section.  
3 Model Description 
Our model consists of one or more villages of people, each with a leader.  All agents have a 
finite lifetime (they can die of “old age”) and need to eat food resources in order to sustain 
themselves. If an agent doesn’t eat enough food, it can die of hunger. For this reason agents 
may sometimes be motivated to steal food from others.  But agents may be killed for either 
stealing food or for reasons of revenge due to negative opinions of each other or previous nega-
tive experience. During their fertility ages, agents find mates (based on the matching of their 
mutual relationship values) and reproduce offspring that inherit (with a small possibility of 
mutation) their parents’ characteristics. 
Model Overview.  
In summary, our core model follows the idea that ordinary worker agents live in a village that is 
ruled by a leader agent and undergo a regular daily life cycle.  They gather food from the envi-
ronment and bring it to storage locations controlled by the leader. In our model an agent’s time 
schedule is based on its own characteristics. For example, while the length of day is a universal 
parameter and is the same for all agents, an agent’s “productive time” depends on its loyalty 
and defines how many time units during the day that they must work for the village leader. 
During their productive time period, the follower (i.e. non-leader) agents are under the com-
mand of the leader and gather food from the surrounding area which they then deposit into a 
central storage controlled by the leader.  
After an agent’s productive time period has elapsed, it is free from obligations to the leader. At 
this point agent can keep the collected food. Agents can carry this food around, or can store it 
in their home. The stored food at home is accessible by all members of a household and is 
secure from theft, while the food that agents carry might be subject to theft. Beyond these activ-
ities, agents engage in other activities, such as sharing food (in order to increase their reputation 
and hence increase their chance of finding a mate), stealing, socializing (sharing what they 
know about other agents’ reputations with other agents that they know), and taking revenge if 
they hold a negative relationship value toward another agent. An agent could have a negative 
relationship value toward another agent if it were to witness that agent’s stealing or killing acts, 
or witness an out-group agent (an agent from another village) collecting food from the observ-
er’s village’s food sources. Apart from these actions, agents also perform automated activities 
that do not require deliberation. Those include growing older, experiencing increase in the 
hunger level due to energy consumption, eating (if they carry food and their hunger level is 
high), observing other nearby agents, and mating (under the condition that they had already 
found a mate). 
Leaders maintain order in the village, but they do not gather food. They have control over the 
village’s storage, however. They issue orders to collect food. Furthermore, they might share 
food with hungry follower agents based on their own loyalty and altruism level. They also have 
the power based on their aggression level to arrest agents who commit crimes in their vicinity. 
The overall social climate is affected by the leader’s behavior. For example, leaders with high 
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personal altruism levels tend to share more food with their followers, which can lead to social 
welfare without starvation (but also possibly to overexploitation with deleterious results). On 
the other hand, leaders with high personal aggression levels prevent more crimes and therefore 
decrease overall deaths due to crime. A schematic and high-level overview of the simulation is 
shown in Algorithm 1.  
Schematic overview of the simulation run  
1: Initiate Global Parameters 
2: Set the physical environment 
3: Create the agents 
4: Assign Leader to each village 
5: for SimulationDuration do 
6:             if  clock < (Loyalty * LengthOfDay) and IsFollower and LeaderOrder = Col-
lectFood do 
7:             Move Toward Food Sources 
8:             Collect Food 
9:             Move Back to MyVillage 
10:             Deposit Food Into CentralStorage 
11: else 
12:             if  LeaderOrder = ShareFood do  
13:                         Get a share of food 
14:             end if 
15:             Eat Food at Food Source 
16:             Share Food 
17:             Move Back to MyHome 
18:             Deposit Food into HomeStorage 
19:             Steal 
20:             Take Revenge 
21:             Share Normative Reputation 
22:             Observe Others 
23:             Eat Food From Home Storage 
24:             Procreate 
25:             while Death Condition = False do 
26:                         Grow Older  
27:                         Consume Energy 
28:                         Forget Old or Unimportant relationships 
29:                         Find Mate 
30:              end while 
31: Update Food Resources  
32: Update Statistics 
33: Update Leaders  
34: end for 
Algorithm 1: high level schematics overview of the simulation. 
Model Functional Aspects.  
Our agent-based model is implemented in Netlogo [25], for which the location granularity is 
referred to as a “patch” and relationships between agents are demonstrated with “links”. In the 
following we will give insight into the functional aspects of the model. 
The individual agents in our model have the following feature categories:  
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 Simulation related variables. These track an individual’s states, such as its needed food 
resource level, the amount of food resources it may be carrying, its current chosen goal, or the 
location of its home (its “patch”). This also includes a list of known resource locations. 
 Demographic related variables. Age, sex, and fertility rate are part of this group. 
 Kinship related variables. These include references to parents, children, mate, lineage, 
siblings, and their village. 
 Personal variables. These include Altruism, Aggression, Loyalty, Physical Ability, and they 
are represented by a value between 0 and 1.0. These variables are adopted from [6]. 
 Role related variables. Agents can be Leaders or Followers (corresponding to Commanders 
(C) and Workers (W)). In addition there is a Leader Class of agents with family ties to the 
current leader (they are still follower agents but they may have special privileges) .In this 
connection there is a loyalty-level parameter. For the leader of a village, it determines the ex-
tent to which his ruling is coercive. But for followers, this parameter determines how likely 
they are to obey orders.  
 Agents’ internal CKSW variables. Each agent has C, K, S, and W attributes, and for each 
such attribute there are two values ‒ a capability value and an achievement value. The capa-
bility variable reflects how an agent will react to various opportunities available in the envi-
ronment. For example, if an agent must choose between (1) exploring ways to be able to col-
lect more food resources, and (2) exchanging information with other agents about known re-
sources, then its choice will be determined by whether its knowledge (K) capability or skill 
(S) capability is dominant. If its knowledge capability is dominant, then the agent will choose 
to exchange information.  This achievement level can be enhanced over time according to de-
fined individual learning rates.  
Agents Interactions.  
Agents keep track of their relationships with other agents. The relationships of agents are main-
tained using an internal interaction matrix maintained by each agent that holds information 
about other agents it has encountered. The matrix is modified based on the observation of ‘good 
deeds’, such as sharing, and likewise adjusted based on negative experiences with an agent, 
such as observing or being the victim of stealing. Associated with this is the essential action of 
socialization. Similar to the notion of gossiping, when agents socialize they align their interac-
tion matrix values in congruence with shared common acquaintances. 
Relationships are represented by Netlogo “links”. Each agent has a set of incoming links which 
are carrying another agent’s opinion of the agent. Additionally each agent has a set of outgoing 
links that hold its opinion about other agents. The reputation of one agent is the sum of all the 
observational values on incoming links. 
Links have the following attributes: 
 Age: the creation time of the link.  
 Frequency: the number of interactions so far with the agent at the end of this link.  
 Material exchange value: the amount of resources exchanged with this agent by sharing or 
stealing.  
 Observational Values: the “strength” of the relationship based on observing the other 
agent’s actions or from being informed about that agent from other sources (for example by 
gossiping about a known third agent reputation).  
Agent’s Decision-Making.  
Agents choose actions based on their internal state, which can include their hunger level, levels 
of altruism or aggression, as well as external state, which can be changed by the presence of a 
leader or enforcer agents in their vicinity. In general, we aim to use a minimum of fixed-
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behaviour parameters to determine an agent’s actions, and instead make use of social compari-
son in most decision-making activities. For example aggressive agents are not necessarily just 
those with aggression levels higher than 0.5 (or any other hard-wired parameter); instead, they 
define a personal threshold based on self-comparison with other people that they know in their 
village. This implies that an agent with an aggression level of 0.6 who lives near another agent 
whose aggression level is 0.4 might act more aggressively compared to similar 0.6 aggression 
level agent who lives next to an agent with a 0.8 aggression level. (If an agent’s aggression 
level is higher than those in its vicinity, then it is more likely to act aggressively.) 
Another example of how an agent’s activities can vary according to the social context concerns 
the conditions under which an agent might be motivated to steal. Ordinarily the conditions 
determining when an agent might commit a crime are dependent on whether a composite set of 
threshold conditions is met (the MaxHunger value is the level of hunger at which the agent will 
die of starvation): 
1) There is no law enforcer (e.g. a leader) nearby. 
2) The perpetrating agent is not carrying food. 
3) Another agent is nearby who carries food. 
4) HungerLevel/(MaxHunger)   >  AltruismLevel 
5) HungerLevel/(MaxHunger)   >  (1- AggressionLevel) 
In addition to such situations, however, there are other conditions that could prevail.  A poten-
tial crime perpetrator could evaluate the risk of getting caught and decide that it is worth com-
mitting the crime, for example, when condition 1) is not met.  In that case the perpetrator agent 
might temporarily elevate its aggression level and commit the crime, anyway.  
3.1 The Incorporation of Knowledge into the Model 
Having discussed the fundamental features, we now proceed with introducing new features 
added to the model. In order to make the model more comprehensible, we have classified its 
main features based on their related structural components, which we use as a rough guide for 
the introduction of the model additions. Figure 1 shows the defined model components. The 
Physical Environment covers infrastructural aspects related to the simulation environment, such 
as the locations of resources, growth rates, defining distances between different locations, the 
distances between villages, village settings, and the locations of distributed village storages. 
The Institutional Structure is the social structure we impose upon the agents; it defines the 
structure of the society in which agents live, including the norms and the rules they must con-
sider in their decision-making. The Individual Agent covers anything related to features and 
capabilities of individual agents. 
 
Fig. 1. Model components.  
Physical Environment.  
As shown in Figure 2 at the center of each village is a central storage area that the leader con-
trols. In addition, each village has four distributed storage locations, which are also controlled 
by the leader and which make it easier for villages to deposit food so that there is less time 
spent commuting to and from food sources. There is also a common food source area between 
Physical Environment  
Institutional Structure  
Individual Agent 
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the villages, over which each village makes a claim of ownership. Collecting food from this 
area may lead to revenge attacks or negative reciprocity relationships (since villagers look 
negatively on any other agent from another village who collects food from the common area 
that they claim as theirs). Note that our general model is designed so that different numbers of 
villages can be generated automatically. 
  
Fig. 2. Multi-Village Configurations, Each village has a central storage in the center and four 
distributed storage locations (small houses). Food sources, shown by black squares, are distrib-
uted in a circle with same distance from the center. A common food source area is located 
between villages with same distance to center of each village. 
Institutional Structure.  
As a society grows in size, it becomes increasingly difficult for a leader to maintain a monopoly 
on coercive control.  So for social scalability we have introduced a class of people appointed by 
the leader who monitor and prevent crimes. Those agents are recruited from the “Worker 
Class” (i.e. regular villagers) and selection is done based on the strength of their kinship rela-
tionships to the leader. This is associated with the leader selection strategy, which is based on 
heredity. That is, when a leader dies, either his son, or his next closest kin will step up to be-
come the new leader. And the new leader class will be selected based on the new leader’s kin-
ship relationships; members of the old “Leader class” will be converted back to regular work-
ers.  
The daily course of action of people in the “Leader class” group is similar to that of the normal 
worker class, they have all basic responsibilities; but they also have the authority to secure 
locations identified by the leader to prevent crimes. This is governed by a probability related to 
their aggression and loyalty levels. The aggression level determines the successful prevention 
of crimes, while the loyalty level determines how long (how many time units) these agents are 
under orders to maintain security at a location. They have the power to arrest agents who dare 
to commit a crime in their presence. Resulting prisoner agents are required to work full-time for 
the public good and collect food and deposit it into village storage. This strategy is in accord-
ance with Boehm [26], who argues that in Pacific Island societies, instead of elimination of the 
offender, they have used another sort of temporary punishment which motivated the offender to 
regain group acceptance again and be able to return to life in the society. Whenever agents do 
get arrested, their reputation values will decrease significantly based on their current reputation 
level and the type of the crime they were caught committing. The secondary form of punish-
ment is in accordance with [27], which discusses the effectiveness of combining material pun-
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ishment (having to collect certain amount of food for the leader) with normative punishment 
(lowering one’s reputation), which is a form of group punishment [28] in that it decreases the 
chance of the offending agent in finding a mate or receiving shared food (since an agent’s repu-
tation is publicly visible).  
But this system of law enforcement will only work if knowledge about notable events is shared 
widely. Ordinarily whenever any notable event such as a crime occurs, nearby agents who have 
a high Knowledge Capability may observe this event and record it. But ordinary agents have 
only information about the areas that they visited and they don’t have a big picture of the whole 
village.  However, a group of agents with high loyalty have the opportunity to share their ob-
servations with the leader. This is in line with the notion of having a group of people who care 
more for their society’s wellbeing and see themselves responsible to report crimes whenever 
they see them and take action in order to make their society safer [29]. Then the leader can 
decide on locations which need more control of violence. Since agents with a high Knowledge 
Capability have the motivation to share and distribute their knowledge, if they collocate with 
another agent with a similar Knowledge Capability, they can share information about their 
observations about events and agents they know. 
Thus the distributed enforcement relies on three essential elements (see Figure 3): (1) distribut-
ed knowledge accumulation of K-agents, (2) transmission of this information by a loyal subset 
of K-agents to the leader who will accumulate a global overview of what’s happening in his 
territory, and (3) the leader’s decisions on whether to send enforcers to a certain area.  
 
Fig. 3. Different elements and parties in distributed enforcement.  
Conflict mediation.  
Historians have observed that people living in small groups often go to an elder to resolve their 
disputes [26, 30]. An elder with good reputation can resolve the intragroup conflicts, whereas 
inter-group conflicts should be resolved by the leader himself. Different cultures qualify differ-
ent individuals as the ones who can resolve disputes ‒ sometimes a person with high verbal 
skills, a good warrior reputation or a warm personality can be considered to be a good candi-
date. In some other groups, wealth (or the ability to offer a material gift), generosity, aggres-
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sion, self-assertion, and reputation are considered to be important.  We employ the most often 
mentioned property, which is the reputation. In our model, reputation is also a signal of kind-
ness, since it improves by sharing, and as kind agents grow old, they have more opportunities to 
share. If they have high Knowledge Capability, they have a higher chance of getting to know 
other agents and thereby have more knowledge to make judgment about contesting agents 
inasmuch as they know both parties involved in a dispute. Therefore high-reputation agents 
who have a high Knowledge Capability are good candidates for resolving intragroup disputes.  
A significant aspect of dispute mediation is the procedure itself. In some cultures a material gift 
from the offending person will work, while is some other situations a duel, physical harm, or 
ostracism is needed to resolve the dispute [30, 31]. In our model, we used a practice of gift 
exchange. The amount required for this material exchange is the quantity of food units needed 
to make the relationship between two agents reach a neutral value.  
In simulation runs which have this feature enabled, whenever an agent is collocated with anoth-
er agent with whom he has a negative relationship and his aggression level is not sufficiently 
high to trigger revenge, then a dispute resolution mechanism will be sought. In this case the 
offended agent will identify another agent in the vicinity with a high reputation. Then both 
parties will move toward the identified mediator, and the “neutral” mediator will prescribe a 
penalty based on the relationship values. The target agent must pay the penalty amount to the 
other party to restore his reputation. The cost involved in this procedure is mostly the time both 
agents spend finding the mediator agent and moving toward him. The mediator agent, in turn, 
increases its own reputation in return, which makes him more likely to be chosen in connection 
with future disputes. Thus when this feature is active in our model, agents with higher reputa-
tion are expected to be experienced dispute mediators as well [13].  
The combination of these two new features empowers our artificial society with a simplified 
version of both legal and civil justice. Legal justice aims to prevent crimes, and if enforcers 
catch someone committing a crime, there is a penalty of imprisonment and loss of reputation. 
On the other hand, civil justice attempts to resolve issues between agents by a reputable media-
tor agent without any actual penalty. Figure 4 shows different parties in both mechanisms. 
 
Fig. 4. Crime prevention and mediation mechanisms. 
At this stage we have introduced the essential aspects of our relatively feature-rich agent model. 
Below, we present the results of our sensitivity analysis which we used to test the system for 
plausibility, but also to inform further parameter choices for selected scenarios. 
4 Sensitivity Analysis 
By using multi-agent modelling as a research tool, a repetitive process of defining and re-
defining model requirements based on extensive literature in different disciplines can be fol-
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lowed in order to validate the model based on observational studies and reports from related 
literature. Thereafter simulations of different scenarios can help to gain deeper understanding of 
the causes of deviations or of optimal ways to trigger the desired outcomes [11]. We have fol-
lowed a systematic approach in this fashion by tuning each model parameter to find the most 
reasonable value (or range of values). As defined by [32], reasonable parameters are those 
which help the model to reproduce patterns observed in reality. We tested hundreds of itera-
tions for single parameters, even for the most trivial of them, such as the degree in which agents 
change their direction when exploring or the hunger level at which they start eating.  
We began our simulation study by starting with similar parameters used as reported in previous 
work [7, 13, 33]. In our attempts to extend those models with new features, whenever we need-
ed a new parameter, we have tested wide ranges of values for each one of them. Nevertheless, 
the selection of the range of possible values in itself is not straightforward. In order to illustrate 
how we went about it, we provide an example showing the steps we went through to define one 
of the parameters used. Although in this example we ended up with a different tactic (using 
social comparison instead of using a parameter), we basically followed similar steps for most of 
the used parameters. 
Initially, by adopting a perspective similar to [7, 13, 33], we decided to use the revenge thresh-
old parameter, which could be set at any negative value. Therefore we tested a range from 0 to -
1000 (decremented by values of 20) to see how it affected the simulation outcomes. Each value 
was tested with 20 different Random Seeds which led to 1000 rounds for 1 village setting. The 
outcomes revealed that having high-magnitude values lead to collapse of the simulation (values 
higher than -100), due to high numbers of revenge killings (since revenge killing could start a 
vicious cycle of revenge attacks and thereby lead to a population collapse). On the other hand, 
by using very low-magnitude values, revenge attacks never happen (-600 and lower). However, 
since our overall approach was to employ a minimal number of parameters and by considering 
that not all the people have the same threshold, we took a step back and considered other fac-
tors which helped us to facilitate parameter estimation. We observed the minimum and maxi-
mum relationship values for each agent and used this range for each individual agent in the 
following way: 
RevengeThreshold = Max - ((Max – Min) * (AggressionLevel)) 
Accordingly, an agent will take revenge if (a) the agent has a negative revenge threshold (indi-
cating negative reciprocity) and (b) is collocated with an agent who has a lower-than-threshold 
relationship value toward him. In summary, we tested every single parameter with hundreds of 
experiments and used those which seemed more plausible and led to results closest to [33]. Of 
course the issue of “plausibility” can be subjective and is not objectively measurable, which is a 
framing consideration for all agent-based models.  
 
In summary, as we stated earlier we avoided hard-wired thresholds to introduce new institu-
tional activities that keep the social order intact or in agent decision-making processes. Instead 
we have used notions of social comparison among the agents to define their own views toward 
welfare at the societal level and at the individual level. This is also in accordance with theories 
of the social self and the idea that we are influenced by people around us, and the characteris-
tics of those who are close to us will have an influence on our own [34]. We believe that this is 
missing in many agent-based models, inasmuch they mostly define arbitrary global parameters 
for such thresholds set at low, medium, or high values. We argue that it is preferable to look 
from a situated perspective and ask whether the effects of a particular parameter can be shown 
to emerge from the social and environmental context.  
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5 Experimental Design 
We used 30 different random seeds for each pair of experiments in 2-village configurations 
with 100 agents as initial populations for each village. Agents can live up to 4000 time units, 
and we used 40,000 time units as the total duration of the each simulation run. There were three 
major scenario categories that we examined: 
1) Scenarios without distributed control of violence (or distributed enforcement). 
2) Scenarios with distributed control of violence but without the use of observation of events 
by agents with high Knowledge Capability. Instead we simulated global knowledge of 
criminal occurrences by storing the criminal events locally in the patch and making them 
globally visible to the enforcers. 
3) Scenarios with distributed control of violence and with the use of observation of events by 
agents with high Knowledge Capability. 
For each scenario we tested it with and without conflict resolution, which made a total of 6 
experiments per random seed (180 in total).We considered scenario Types (2) and (3), above, in 
order to compare the relative efficiency difference between global knowledge about crime and 
knowledge about crime that is passed through knowledge-aware agents. For simulation effi-
ciency it can be useful to store the criminal results in the patches, but it is less realistic. We 
found that Scenario (3), which employed criminal event observation and communication by 
high Knowledge-Capability agents to be almost as efficient as Scenario (2) and a more realistic 
representation. 
6 Results and Discussion 
In this section we summarize our experimental results with regard to specific features.  
Effectiveness of distributed information gathering. 
Before moving to our main features and their effects, the scenarios that test the accuracy of 
information will be discussed. The results show that the correlation between decline in death 
due to revenge and enabling enforcers who use crime information stored in the patches is -0.80, 
while the correlation between decline in death due to revenge and enabling enforcers who use 
the information collected by distributed knowledge gathering is -0.78. The results indicate that 
distributed information gathering is almost as effective as using accurate information stored in 
the history of patches.  
Enabling distributed control of violence.  
Other than a leader’s control of the distribution of food based on his altruism level, there is only 
one institutional element that prevents agents from stealing and violence: this is provided by the 
authorized members of the Leader class engaged in distributed violence control. The correla-
tions between enabling this distributed form of criminal control and different causes of death 
are significant. Correlation with the death rate due to (a) revenge is -0.78, (b) during thefts is   
(-0.54), and (c) hunger is +0.8. Specifically correlation with the total number of thefts is -0.77. 
In general, theft and killings are reduced considerably by implementing distributed control of 
violence, while death due to hunger rises. This could suggest that even in this artificial society, 
mere prevention of violence is not enough.  There should be further institutions beyond stop-
ping crime, such as providing the deprived agents with assistance for food acquisition. Addi-
tionally, since agents who are enforcing the rules are not productive anymore, they do not con-
tribute to village central storage sites any longer, and thus the society has fewer contributors 
and more consumers. This result raises the question concerning to what degree can distributed 
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law enforcement be tailored to achieve a balance between crime and starvation. Figure 5 shows 
the average percentages of different causes of death for all scenarios with activated observation 
of events for configurations with and without distributed enforcement. As shown in Figure 5, 
death due to old age is not much affected by this feature. 
 
 
Fig. 5.   Effect of distributed enforcement on different causes of death. 
Conflict mediation  
This feature made much more of a difference in the absence of other types of crime prevention 
(See Figure 6 and 7). Unsurprisingly, it has a correlation of +0.8 with the Reputation Gini, 
which defines the inequality in agent reputations1. The reason behind this effect is due to the 
role of the mediator who gains in reputation as he resolves the disputes. In addition, those with 
negative reciprocity toward each other have the chance to remedy their relationship and thus 
improve it. However, this indicates the emergence of class stratification based on reputation. 
While we expected that conflict mediation improves the overall welfare of the society, it has 
the unforeseen effect in population rise this lead to resource scarcity and more conflict over 
resources. This is schematically illustrated in Figure 8. 
The correlations between population increase and different causes of death are significant (see 
Figures 6 and 7). The correlation between the number of agents and: (a) death due to hunger is 
+0.51, (b) death due to thefts is +0.63, and (c) death due to old age -0.8. Moreover, it decreases 
the life expectancy of agents in such a way that the average age at death decreases considerably 
when population size increases (correlation is -0.8). Figure 6 shows the average population 
change for scenarios with and without dispute resolution, and Figure 7 shows the average rates 
of different causes of death in scenarios with and without dispute resolution.   
                                                                
1 The reputation Gini index shows the relative reputation inequality in a group.  In particular, it 
reveals the gap between agents with very high reputation and agents with low reputation. In 
order to calculate the Gini index, we implement formula used by [35]. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  ‘s reputation 
represented by 𝑦𝑖 . Then we sort 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 in ascending order (𝑦𝑖 <=  𝑦𝑖+1). Finally, 
Gini can be calculated using following formula:  𝐺 =
1
𝑛
(𝑛 + 1 − 2 (
∑ (n+1−i)𝑦1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) )  
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 Fig. 6.    Population change over 10 generations for scenarios with and without conflict resolu-
tion.  
 
Fig. 7. Average rates of different causes of death with and without dispute resolution. 
 
Fig. 8.    Effect of higher reputation results of conflict resolution. 
In addition to calculating the correlations between each feature and different outputs, we have 
used regression analysis to confirm the results. Table 1 summarizes the regression analysis of 
180 experiments which shows the p-value and coefficients of regression test with a confidence 
level of 95%. 
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Table 1. Regression results. 
 Revenge Hunger Thefts 
  P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients 
Intercept 0.79 661.29 0.46 -2196.00 0.69 317.62 
Random Seed 0.79 -4.7538E-06 0.45 1.65E-05 0.70 -2.338E-06 
Distributed Enforce-
ment 
4E-40 -8.53 5E-50 12.47 5E-20 -1.70 
Event Observation 0.020 1.27 0.00 -2.14 0.11 0.28 
Conflict Resolution 0.000 -1.59 8E-07 2.52 7E-13 1.03 
Adjusted R Square 0.685 0.73 0.48 
 
Distributed enforcement has significant p-values for all three output variables. It is worth men-
tioning that the reason behind less significant p-values for event observation compared to dis-
tributed enforcement lies in its comparison with scenarios in which enforcers had actual 
knowledge of crime areas. As shown in the results, distributed enforcement comes with the cost 
of higher death due to hunger. As mentioned earlier, this can be due to more consumers and 
less contributors. In the same way, in the real world, enforcement comes at a cost too, and this 
brings up the challenge of balancing enforcement and the cost of enforcement.  
Figure 9 compares the average values for three main scenarios at once. It can be seen that as 
crime prevention features are added, deaths due to revenge decrease, but deaths due to starva-
tion increase which shows the cost of resolving conflicts or its prevention. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Death rates due to revenge and hunger for different scenarios. 
7 Conclusion And Future Work 
As evidenced by the claim made in [36] that agent-based modeling is “a new standard of expla-
nation”, there has been a growing interest in agent-based modeling of complex social phenom-
ena. However, perhaps partly due to computational limitations, the complexity and interactive 
scope of the modeled agents has been limited. In the work presented in this paper and by ex-
panding the model developed by [33], we have aimed to include more aspects of a real society 
in the model and study the interaction of these different aspects under different simulation 
settings. In this work we have explored the impact of compliance and dispute resolution mech-
anisms on the well-being of a society, along with the structural change of the society’s configu-
ration based on the different social roles.  
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Base Scenario
Prevention, No Mediation
Prevention and Mediation
Death Rate % 
Revenge-Rate Hunger-Rate
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However our path toward building more realistic artificial human societies has much ahead of 
it. We believe that continued development of CKSW-based meta-role social modelling can 
offer new opportunities in the area of social modelling. The CKSW perspective takes into ac-
count social ordering activities that have been observed across the history of human societies. 
Building models using agents with these meta-role capabilities will enable us to reproduce 
some of the observed higher-level social structures in an organic fashion. These general role 
scenarios offer a more realistic representation of how primitive societies of autonomous agents 
achieve a measure of societal coordination. 
Considerably more work will need to be done to achieve our main objective of modelling a 
human society with the internal ability to construct essential institutions to sustain and enhance 
the overall social prosperity. A number of important limitations need to be considered in order 
to refine and improve the current model. Some immediate extensions we will be pursuing in-
clude improving the current simplistic view of mate selection (the selected mate cannot reject 
the proposal) by considering real mate selection criteria in different cultures. Furthermore, we 
will be introducing more variation in food resource fertility rates and transportation channels. 
The next major extension of the model will be implementing the skill (S) class and introducing 
concepts such as agricultural technology for different societies.  
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Abstract. In many scenarios, humans must team with agents to achieve
joint aims. When working collectively in a team of human and artificial
agents, communication is important to establish a shared situation of
the task at hand. With no human in the loop and little cost for com-
munication, information about the task can be easily exchanged. How-
ever, when communication becomes expensive, or when there are humans
in the loop, the strategy for sharing information must be carefully de-
signed: too little information leads to lack of shared situation awareness,
while too much overloads the human team members, decreasing perfor-
mance overall. This paper investigates the effects of sharing beliefs and
goals in agent teams and in human-agent teams. We performed a set of
experiments using the BlocksWorlds for Teams (BW4T) testbed to as-
sess different strategies for information sharing. In previous experimental
studies using BW4T, explanations about agent behaviour were shown to
have no effect on team performance. One possible reason for this is be-
cause the existing scenarios in BW4T contained joint tasks, but not joint
actions. That is, atomic actions that required interdependent action be-
tween more than one agent. We implemented new scenarios in BW4T in
which some actions required two agents to complete. Our results showed
an improvement in artificial-agent team performance when communicat-
ing goals and sharing beliefs, but with goals contributing more to team
performance, and that in human-agent teams, communicating only goals
was more effective than communicating both goals and beliefs.
Keywords: human-agent collaboration, BlocksWorld for Teams, joint action,
interdependence
1 Introduction
Over the past decade or so, there has been a realisation that “autonomous”
intelligent agents will offer more value if they work semi-autonomously as part
of a team with humans [4]. Semi-autonomous agents must therefore be designed
to explicitly consider the human in the loop to work effectively as part of a team.
In a joint task, a team has a joint aim to achieve a goal, and they must
work together to do achieve this goal. While in some simple scenarios, team
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members may be able to operate individually to achieve the joint goal, in most
scenarios, the individual actions within a task are interdependent [17]. However,
to successfully operate on an interdependent tasks, team members must have a
shared situation awareness of at least part of the task, and must coordinate the
actions that comprise the task. As such, communication between team members
is important to efficiently complete a task.
This is the case in human-human teams, but also in human-agent teams. For
example, Stubbs et al. [18] observed over 800 hours of human-robot interaction
and noted that as the level of autonomy in the robot increased, the efficiency
of the mission decreased as operators started questioning the robot’s decision
making more and more. They conclude that having an agent explain relevant
parts of the behaviour to maintain a common ground on the task is important
for effective collaboration. The process to achieve common ground requires com-
munication, taking into account what is necessary and important, and what the
other team members already know.
The aim of our work is to identify the types of and amount of informa-
tion that are relevant for interdependent tasks. We use the BlocksWorlds for
Teams (BW4T) [11] test bed for this. BW4T is a simulation tool that allows
experimentation of scenarios involving humans and agents. The joint goal of
the human-agent team is to locate and retrieve a sequence of coloured blocks
in a given order. Harbers et al. [6, 5] have experimented with the same concept
in BW4T, however, they found that communication did not improve team ef-
ficiency in completing the task. They hypothesise that one reason may be the
simple nature of the task, and that more complex scenarios show results similar
to those seen in field experiments such as the ones by Stubbs discussed above.
In this paper, we developed a new scenario for BW4T that contained joint
actions, rather than just joint tasks. By this, “action”, we mean the atomic
actions that make up a task. Our simple extension is to introduce a type of
heavy block that requires one agent to hold the door to a room for another
agent, meaning that moving the block out of the room is a joint action. In terms
of the model proposed by Saavedra [15], this extension moves the task from
one of a team merely working in parallel towards a common goal, called pooled
interdependence, to one of team task interdependence, where team members must
execute actions jointly.
We performed initial experiments to assess different communication strate-
gies teams of artificial agents, demonstrating that sharing goals improves task
efficiency better than sharing beliefs. Then, we used this to determine experimen-
tal parameters for human-agent experiments on similar scenarios, and showed
sharing goals in the scenarios does indeed increase the efficiency of the team in
completing the task.
This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the most closely re-
lated work, and Section 3 presents relevant background on the BW4T simulator.
Section 4 outlines the agent communication models used in our experiments, in-
cluding how agents handle communication for joint tasks. Section 5 presents the
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experimental evaluation, including results, for both sets of experiments (agent
teams and human-agent teams), while Section 6 concludes.
2 Related work
In this section, we discuss the most closely related work to the work in this
paper. While there is a large body of work investigating how human teams work
together on interdependent tasks [15, 14] and how the process of grounding a
common ground [12, 3], and their relation to shared cognition of a team [2, 16],
this section will focus on related work on interdependence in human-agent teams.
The primary questions of work in this domain are: (1) “how much” autonomy
should we grant a semi-autonomous agent, and; (2) given this, what information
needs to be communicated between the agent and the human for efficient task
completion. In this paper, we look mostly at the second question.
In recent years, the realisation that human-agent teams offer more than
agent-only teams was lead to many empirical studies of human-agent teams [1,
13, 4] that address the issue of what and when to communicate to team members.
For example, Stubbs et al. [18] discuss their experience observing over 800 hours
of human-agent teamwork in a scientific setting. Their team remotely deployed a
robot in the in Chile’s Atacama Desert to investigate microorganisms that grow
there, with the view that such a deployment would be similar to deploying a
semi-autonomous robot on other planets. The team changed the level of auton-
omy of the deployed robot, giving it more responsibility on some tasks in certain
cases, and observed the scientific teams’ response. Stubbs et al. found that as
the level of autonomy increased, the effectiveness of the team reduced. This was
mostly caused by a lack of transparency in the robot’s decision-making, result-
ing in cases where the scientific team spent more time discussing and trying to
understand why the robot had made certain decisions, rather than on the scien-
tific aims related to microorganisms. Stubbs et al. hypothesis that establishing
a common ground between the relevant parties on tasks is essential.
Bradshaw et al. [1] hypothesise that human-agent teams will become more ef-
fective if agents are considered peers and team members, rather than just tools to
which to delegate tasks. They later discuss the concept of coactive design [9], and
argue that the consideration of interdependence between agents in performing
joint tasks is key to effective human-agent teams. They define interdependence
as the relationships between members of a team, and argue that these relation-
ship determine what information is relevant for the team to complete a task,
and in that sense, the interdependent relationships define the common ground
that is necessary. In more recent work [10], they present the Coactive Design
Method for designing intelligent agents that must interact with humans. In this
model, interdependence is the organising principle. Human and artificial agents
worked together through an interface that is designed around the concepts of
Observability, Predictability and Directability (OPD). The model was applied
to the design of a simulated teleoperated robot for the DARPA Virtual Robotics
Challenge, and gained excellent score due to the advantages the coactive system
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model. They describe scenarios in which the identification of interdependent
tasks improved their agent design, such as the robot having to attach a hose to
a spigot. The robot is unable to identify the hose — a task done by the human
—, but attaching the hose itself was a joint task, in which the robot positioned
the hose and the human directed the arm to the spigot.
Other recent work looks at how to simulate such scenarios in a laboratory set-
ting to allow for more controlled experimentation. In particular, the BlocksWorld
for Teams (BW4T) testbed [11], used in our work, was developed to support ex-
perimentation of human-agent teaming in joint activities.
Harbers et al. [5, 6] use the BW4T testbed to experiment with explanation
in human-agent teams. In particular, they looked at the effect of sharing beliefs
and intention within teams, providing the humans with the ability to exploit
information about intentions to improve their understanding of the situation.
Their results showed that, while participants reported increased awareness of
what the agents were doing, there was no improvement in team effectiveness
measured by completion time. Thus, their explanation model did indeed explain
the situation, but this information was not useful for the human players to
coordinate their actions. Harbers et al. hypothesise that this may be because
the team tasks are so straightforward that the human player can easily predict
what behaviour it requires, and thus processing the explanations has a cost that
is similar to what the explanation is worth. We agree with this analysis. Our
experiments are similar in spirit to these experiments, however, the introduction
of joint action helps to provide a more complex scenario without increasing the
complexity to a point that confuses the human players or requires training.
In other work, Harbers, Jonker, and Van Riemsdijk [7] used BW4T to investi-
gate communication in agent-only teams, and found that sharing intentions and
taking advantage of this knowledge increased the team efficiency, while sharing
beliefs had minimal impact — a finding consistent with the work in this paper.
Wei, Hindriks, and Jonker [19] study the construction and effectiveness of
shared mental models between artificial agents using BW4T. They designed
four scenarios with different numbers of artificial agents and environment sizes,
and measured completion time as a proxy for the effectiveness of different com-
munication strategies. Their results showed that communicating between team
members improved efficiency, especially in the case in which there were sequen-
tial interdependencies between tasks; that is, the tasks had an explicit order in
which they must have been completed. Further, they also found that commu-
nicating more information lead to more interference between agents, indicating
that even in agent teams where processing is not a large issue, it is important to
communicate only the most relevant and important information. Our work goes
further than the experiments by Wei, Hindriks, and Jonker by looking at joint
actions and including humans in the loop.
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3 BlocksWorld For Team
BlocksWorld For Team (BW4T) is a simulator that extends the classic blocks
world domain, written specifically for experimenting with human-agent teams.
The overall goal of the agent team is to search for the required blocks in a
given set of rooms. The task can be performed by a single agent or a group of
agents. Agents can be either artificial or human. The role of the agents can be
distinguished based on how it is programmed.
Fig. 1: The BW4T environment
Fig 1 displays the three different BW4T maps we used in our experiments.
The environment of BW4T consists of rooms and coloured blocks scattered in
different rooms. Each room has one door, which is represented by the small
green bold line. The dark area on the bottom is the drop zone, where blocks
are dropped once collected. The small black squares with red labels represent
agents. At the bottom, the sequence of colours specifies the blocks that the team
is tasked with collecting. The team must put down the block with the right
colour into the drop zone, otherwise, the block will disappear. The sequence is
represented by the colourful bar on the bottom of the environment. The small
triangles on the colourful bar means the completed tasks.
The agents within BW4T are programmed using the GOAL programming
language [8], and the BW4T simulator provides specific constructs for interacting
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with GOAL agents. Agents can perceive the environment using an environmental
sensor, including information such as the next target block, or the blocks in the
room they are in.
Agents communicate to each other using messaging, and the contents can be
arbitrary. On receiving a message, it is stored in a “mailbox” for reading. When
an agent representing a human (which we call the supervisor agent) receives a
message, it translates the message into a human-readable format, and displays
this on the GUI that is viewable by the human. The human player can inform and
direct the supervisor agent using a drop-down menu of commands; e.g. telling
the agent which room a particular-coloured block is in.
4 Agents and Joint Activities in BW4T
In this section, we present the scenario and models of agents that we used to
experiment with human-agent teams in joint activity. We model how an artificial
agent communicates with artificial team members, and then with humans.
4.1 The scenario
From the perspective of the rules of the BW4T game, we alter only one aspect:
we introduce types of block. In the BW4T simulator, blocks have colours, and
the sequence of target blocks must be returned according to a specific colour
in each slot. In our model, blue blocks are given a special status, in that they
are considered heavier than other blocks, and they require two agents to get
the block from its location to the drop zone. As part of our experiments, we
implemented a simple scenario in which, when an agent wanted to take a blue
block from a room, a second agent was required to hold the door open for them
(because the block is too heavy to hold in one arm, and the carrying agent
therefore has no hand to open the door).
This represents an interdependent action [17]: an agent can only take a blue
block from a room if another agent opens the door, and the agent opening the
door receives no value from this unless the block is taken from the room and
back to the drop zone. One can imagine different implementations; e.g. two or
more agents must carry blocks together, but this simple variation is enough to
test out joint actions in BW4T.
4.2 Agent models
In this section, we outline our model for dealing with the joint activity of col-
lecting a blue block. We adopt a basic model of searching and retrieving blocks,
and extend this with the ability for agents to request and offer assistance for
heavy blocks. In our basic model, all agents know the sequence of blocks to be
found. They search rooms in a random fashion, not revisiting previous rooms,
and maintain a belief set of the locations of blocks (which colours and in which
rooms) that they have perceived. An agent’s “default” goal is to find and retrieve
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the the next block in the sequence, until they receive a request for assistance, or
until another agent finds the block and broadcasts this fact, in which case they
adopt the goal of finding the next block.
4.2.1 Requesting and offering assistance
Requesting help and offering assistance are required for the particular joint ac-
tivity of heavy blocks. As mentioned before, blue blocks represent heavy blocks.
This process for request and offering assistance for a blue block is shown in Fig 2.
Fig. 2: Request help and offer assistance
All available agents will search for the blue block. The first agent to find one,
who we call the operator agent will broadcast the needhelp message to all other
agents. Any artificial agent ready to assist will move towards the room, and send
a “ready” message (“Help has arrived”) indicating they are at the help position
(e.g. holding the door at Room1). The first agent to arrive will inform all others,
who adopt their default goal of searching for the next block in the sequence. All
agents attempting to help may not be an efficient use of their time, but we opt
for a simple policy here to avoid any possibility of this policy influencing results
about communication.
4.2.2 Supervisor agent
Recall that humans are represented by a supervisor agent, who can direct other
agents to perform tasks. This agent acts as an interface between the human and
artificial agents, but is also a player capable of finding and retrieving blocks. Hu-
man players direct their representative agents using high-level commands, such
as which block to search for; in sense, simulating a basic remote teleoperation
of a robot. Human players can request and offer assistance like artificial agents,
however, the decision making about whether to offer assistance is left up to the
human, rather than coded in GOAL.
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Fig 3 shows the models used for a supervisor agent. The first model is used
when taking on a new task (Fig 3a), and the second is used when the player
intends to provide assistance to another agent trying to retrieve a blue block
(Fig 3b).
(a) Completing a New Task (b) Helping the Artificial Agent
Fig. 3: Supervisor Agent
From Fig 3a, one can see that a supervisor agent is idle unless directed by the
human player to take a task; that is, to starting searching for a particular colour
block. The supervisor agent then searches autonomously for the block. If it finds
the block and the block is non-blue, it will update the other agents to inform
them that the block has been located and is being taken back to the drop zone,
allowing other agents to drop this task1. If the block is blue, it will request help
and wait. After getting help from other agent, the “take block” option is made
available on the human player’s GUI, and clicking this directs the supervisor
agent to take the block to the drop zone autonomously.
1 Artificial agents are also programmed with this capability in our model.
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The other artificial agents adapt the player’s changing actions. For example,
if the supervisor agent drops its goal while carrying a block (e.g. yellow) to the
drop zone, the other agents will drop their current task of searching for the next
block in the sequence, and will adopt the goal of finding a yellow block.
The model outlined in this section is put in place to provide human decision
support into the system. In a team with only artificial agents, if all agents have
a current goal and one agent finds a blue block, it will be required to wait for
one of its team members to complete its tasks.
However, in our model, we offer the human player the possibility to drop its
own goal to help complete the tasks. We opted not to have the human player
directing other artificial agents to drop goals when other agents find blue blocks,
as we believed that the extra decision of which agent to direct could increase the
cognitive load of the human player to the point where decisions became arbitrary.
By allowing the human player to direct only their own agent, this model provides
a complex-enough scenario to introduce an interdependent action into BW4T,
without the complexity of the scenario overwhelming participants.
Ultimately, we believe that the results from our experiments (see Section 5)
demonstrate that our decision is justified.
4.3 Information exchange between agents
It is clear that sharing information can improve team efficiency. However, the
information shared, and how much of it, is crucial, especially in human-agent
teams, where the humans’ capacities to process information is reduced compared
to its artificial team members.
4.3.1 Information messaging
In this section, we present the communication protocols between agents, which
consist of individual messages. Several types of message can be sent, enabling
agents to inform others about part of the environment, or its own goals.
Beliefs are the information about the environment, which are perceived via
agents, such as the location of different coloured blocks. Goals are mental states
that motivate action. To complete a single task, an agent must complete a se-
quence of goals. We enabled agents to share their beliefs and goals.
Five messages can be transferred amongst agents:
1. block(BlockID, ColourID, PlaceID): block BlockID with colour ColourID
has been found by the message sender at room PlaceID. When in a room,
an agent broadcasts information about any block colours that are in the goal
sequence.
2. visited(PlaceID): room PlaceID has been visited by the message sender.
3. hold(BlockID, ColourID): block BlockID with ColourID is held by the
message sender.
4. will deliver(Index, ColourID): a block of colour ColourID, which is also
the Indexth block in the sequence of the main goal, is being delivered to the
drop zone.
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5. dropped(Index, ColourID): the Indexth block in the task sequence, with
colour ColourID, previously held by the message sender, has been dropped.
While all messages are sharing information about the task, the intention of
the first three is to share belief about the environment, while the intention of
the last two is to share goals; e.g. when an agent delivered the task, it will drop
this goal.
Agents use the information about where they have visited and what colour
blocks are in the rooms to inform their search strategy. We model the artificial
agents to used the shared information about block locations and room searching
to improve the completion of the task. For example, when the agents share their
belief about the location of blocks, others can update their own beliefs with this
information, preventing unnecessary searching of rooms.
Our models use shared information about blocks being retrieved and dropped
to further improve this. That is, when an agent broadcasts that they have located
the next block, others will stop searching for that colour, and when a block in
the main sequence is dropped, others will starting searching for this again.
4.4 Filtering for human players
The hypothesis in human-agent collaboration research is that explanation from
the later can improve team performance in the joint activities. However, it is clear
that humans do not have sufficient processing capabilities to use all information
shared in the previous section. Despite this, the human player also needs to
know some of the critical information such as the environment states and other
artificial agents’ message.
In our model, the supervisor agent takes on the role of an information broker
who is responsible to deliver and translate information for the human player,
and to filter the “explanation” from artificial agents. From the artificial agents’
perspective, a supervisor agent is another artificial agent that receives and sends
messages, and supervisor agents are the bridge between the environment, artifi-
cial agents, and human players.
The key part of any design is what information should be filtered out, and
what should be filtered in and explained. In the next section, we describe an
experiment design that looks at three levels of filtering, and their effect on the
performance of the overall system.
5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we outline two sets of experiments to provide evidence towards
our hypothesis that communication can improve the team performance in joint
activities, and report the results. The first set of experiments runs three BW4T
scenarios using a team made entirely of artificial agents, while the second set
includes a human player in the loop, along with its supervisor agent. Within each
experiment, the information that is shared between team members is changed
to measure the effect of information exchange.
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5.1 Artificial agent team experiment
5.1.1 Experiment design
The aim of this experiment is to study which type of information sharing between
artificial agents effects the team performance: sharing beliefs, goals, or both.
Independent variable We modify two independent variables: (1) communi-
cation strategy; and (2) the environment type. For the communication strategy,
we use four values: (1) minimal information shared: the only communication is
to ask for help moving a blue block; (2) belief only: minimal plus belief about
the environment (items 1-3 in Section 4.3.1); (3) goals only: minimal plus agent
goals (items 4-5 in Section 4.3.1); and (4) belief and goals. For the environment,
we use three different maps: (1) cooperative block world; (2) rainbow; and (3)
simple. The first two are shown in Fig 1 (page 5). Cooperative block world con-
tains seven block colours, but only three occur in the main goal, and these are
randomly allocated to the main goal in a uniform manner. Rainbow contains
seven coloured blocks, and all seven colours can appear in the main goal. Simple
contains randomly allocated blocks, but with no blue blocks; and therefore, no
joint action.
Measures We measure completion time of the entire scenario as a proxy for
the effectiveness of each communication strategy.
Setup For each map, we run all four communication strategies giving us 12
combinations. Each combination is run 30 times, with different random seeds to
generate different block locations, resulting in 120 experiments run in total. All
experiments were run with two artificial agents, nine rooms, and nine blocks in
the main goal.
5.1.2 Results
Fig 4 shows the average completion time for all combinations of scenarios and
communication strategies. This figure demonstrates several interesting findings
from our experiments.
With regards to the three scenarios maps, cooperative blocks world consumes
more time than other two, and the simple map, with no strictly joint action, took
the least time to finish on average. This supports our hypothesis that having joint
actions in a scenario increasing the complexity more than simply joint tasks. The
largest gap (40%) between the cooperative block world and simple world results
is in the scenario where “nothing” is shared (recall that agents still request help
once they pick up a heavy blue block), indicating that sharing beliefs and goals
is useful in this environment. Further, for the cooperative blocks world scenario,
there is a large step between sharing belief and sharing goals, indicating that
sharing goals is far more valuable that sharing just belief. This is further backed
up by the small decrement from sharing goals to sharing both belief and goals. In
all three maps, sharing belief had only a small impact. This finding is interesting,
because while agents share their knowledge of the environment, meaning that
searching for the right coloured block can be reduced, it is in fact coordinating
the joint action early that increases efficiency the most in this scenario.
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Fig. 4: Average task completion time for the artificial agents team
Source of Variance SS F P-value
Communication strategy 6669.31 110.39 9.20E-33
Map 1948.40 48.38 9.97E-16
Interaction 585.17 4.84 2.04E-04
Table 1: The two-way factorial ANOVA results for the artificial agents team
Table 1 shows the outcomes of a two-way factorial ANOVA to examine the
influence of the two different independent variables. The p-values for the rows
(maps), columns (communication strategy), and the interaction, are all < 0.001,
indicating that the results are statistically significant to this level. Comparing
the sum of square errors (SS), we see that communication has more impact than
the scenarios, but both factors have a significant influence on the results.
The results show that communication is beneficial for improving cooperative
team work, and sharing goals has the largest impact. We drilled down into the
experiment data and found that the primary reason for this was labour redun-
dancy. An agent will update its team members once a block is placed in the
drop zone, limiting the team members’ knowledge of task progress. By shar-
ing the goal that they have collected a block suitable to fulfil the current team
sub-goal, the other team members can start on a new task.
5.2 Human agent teams
The results from the artificial agent teams helped to inform the design of the
human-agent team experiments. In this section, we outline the experimental
design and results for the human-agent team scenarios.
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Information Full info Partial info Silence
Next target 4 4 4
Other agent’s current task 4 4
Request assistance 4 4
Offer assistance 4 4
Task completion 4 4
Block location 4
Room occupancy 4
Other agents’ state 4
Table 2: The information shared in the three scenarios
5.2.1 Experiment design
The aim of this experiment is to study how the type of information shared
between the human player and other agents effects the team performance. Due
to the introduction of a human into the loop, the experiment is much simplified
compared to the experiments in the previous section, as we aimed to keep total
completion time to under 30 minutes for each participant.
Independent variable The independent variable in the experiments is fil-
tering strategy used by the supervisor agent to exchange information with the
human player: (1) full info: everything is shared as in the artificial team; (2)
partial info: only information that will change the goals of the human player are
shared; and (3) silence: only information that a block has been delivered to the
drop zone. Table 2 outlines what information is shared in each of the three cases.
Measures As in the artificial team experiment, we use completion time of the
entire scenario as a proxy for the effectiveness of each communication strategy.
Setup We recruited 12 participants to perform three runs of the experiment
— one with each communication strategy. No participant had used or heard of
the BW4T simulator previously. To avoid bias, the order in which the partici-
pants used the various communication strategies were systematically varied.
Due to the relative difficult of recruiting participants and running the ex-
periments, we used only one map in all three scenarios: the cooperative block
world map (Fig 1). We chose this map because the results of the agent-team
experiments demonstrate that this best simulates a reasonably complex scenario
with joint action. The speed of the BW4T simulation is adjusted to be slow to
provide the human player with sufficient time to make decisions. Each exper-
iment consisted of two artificial agents, one supervisor agent, and one human
players. There was no time out for completion of the experiment, and none of
the participants failed to complete the scenario.
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5.2.2 Results
Fig 5 shows the results for the human-agent team experiments. Due to the rela-
tively smaller number of data points, results for each participant is shown. The
x-axis is the communication strategy, the y-axis are the individual participants,
and the z-axis is completion time. Results are sorted roughly by completion time.
The overall average completion time for the three scenarios are: full info = 4.92
minutes, partial info = 4.36 minutes, and silence = 4.72 minutes.
Fig. 5: The results of human-artificial agents’ team
From the figure, it is clear that results differ among people, but that the
difference between the strategies per person establishes a trend. From the average
scores, having full information took the longest time, followed by silence, and
finally, the partial information. We discuss this more below.
To test the effect of different communication scenarios, we performed a two-
way ANOVA between groups, and a pairwise Tukey HSD comparison between
all pairs of groups. Relevant values for the ANOVA are shown in Fig 3. These
demonstrate that the results between groups is statistically significant, support-
ing the hypothesis that explanation can improve the team performance in sce-
narios with joint action, and further, that too much explanation can hinder a
human players ability for decision making. For the pairwise Tukey HSD test, the
full information vs. partial information results are significant at the 0.05 level,
while the other two pairs are not.
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Source SS df MS F P-value
Treatment (between groups) 1.985 2 0.9925 5.07 0.0154
Error (within groups) 4.305 22 0.1957
Table 3: ANOVA analysis of human-artificial agents’ team results
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of communication in artificial agent
teams and human-agent teams using the BW4T testbed. Extending previous
studies using BW4T, we added the concept of a joint action — a single atomic
action that requires more than one agent to complete.
For the artificial agents team, we performed extensive simulation experiments
to assess the value of sharing beliefs, sharing goals, and sharing both belief and
goals. The results showed that sharing goals, namely, agents exchanging their
immediate goals, increase team efficiency significantly more than sharing beliefs.
Using these results, we designed an experiment using the same joint action
scenario, but with a human player in the loop. We recruited 12 people to each
play in three scenarios using three different communication strategies: (1) update
only when a block sub-task has been completed; (2) share goals; and (3) share
goals and beliefs. We observed that sharing goals and beliefs lead to information
overload of the human, resulting in a less efficient team than just sharing goals,
and that sharing almost nothing is more efficient than sharing all goals and
beliefs, most likely because the scenario is still straightforward enough to guess
the optimal next movement.
We identify two areas of future work: (1) a more fine-grained study on the
types of goals that are shared; and (2) study of tasks in which communication
is necessary to complete a task.
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Abstract. Coordination is essential to the effective operation of multi-
agent systems. Convention emergence offers a low-cost and decentralised
method of ensuring compatible actions and behaviour, without requiring
the imposition of global rules. This is of particular importance in envi-
ronments with no centralised control or where agents belong to different,
possibly conflicting, parties. The timely emergence of robust conventions
can be facilitated and manipulated via the use of fixed strategy agents,
who attempt to influence others into adopting a particular strategy. Al-
though fixed strategy agents have previously been investigated, they have
not been considered in dynamic networks. In this paper, we explore the
emergence of conventions within a dynamic network, and examine the
effectiveness of fixed strategy agents in this context. Using established
placement heuristics we show how such agents can encourage conven-
tion emergence, and we examine the impact of the dynamic nature of
the network. We introduce a new heuristic, Life-Degree, to enable this
investigation. Finally, we consider the ability of fixed strategy agents to
manipulate already established conventions, and investigate the effec-
tiveness of placement heuristics in this domain.
Keywords: Dynamic networks, Conventions, Social Norms, Influence
1 Introduction
Within multi-agent systems (MAS) cooperation and coordination of individu-
als’ actions and goals are required for efficient interaction. Incompatible actions
result in clashes that often incur a resource cost, such as time, to the participat-
ing agents. The pre-determination of which actions clash is not always possible,
particularly for large action spaces and dynamic populations.
The emergence of conventions is often used to solve these problems. Conven-
tions represent socially-adopted expected behaviour amongst agents and thus
facilitate coordinated action choice without the dictation of rules. Convention
emergence has been shown to be possible in static networks with minimal re-
quirements, namely agent rationality and the ability to learn from previous inter-
actions [5, 25]. This adds little design overhead, and is of particular importance
in open MAS where agent modification is likely to be impractical or impossible.
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Fixed strategy agents continue to choose the same action regardless of its
efficacy or the choices of others in the system. Their presence has been shown
to affect the direction and speed of convention emergence in static networks.
Small numbers of these agents are able to influence much larger populations
when placed within such networks [21], especially when placed using appropriate
heuristics [7, 10]. Fixed strategy agents can also be used to cause a system to
abandon an already established convention in favour of an alternative [13,15].
In many domains, the nature of the relationships between agents is not static.
Agents may leave the system, new agents can enter, and the links between agents
may change over time. These dynamic interaction topologies induce different
system characteristics than those found in static networks. Relatively little work
has studied the nature of convention emergence in these types of networks.
This paper considers the emergence and manipulation of conventions within
dynamic topologies. We introduce a new heuristic, Life-Degree, to support this
investigation which considers aspects of the dynamic nature of the system when
placing fixed strategy agents. We examine the importance of dynamic topology
characteristics by comparing the performance of Life-Degree against previ-
ously used heuristics based on network metrics. We then consider the efficacy
of the various heuristics when fixed strategy agents are used to destabilise or
remove an established convention.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the
related work on convention emergence, fixed strategy agents and dynamic topolo-
gies. Section 3 describes the model of convention emergence being used, as well
as the simulation model used to generate the topologies. Additionally this sec-
tion introduces the heuristics used to place fixed strategy agents. Our results are
shown in Section 4 and, finally, we present our conclusions in Section 5.
2 Related Work
A convention is a form of socially-accepted rule regarding agent behaviour and
choices. Conventions can be viewed as “an equilibrium everyone expects in in-
teractions that have more than one equilibrium” [26]. No explicit punishment
exists for going against a convention nor is there any implicit benefit in the ac-
tion represented by the convention over other possible actions. Members of a
convention expect others to behave a certain way, and acting against the con-
vention increases the likelihood of incompatible action choices and the costs
associated with these. Conventions have been shown to emerge naturally from
local agent interactions [5,12,23,25] and enhance agent coordination by placing
social constraints on agents’ action choices [22].
Although the terms are often used interchangeably in the literature [17, 21],
in this paper we differentiate between conventions and norms. Norms typically
imply an obligation or prohibition on agents with regards to a specific action.
Failure to adhere to norms and exhibit the expected behaviour is often associ-
ated with punishments or sanctions [1, 3, 11, 19]. Alternatively, agents may be
explicitly rewarded for adherence to norms. Thus, norms generally require addi-
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tional system or agent capabilities as well as incurring a system-level overhead
for punishment/reward. In this paper, we assume that agents do not have the ca-
pability to punish one another, nor can they observe defection in others. Instead,
we use conventions as a lightweight method of increasing coordination.
We make only minimal assumptions about agent architecture and behaviour;
we assume that agents are rational and that they have access to a (limited)
memory of previous interactions. Numerous studies have focussed on conven-
tion emergence with these assumptions [5,10,21,25] and have shown they allow
rapid and robust convention emergence. Walker and Wooldridge [25] investigated
convention emergence whilst making few assumptions about the capabilities of
the agents involved. In their model, agents select actions based on the observed
choices of others, and global convention emergence is shown to be possible.
Expanding on this, Sen and Airiau [21] investigated social learning for con-
vention emergence, where agents receive a payoff from their interactions which
informs their learning (via Q-Learning). They showed that convention emer-
gence can occur when agents have no memory of interactions and are only able
to observe their own rewards. However, their model is limited in that agents
are able to interact with any other member of the population rather than being
situated in a network topology. Additionally, the convention space considered is
restricted to only two possible actions. In more realistic settings larger conven-
tion spaces and more restrictive connecting network topologies are likely. The
network topology agents are situated in has been shown to have a significant
effect on convention emergence [4,5,12,24], affecting the speed with which emer-
gence occurs. Recent work has shown that a larger number of actions typically
slows convergence [7, 10,18].
The use of fixed strategy agents, who always choose the same action regard-
less of others’ choices, to influence convention emergence has also been explored.
Sen and Airiau [21] show that a small number of such agents can cause a popula-
tion to adopt the fixed strategy as a convention over other equally valid choices.
This indicates that small numbers of agents are able to affect much larger pop-
ulations.
In Sen and Airiau’s model, due to the lack of connecting topology, all agents
are identical in terms of their ability to interact with others. However, in many
domains, agent interactions may be limited to neighbours in the network. As
such, some agents will have larger sets of potential interactions than others. In
the context of static topologies, Griffiths and Anand [10] establish that which
agents are selected and where they are in the topology is a key factor in their ef-
fectiveness as fixed strategy agents. They show that placement by simple metrics
such as degree offers better performance than random placement.
Franks et al. [6, 7] investigated fixed strategy agents where interactions are
constrained by a static network topology and agents are exposed to a large
convention space. They found that topology affects the number of fixed strategy
agents required to increase convergence speed. This also expanded on the work
of Griffiths and Anand [10] by investigating the effectiveness of placing by more
advanced metrics such as eigenvector centrality.
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Few studies have focussed on convention emergence in dynamic topologies,
with most work focussing on static networks. Savarimuthu et al. [20] consider the
related emergence of norms in a dynamic topology. They show that norms are
able to emerge under a number of conditions, but their work differs from ours due
to the requirements placed on agents. The interaction model used requires agents
to maintain an internal norm as well as being able to query other agents. We
make minimal assumptions about agent internals or the information available.
Additionally, our work investigates the manipulation of convention emergence,
something not considered by Savarimuthu et al.
Mihaylov et al. [16] briefly consider convention emergence in dynamic topolo-
gies using the coordination game. Their work focusses on a new proposed method
of learning, rather than on the emergence itself and how it may be influenced. In
particular, they do not consider fixed strategy agents, or the action that emerges
as a convention.
In this paper, we consider both convention emergence in dynamic topolo-
gies and the use of fixed strategy agents to understand the impact of network
dynamics.
Relatively little work has considered destabilising established conventions,
with previous investigations of fixed strategy agents typically inserting them at
the beginning of interactions. We have previously [13,15] investigated using fixed
strategy agents in static topologies to cause members of the dominant convention
to change their adopted convention and hence destabilise it. We found that this
required substantially more fixed strategy agents than is needed to influence
conventions before emergence. We also expand on this work to examine aspects
of dynamic networks when selecting fixed strategy agents for destabilisation.
This paper expands on [14] and considers the general nature of convention
emergence in dynamic topologies, particularly without the use of fixed strategy
agents. We also consider the effect of topology features on convention emergence
time. Finally, we explore the relationship between placement heuristics, number
of fixed strategy agents and the speed of convention emergence.
3 Convention Emergence Model
Our experimental setup consists of three main components, introduced below:
the network topology, the interaction regime used by agents and the heuristics
used for placing fixed strategy agents.
3.1 Dynamic Topology Generator
Similarly to Savarimuthu et al. [20] we utilise a particle-based simulation, de-
veloped by Gonza´lez et al. [8, 9], to model dynamic network topologies with
characteristics comparable to those observed in real-world networks. Agents are
represented as colliding particles and the topology is modified by collisions cre-
ating links between the agents. A population of N agents, represented as a set of
particles with radius r, is placed within a 2D box with sides of length L. Initially,
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all agents are distributed uniformly at random within the space and are assigned
a velocity of constant magnitude v0 and random direction.
Each timestep, agents move according to their velocity and detect collisions
with other agents. When two agents collide, an edge is added between them in
the topology if one does not already exist. Both agents then move away in a
random direction with a speed proportional to their degree. Thus, higher degree
nodes have an increased probability of further collisions, which in turn further
increases their degree. In this way, the model exhibits preferential attachment,
a characteristic found in static scale-free networks [2]. Such networks are often
studied in the field of convention emergence [5, 7, 10, 18] due to characteristics
that are representative of real-world networks.
Additionally, all agents are assigned a Time-To-Live (TTL) when created.
This is drawn uniformly at random between zero and the maximum TTL, Tl.
After each timestep agents’ TTLs are decremented by one. When an agent’s
TTL = 0 the agent and all its edges are removed. A new agent is placed at
the same location within the simulation with the randomised initial properties
discussed above. In this manner, the topology is constantly changing.
Different topologies can be characterised by the value of Tl/T0 where T0 is
the characteristic time between collisions. This can be expressed as:
Tl
T0
=
2
√
2pirNv0Tl
L2
Gonza´lez et al. show that this value dictates key characteristics of the generated
topology, primarily the average degree and degree distribution.
The concept of a quasi-stationary state (QSS) is discussed by Gonza´lez et
al., such that a QSS emerges after a number of timesteps and is characterised by
macro-scale stability of network characteristics. Micro-scale characteristics, for
individual agents, remain in flux. In [8] it is shown that the QSS can be described
as any timestep, t, where t & 2Tl. Our approach here differs from Savarimuthu et
al. [20] as we consider agent interactions starting from t = 0 rather than waiting
for the QSS. This allows us to mimic scenarios where agents have been placed in
a new environment rather than only considering already established networks.
3.2 Interaction Regime
Agents within the system interact with one another and, learning from these
interactions, converge to a shared behaviour in the form of a convention. Agent
interactions occur during each timestep of the regime. In each timestep, every
agent chooses one of its neighbours in the network at random. These agents play
a round of the n-action pure coordination game. In this game, both agents are
given a choice from a set of n-actions, A. Agents do not know what their opponent
has chosen. The payoff that each agent receives depends on the combination of
chosen actions: if both chose the same action, they receive a positive payoff (+4);
if the actions differ they receive a negative payoff (-1).
Each agent monitors their expected payoff for each action, based on the
previous payoffs they have received when choosing that action. We adopt the
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approach of Villatoro et al. [24] in this regard by using a simplified form of the
Q-Learning algorithm. For each action, a ∈ A, the agent maintains a Q-Value
which is updated by Qi(a) = (1 − α) × Qi−1(a) + α × payoff where α is a
parameter known as the learning rate and i represents the number of times a
has been chosen. All agents start with Q0(a) = 0,∀a ∈ A. To combat the issue of
local optima, we allow each agent, with probability pexplore to randomly select
an action. Otherwise, as each agent is rational, they will always select the action
with the highest Q-Value, selecting randomly between ties.
In the formulation proposed by Kittock [12], a convention has emerged when
90% of (non-fixed strategy) agents, when not exploring, would choose the same
action. We adopt this definition of a convention but modify it to better fit the
dynamic nature of the network topology. Instead of considering the entire popula-
tion, we monitor adoption within the largest connected component. This follows
from the findings of Gonzalez et al. [8] that in most simulations a giant cluster
consisting of nearly all agents will emerge having the properties discussed above.
Agents not within this cluster are likely to be recently created agents and, as
such, should not be included in the adoption rate calculation as they have not
interacted. This is reinforced by our simulations which showed that most agents
not within the largest connected component had degree zero. Similarly, 100%
adoption is unlikely due to new agents joining.
Fixed strategy agents will be placed within the network to study the effect
they have on convention emergence. These agents will replace selected agents
upon insertion, keeping all edges of that agent. This can be justified in real-world
scenarios as persuading selected agents to act in a desired manner through some
reward mechanism. All such agents will be assigned the same fixed strategy and
their placement will be determined heuristically as discussed below. If a fixed
strategy agent’s TTL should reach zero, a new agent will be selected using the
same placement heuristic.
We consider two different scenarios: placing fixed strategy agents at the be-
ginning of a system’s life, to encourage and direct initial convention emergence in
a population, and inserting fixed strategy agents once a convention has emerged
to attempt to change it. In the former case, the fixed strategy will be randomly
chosen from the available actions. In the latter, it will be randomly chosen from
the available actions excluding the already established convention. Initial in-
sertion will occur once a connected component of size greater than N/2 has
emerged. This prevents convention emergence being declared prematurely for a
non-giant cluster. Additionally, placement heuristics which rely on network met-
rics (such as degree) may select sub-optimal agents if used before a main cluster
has emerged.
3.3 Placement Heuristics
Previous work has utilised placement heuristics to enhance the effect of fixed
strategy agents. Metrics such as degree, eigenvector centrality and betweenness
centrality have been used with greater efficacy than random placement [6,10]. In
this paper, we focus on degree-based placement. However, the dynamic nature of
COIN@AAMAS2015
132
the topology introduces a number of ways to apply it. All heuristics are calculated
with respect to the largest connected component.
Our initial heuristic, Static Degree, corresponds to the equivalent heuristic for
static networks. At the time of insertion, agents are chosen to be fixed strategy
agents in descending order of degree. This selection is static once chosen, only
being modified upon agent expiration as detailed above. This simplistic approach
is computationally cheap, a factor of importance in settings where gathering
or computing this information is expensive. However this risks selected agents
potentially becoming sub-optimal choices as the simulation progresses. The static
nature of this heuristic means that if another agent acquires a larger degree it
will not be selected until one of the current agents expires. Depending on the
TTL of the current fixed strategy agents, this could be a substantial period.
To address this issue we propose another degree-based heuristic: Updating
Degree. This approach is sensitive to the dynamic nature of the topology and
reselects the fixed strategy agents each timestep, based on highest current degree.
Whilst this offers a solution to the potential sub-optimality of Static Degree it
suffers from two problems. Firstly, the ability to acquire this information each
timestep in a timely manner may be infeasible in many domains. Secondly, there
is the potential that the fixed strategy agents will not remain in a given location
long enough to influence the local area before being replaced.
The Static and Updating Degree heuristics do not fully consider the dy-
namic network context. Whilst high degree agents are likely to be influential
due to their ability to interact with many others, additional dimensions may
affect their applicability. Agents that are close to expiring may be less desirable
than younger nodes as their expected number of interactions before replacement
is much lower. However, the youngest nodes, those newly created, cannot be
guaranteed to become influential later on. Hence, the age of an agent adds an
additional consideration. We propose a new heuristic, Life-Degree, that allows
exploration of the effect of age in addition to degree on a fixed strategy agent’s
efficacy.
In many settings it may be impossible to know an agent’s TTL. However,
we can estimate an agent’s remaining life. Given the upper bound, Tl, and the
uniformly distributed nature of TTL, the normalised expected remaining TTL,
ErTTL, for an agent n ∈ N is:
ErTTL(n) = 1− age(n)× 2
Tl
We can also calculate the normalised degree of a node within the largest con-
nected component as:
degnorm(n) =
deg(n)
maxn′∈LCC deg(n′)
The Life-Degree heuristic is then defined as:
Life-Degree(n) = ω × degnorm(n) + (1− ω)× ErTTL(n)
COIN@AAMAS2015
133
In this, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 is a weight, determining the relative contributions of degree
and expected TTL.
Life-Degree allows combination of the relevant information, normalised
against theoretical maximums, in a manner that allows exploration of the im-
portance of both. Two variations of Life-Degree will be used, Static and Up-
dating, to compare against the heuristics discussed above.
4 Results and Discussion
In this section we present our findings on convention emergence in dynamic
topologies and consider the effect of agent age via our proposed heuristic, Life-
Degree. Unless otherwise mentioned, all experiments used 1000 agents, the
10-action coordination game and an exploration and Q-Learning rate of 0.25.
Results were averaged over 100 runs.
4.1 Characterising Topology
We initially consider convention emergence without external manipulation in
dynamic topologies. This gives insight into the impact of network dynamics
on convention emergence and provides a baseline. Additionally, it allows us to
quantify the point at which a stable convention will have emerged for later
experiments that focus on destabilisation.
The features of the dynamic topology can be manipulated by varying the
parameters of the network model, and are encapsulated in different values of
Tl/T0. Gonza´lez et al. [9] show that the features of the topology thus only depend
on the ratio Tl/T0 and the density, ρ ≡ N/L2. Additionally, they show that the
average degree is a non-linear function of Tl/T0 that depends on the chosen ρ.
As such, for all experiments we use a constant ρ = 0.625 (i.e. N = 1000, L = 40)
to allow meaningful comparisons of the Tl/T0 values.
Parameter settings were chosen that generated values of Tl/T0 between 0 and
20. These were rounded to the nearest integer to combine similar Tl/T0 values,
with each bucket containing 10 values. The average time taken, over 30 rounds,
for convention emergence to occur was measured on the generated topologies
and the average time over the bucketed values was then calculated. Values which
did not result in convention emergence after 20,000 timesteps were discounted
from the second average as they were unlikely to result in conventions emerging.
Only runs with Tl/T0 . 4 are affected by this. Simulations with a higher Tl/T0
exhibited convention emergence for all runs. With Tl/T0 . 4 as much as 80% of
the runs for a given simulation did not result in convergence. The transition is
notable and is discussed below.
It is clear that convention emergence is successful in the dynamic topology,
and for most values of Tl/T0 there is little variation in the average time for
convention emergence as shown in Figure 1. Values of Tl/T0 & 5 all have a
convention emergence time of around t = 500 with little variation between runs.
However, values of Tl/T0 . 4 displayed significant variation and, in general,
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after initial intervention using standard
heuristics
much more time was required for convention emergence to occur if it occurred
at all. Higher values of Tl/T0 did not exhibit this.
At low values of Tl/T0 the topology was found to either not generate a giant
cluster or agents were found to expire before meaningful convention emergence
could occur. This follows from the parameter settings required to give a small
Tl/T0 and means that there is a lower threshold for the topology to experience
convention emergence. In particular there is a minimum level of connectedness
and lifespan that must be present. Below this threshold the network will be
partially disconnected and not representative of real-world topologies. However,
once this is achieved the time required for convention emergence is mostly in-
dependent of Tl/T0. As such, we select parameter settings that are used for all
following simulations that give Tl/T0 = 4.7 which was found to provide stable
convention emergence times. For completeness, additional Tl/T0 values in the
range 20 to 200 were also examined. There was a slight decrease in the average
time at higher values, although the low variation remained.
As the real-world networks examined by Gonza´lez et al. had equivalent Tl/T0
values around 5-6 these results were purely to determine the impact of high Tl/T0
values, and hence have not been included.
4.2 Initial Intervention
Having established that convention emergence occurs in dynamic topologies, we
now examine the effect of fixed strategy agents. We start by considering the
scenario where fixed strategy agents are introduced early in a system’s lifespan
to manipulate convention emergence. As discussed in Section 3, this initial in-
sertion is delayed until a cluster of size greater than N/2 has emerged. This was
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found empirically to always have occurred by t = 200. Fixed strategy agents are
inserted after this “burn-in” period has elapsed.
We begin by considering the initial heuristics discussed in Section 3: Static
Degree and Updating Degree. We also consider random placement of the fixed
strategy agents as a baseline. The fixed strategy agents were inserted into the
system at t = 200 and the simulation allowed to run for 5000 timesteps. Prior
simulations showed that conventions always emerged well before this time even
without the presence of fixed strategy agents. The number of fixed strategy
agents inserted into the system was varied from zero to twenty and the propor-
tion of simulations in which the fixed strategy emerged as the convention was
monitored. The results of this setting are shown in Figure 2.
As expected, given the size of the action space (10), when no fixed strat-
egy agents were inserted, the proportion of times the fixed strategy emerged as
the convention is approximately 0.1. With the introduction of only a few fixed
strategy agents placed at targeted locations we are able to readily manipulate
the emerged convention more than 50% of the time. The results also show that
even randomly placed fixed strategy agents are able make a large difference in
convention emergence. This corroborates the findings in previous work on static
networks [10, 21], although larger numbers of fixed strategy agents are needed
comparatively. As the number of inserted agents increases, the difference be-
tween the targeted heuristics and random placement becomes more pronounced.
The targeted heuristics are able to cause convention emergence in nearly 100%
of cases with only 12 agents whilst random placement requires 20.
Most importantly, there is very little difference between the two targeted
heuristics. Updating Degree slightly outperforms Static Degree but, given the
additional complexity and resource requirements needed for calculating the Up-
dating Degree heuristic, Static Degree would likely be sufficient in most cases.
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Having established the efficacy of the traditional heuristics, we now examine
the effect of considering agent age using our new heuristic, Life-Degree. We
begin by examining Static Life-Degree, contrasting this to Static Degree. Var-
ious weightings of Life-Degree were considered and the results are presented
in Figure 3. The results of Static Degree have also been included for comparison.
When given equal weighting between expected life and degree (ω = 0.5),
Life-Degree performs markedly worse than Static Degree for nearly all num-
bers of fixed strategy agents. This is due to the fact that such a weighting is
heavily biased to much younger agents. The range of possible ages is larger than
that of degree and as such, even when normalised, age was found to be the pri-
mary selector. As can be seen, this has similar performance to random placement
and should be avoided. A weighting of 0.7 in favour of degree exhibits similar
performance to Static Degree. Further increasing the weighting offers no further
improvement in performance with ω = 0.9 also performing the same as Static
Degree. Additional weightings of 0.95 and 0.99 (asymptotically approaching pure
degree) were also considered and similarly offered no improvements.
These results show that an agent’s connectivity, indicated by its degree, is
a much larger contributor to its ability to influence others than how long that
agent will remain in the system. The fact that considering age can only decrease
the effectiveness of the chosen agents indicates that agents’ short-term influence
is a larger factor in convention emergence than choosing long-term targets.
Life-Degree was also used in an updating manner, such that the set of
fixed strategy agents was re-calculated each iteration. The results from this
and, for comparison, Updating Degree are shown in Figure 4. Similarly to the
Static Life-Degree experiments, the performance of Updating Life-Degree
depends heavily on the value of ω being used. As before, giving equal weight-
ing to each factor results in poor performance, far below that of pure degree.
Increasing the weighting again enhances performance but only to that of Up-
dating Degree. This mirrors the results of Static Life-Degree and shows that,
regardless of the ability to continuously assess an agent’s remaining lifespan,
choosing agents with numerous connections is the most important factor. This
indicates that, even in the extreme case where an agent is expected to expire in
a few timesteps, on average equal performance can be achieved when selecting
them compared to selecting an equivalent agent who remains in the system much
longer.
Static Life-Degree and Updating Life-Degree, like their pure degree
counterparts, have only slight differences in performance, with Updating Life-
Degree performing slightly better. However, the constant information updates
may make Updating Life-Degree untenable in many domains. In domains
where this information is readily available, we have shown that using up-to-date
estimates of degree is sufficient to offer improved outcomes from fixed strategy
agent selection.
The results presented above show that it is possible to influence the direction
of convention emergence in dynamic topologies. Another commonly used metric
of the efficiency of fixed strategy agents is the effect they have on the speed of
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Fig. 5. Effect of fixed strategy agents on convention emergence speed
convention emergence [7,10]. Figure 5 shows how time for convention emergence
varies for different numbers of fixed strategy agents using the heuristics. As is
to be expected, given the asymptotic behaviour exhibited above, consideration
of age, depending on weighting, causes either an increase in the average time
required or results in similar times to the equivalent pure degree heuristics.
Omitted from the graph for clarity, a value of ω = 0.5 requires more time for
convention emergence to occur for any number of fixed strategy agents. Values
higher than 0.7 perform similarly to 0.7 and hence have also been omitted.
The standard deviation of the convention emergence time also decreases
rapidly as the number of fixed strategy agents rises, from up to 100 with zero
agents to around 20 with 20 agents. The standard deviation of the results from
the Life-Degree simulations are equivalent to those of the Degree heuristics
except for ω = 0.5 which exhibits much larger variance. Thus, consideration of
age has a negative effect both in establishing conventions as well as the time
it takes to do this. This indicates that, in all aspects, degree is the factor that
contributes most to how influential a given agent will be.
4.3 Late Intervention
We now look to the related use of fixed strategy agents in destabilising and
replacing an already established convention [13, 15]. This requires a convention
to already have emerged within the system. So that the results are representative
of the general case, we allow a convention to naturally emerge without the use
of fixed strategy agents to encourage it. It was found that conventions always
emerged before timestep t = 1500 and, as such, insertion of fixed strategy agents
occurs at this time. This also means that the system will have entered the QSS,
and the topology and convention can be considered truly emerged. The action of
the fixed strategy is chosen uniformly at random from the actions that exclude
the established convention.
In common with the findings of Marchant et al. [13, 15] for static networks,
our initial experiments showed a much larger number of fixed strategy agents
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was required to affect the established convention compared to the number needed
when inserted into a system earlier. However, a relatively small set of fixed strat-
egy agents are still able to effect a change. In contrast to static networks, the
transition between no effect and guaranteed change occurs over a much smaller
range of fixed strategy agents. For nearly all heuristics (excluding random) there
is little or no effect at 40 fixed strategy agents (4% of the population), whilst 50
fixed strategy agents (5% of the population) results in the targeted convention
supplanting the established convention in almost 100% of cases. This narrow
window indicates that there is a critical number of fixed strategy agents, nearly
independent of placement, that is required to guarantee replacement of a con-
vention in dynamic topologies.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of runs in which the convention represented
by the fixed strategy became established when using the Static heuristics: Static
Life-Degree and Static Degree. Like in initial intervention, consideration of
age induces poorer performance here. With ω = 0.7, Life-Degree is substan-
tially outperformed by Static Degree for any non-trivial proportion, in contrast
to the case in initial intervention when such a weighting produced similar per-
formances. Even when increasing the weighting to 0.9, previously equivalent to
the performance of pure degree, Static Life-Degree is still slightly outper-
formed by Static Degree though this is within the margin of error. Increasing
the weighting further resulted in performance which asymptotically approached
that of Static Degree.
Similar results are presented in Figure 7 for updating heuristics. The differ-
ence between Updating Life-Degree and Updating Degree in this scenario is
even more pronounced. A weighting of 0.7 is again substantially worse than the
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pure degree heuristic with the higher weightings, 0.9 and 0.95, being of similar
quality to Updating Degree.
Of note, the difference in performance between static heuristics and updating
heuristics is more pronounced here than in initial interventions; the updating
heuristics consistently require noticeably fewer fixed strategy agents to effect
a change. This indicates that the inclusion of up-to-date information regarding
agent state is more important when attempting to combat an existing convention
and makes a larger contribution compared to when establishing a convention
from a state of neutral agents.
These findings indicate that destabilisation of an existing convention is even
more sensitive to the consideration of agent longevity than initial convention
emergence. Indeed, the age or expected lifespan of an agent can be safely ignored
with no detrimental effects to the performance of the fixed strategy agents. This
strongly implies that the major factor in destabilising conventions is instead
choosing agents with high degree, regardless of how long that agent will last.
High degree is more effective at spreading influence than choosing a lower degree
agent with longer life. The difference between Static and Updating Degree, not
present in initial intervention, also supports this view; the importance of choosing
the current highest degree agents is far more pronounced.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Convention emergence is often used in multi-agent systems to encourage efficient
and coordinated action choice. It provides a mechanism though which such be-
haviour can naturally occur without requiring changes to, or assumptions about,
underlying agent capabilities. How best to facilitate robust convention emergence
in a timely manner is an area of ongoing research. Fixed strategy agents can be
used to speed up and direct emergence. In particular, placing small numbers
of fixed strategy agents at targeted locations within the network topology con-
necting agents has been shown to better facilitate convention emergence than
untargeted placement. The heuristics used to choose these locations often make
use of metrics derived from an agent’s location within the topology.
In this paper, we initially considered organic un-influenced convention emer-
gence in a dynamic network, using the topology model proposed by Gonza´lez et
al. [8,9]. We showed that conventions emerge in a dynamic environment and that
the average time taken for this is largely independent of the parameter settings
used in the network model, provided the value of Tl/T0, is above a threshold of
approximately 4. Below this, the topology or agent lifespans are not conducive
to any convention emergence occurring at all. This indicates that there is a min-
imum level of connectedness required in dynamic topologies for conventions to
emerge.
We proposed a new placement heuristic, Life-Degree, that utilises informa-
tion unique to dynamic topologies in its decision making process, allowing us to
test the importance of that information. We contrasted this to the performance
of the traditionally used placement heuristics.
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We examined the scenario where fixed strategy agents are introduced early
in the life of the system to direct and encourage faster convention emergence. We
showed that, as in static networks, targeted placement offers better performance
than untargeted. A small number of agents are able to influence a population
much larger than themselves. We established that, in domains where it is pos-
sible to change the fixed strategy agents after selection, doing so offers small
improvements in performance. In both settings, the most important aspect of
selected agents was found to be their degree, ignoring their longevity. This was
found to both increase the probability of a specific convention emerging as well
as increasing the speed of that emergence.
Finally, we considered the destabilisation of already established conventions
in dynamic networks. We found that destabilisation is more sensitive to the in-
clusion of agent lifespan than when using fixed strategy agents to establish a
convention at the beginning of simulation. Choosing locations that will max-
imise an agent’s influence, regardless of how long they will remain, is the most
important aspect to consider when destabilising conventions in dynamic net-
works. Future work will investigate this further and examine if other features
of dynamic networks offer beneficial information when selecting fixed strategy
agents. We showed that the updating heuristics cause more destabilisation than
the static heuristics and that this effect was much larger than the equivalent
difference when encouraging initial convention emergence.
Overall, we have shown that convention emergence is possible in dynamic
topologies and that many characteristics have direct parallels in static networks.
We have shown that the degree of an agent is a major factor when choosing
them and can be used to cause rapid convention emergence and destabilisation.
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Abstract. We describe the reciprocal agents that build virtual associations ac-
cording to past cooperative work in a bottom-up manner and that allocate tasks
or resources preferentially to agents in the same associations in busy large-scale
distributed environments. The models of multi-agent systems (MASs) are often
used to express the tasks that are done by teams of cooperative agents, so how
each subtask is allocated to appropriate agents is an important issue. Particularly,
in busy environments where multiple tasks are requested simultaneously and con-
tinuously, simple allocation methods result in conflicts, meaning that these meth-
ods attempt to allocate multiple tasks to one or a few capable agents. Thus, the
system’s performance degrades. To avoid such conflicts, we introduce reciprocal
agents that cooperate with particular agents that have excellent mutual experience
of cooperating as team members. They then autonomously build associations in
which they try to form teams with their members for new incoming tasks. We
introduce theN -agent team formation game, an abstract expression of allocating
problems in MASs by eliminating unnecessary and complicated task and agent
specifications, thereby identifying the fundamental mechanism to facilitate build-
ing and stably maintaining associations. We experimentally show that reciprocal
agents can drastically reduce the number of conflicts, enabling tasks to be ex-
ecuted efficiently with teams. Finally, we analyze the reasons for such efficient
allocations.
1 Introduction
Many computational tasks are completed by not just a single agent but by teams or
groups of cooperative agents. For example, a task in service computing often dynami-
cally composed of a number of service elements and can be achieved by allocating them
to appropriate agents. These agents are usually software entities on the Internet created
by different developers. We can find such applications not only in computer science
such as ad hoc networks, e-commerce, and sensor networks, but also in other domains
such as coalitional formation for tackling pollution control problems (economics and
social science) [21] and group work in education (e.g., [22, 27]). In these applications,
the efficient and effective formation of teams for doing tasks is vital for providing qual-
itative service in a timely manner. However, in open environments such as the Internet,
centralized controls are often impractical because such information is too large and dy-
namic to process at a single point. Furthermore, numerous agents, which usually work
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as delegates of companies, organizations, and individuals, are likely to block access to
parts of the information to ensure security and confidentiality. Thus, autonomous dis-
tributed methods are required. However, forming a team in a large-scale MASs is costly
because agents have to select team members from a large pool of agents. In addition, if
tasks are numerous and appear simultaneously in distributed environments, many con-
flicts in allocations — meaning that multiple tasks will be allocated to a single or to
a few capable agents — are likely to occur because centralized managers cannot be
assumed to have complete latest information. Hence, they hinder team formation and
degrade the entire performance.
A number of literature have discussed approaches to form teams and coalitions for
group-based tasks, especially in the multi-agent systems context. For example, in the
literature of coalition formation (e.g., [7, 13, 19]), methods have been proposed to find
the combinatorial formation that provides the maximum social utility under the assump-
tions that characteristic functions for all possible groups are given. However, real-world
applications often cannot assume characteristic functions in advance. Therefore, a few
studies focus on identifying characteristic functions [18, 28]. However, they assume that
their environments are static and not busy, so the characteristic functions take into ac-
count only a one-shot and static situation [18]. Another approach to team formation
is market-based methods, such as the conventional contract net protocol and its exten-
sions. However, they also assume that the system is not large and very busy; when it
becomes busier and larger, the efficiency for forming teams, i.e., allocating the elements
of the given tasks to agents, is severely degraded. More importantly, most of these stud-
ies did not take into account the conflicts in allocations in busy environments.
Often we form groups for doing tasks in the real world, and if conflicts in group
formation occur and if no prior communications for pre-negotiation are possible, we
first find reliable and dependable persons with whom to work. Such people are usually
identified according to past reciprocity and an agreement for benefit distribution within
the groups (e.g., [9]). Furthermore, if the opportunities for group work are frequent, we
try to form collaborative relationships with these mutually reliable people. In an ex-
treme case when group work with unreliable people is offered, we can refuse the offers
for the sake of finding possible future proposals with reliable people and for punishing
the proposing agents because of their past unreliable behavior [9, 10]. Although such
behavior is irrational because of its self-interest, it can stabilize collaborative relation-
ships and avoid the possibility of conflicts in team formations. Thus, we can expect
stable benefits in the future through working with reliable agents.
This paper describes the first attempt to create a computational method for team
formations that have fewer conflicts (thereby ensuring stability) and more acceptable
benefit distributions among teams. This is done by introducing non-self-interested and
irrational behavior — much like that in humans. Initially, agents form teams randomly,
so many trials may fail due to conflicts or may result in unacceptable benefit distribu-
tions. However, through these trials, the agents mutually memorize the reciprocal and
non-reciprocal behaviors by agents encountered in teams and also learn the appropriate
behaviors for other reciprocal agents. Then, agents with enough experience in group
work will identify which agents are dependable when necessary and virtually build col-
laboration relationships, called associations of agents, in a bottom-up manner. Agents
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also learn how the benefits should be shared with collaborators in the associations.
Conversely, agents that are found to be dependable by certain agents will try to be-
have as expected. Agents often behave irrationally like humans in this learning process
because they may decline group work offers provided by undependable or first-time
agents. However, from a long-term viewpoint, these behaviors and learning will facili-
tate agents building associations consisting of mutually dependable and trusted agents
and will enable teams to be formed stably within the associations to which they belong.
Such teams within an association may not be the best from the viewpoint of the opti-
mality, but if they can complete tasks with the required quality, the effectiveness and
less conflicts are more important in a large-scale and busy MAS. team
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work, and Section 3
describes the model of agents and the game of team formation by detailing an abstract
resource allocation problem in a multi-agent system context. Then, in Section 4, we
describe several types of agents, including reciprocal agents, and explain how they per-
form the games with building associations consisting of dependable agents. Section 5
shows how the performance of the game improved by learning of payoff distributions
and by building associations based on the behavior in games. Finally, the paper is con-
cluded in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Many studies on resource or task allocation have been conducted in multi-agent sys-
tems contexts. Resource and task allocation problems are usually formulated by using
integer or linear programming techniques (e.g., [23]). These techniques are the cen-
tralized methods and are thus applicable only when all information is available at a
single point. However, this assumption is often impractical in distributed environments.
An important approach in such environments is coalitional formation based on coop-
erative game theory and teamwork [7, 19, 24, 25]. Although this work has numerous
applications such as disaster control [2], sensor networks[13] and unmanned air vehi-
cles [1], they assume coalitions for one-shot situations, so these are applicable only to
static and unbusy environments. Furthermore, they assume that characteristic functions
for coalitions are shared among agents in advance. However, this assumption is often
implausible in real-world applications.
Research more related to ours in this approach is coalitional formation in dynamic
environments [6, 16, 18, 28]. For example, Chalkiadakis and Boutilier [6] proposed sta-
ble coalitional formation in the framework of cooperative game theory using Bayesian
reinforcement learning, but this method is not scalable enough. Kluschand and Gerber
[18] proposed a dynamic coalition formation mechanism using rational agents, called
DCF-A, in which fixed leader agents learn how coalitions should be formed. The leaders
are the central points and DCF-A assumes that all agents are constantly available. Ye et
al. [28] proposed a dynamic method in environments where agents are connected with
a certain network structure. However, we focus on autonomous and bottom-up gener-
ation of a stable coalitional (or association) structure formation in busy environments
where tasks continuously arrive at the MAS. Jones and Barber [16] proposed a bottom-
up method that uses heuristics combining team formation strategies and task selection
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strategies to adapt to dynamic environments. Faye et al. [8] proposed coalitional forma-
tion in environments where the availability of agents is unpredictable, although it was
concerned with network applications. However, our study addresses how dependable
agents are mutually recognized and make associations for stable task executions.
Of course, a lot of research on groups and reciprocity in human societies have been
conducted in sociobiology and economics (e.g., [26]) and we wanted to utilize the find-
ings in these research areas. Numerous studies attempted to explain non-self-interested
behavior using reciprocity. The simplified meaning for this is that people do not engage
in selfish actions towards and do not betray others who are reciprocal and coopera-
tive, even if such selfish actions could result in higher payoffs for themselves [12, 11,
20]. Panchanathan and Boyd [20] stated that cooperation can be established from in-
direct reciprocity, meaning that people work together with certain persons and expect
future rewards through cooperating with others [9]. The authors of [11, 12] insisted
that fairness in cooperation produces non-self-interested behavior; agents do not be-
tray relevant reciprocal agents because such a betray would be unfair. One important
study related to our work is the results of a repeated ultimatum game [14] done by Fehr
and Fischbacher [9] that showed how payoffs shared among collaborators affected the
strategies in subsequent games. The same authors also found that punishment towards
those who distribute unfair payoffs is frequently observed, although the punishment can
be costly [10]; fairness and punishment are key points in continuing cooperation in an
ultimatum game.
Group formation and selection are also related work. For example, Bowels et al. [5]
insisted that people form groups because those belonging to groups have high proba-
bilities to win races occurring in their societies (we believe the notion of race in [5]
corresponds to conflict in our work). Bowles et al. [4] also investigated using agent-
based simulations, and they found that groups and group-adapted behavior that may
be individually costly evolved because group institutions can limit the fitness cost of
the behavior. Bornstein and Yaniv [3] experimentally indicated that in the ultimatum
game, people in a group can receive lower payoffs than in individual-based games but
are nonetheless likely to accept the proposals in the group. The situations we addressed
in this paper are quite similar to those of the repeated ultimatum game — more specifi-
cally, the dictator games [17], which is a variant of the ultimatum game— but we focus
on algorithmic methods to understand how agents can autonomously form groups and
how they become likely to accept group proposals; in our context, this means that con-
flict situations can be avoided by choosing group-based behavior.
3 Model and Problem
3.1 Overview of Allocation Problem
Our source of motivation in this paper is a continuous task or resource allocation prob-
lem in which a task consisting of a number of subtasks is executed by a number of agents
that have sufficient resources to process the allocated subtasks [15]. Briefly, the prob-
lem is formulated as follows: Let A = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of agents, and agent i 2 A
has its resources expressed by Ri = fr1i ; : : : ; rpi g, where p is the number of types of
resources. Task T = fs1; : : : ; sKg consists of a number of subtasks sk. Some amounts
COIN@AAMAS2015
146
of resources are required to execute subtask s, so we identify it as s = fr1s ; : : : ; rps g,
where rks is the k-th resource required for s. Agent i can process s when its resources
satisfy
rk  rks (1  8k  p); (1)
and T is executed by a team of agents, but any agent can belong to only one team at a
time. When the agents in the team satisfy Condition (1) for the given subtasks, the team
can successfully execute T .
For vo, a positive integer, tasks on average are given to the systems every tick, which
is the time unit in our model. Let Q = fT1; : : : ; Tlg be the set of the given tasks. For
task T 2 Q, one agent works as a leader that is an initiator to form the team. The leader
selects one agent (or a few) for each subtask in T , then sends it a solicitation message
with a subtask to join the team. The agents that receive the messages select one of
them and send back an acceptance message. If agents accepting the solicitation mes-
sage satisfy Condition (1) for all subtasks, the team can execute T with a certain game
duration. Then, the leader receives the payoffs for T and distributes them to members
with a certain policy. In this process, a number of (capable) agents may receive multiple
solicitation messages simultaneously or during execution. Because agents can belong to
only one team simultaneously, such agents have to decline the rest of the solicitations.
Thus, team formation may fail. This sort of conflict is common and frequent when the
system is busy, so the performance is degraded.
We proposed the aforementioned task allocation method based on past successful
cooperation in forming teams and achieved efficient team formation [15]. However,
the success rate was insufficient to use in actual applications. One major reason for
the low success rate was the conflicts in allocations. This kind of request for group
work is often observed in human society, but we attempted to improve the success rate.
For example, we sent join solicitations only to dependable people who we believe will
probably accept them if they are inactive. Conversely, when we receive multiple solic-
itations, we tend to select the solicitation from the most reliable leader, meaning that
that leader selects us over others. To stabilize such team formations, we often build a
group, which is called an association, whose members consider each other to be reliable
and dependable. Our purpose was to reduce these conflicts in task allocation by using
the associations of computer systems from which leaders select the candidates for team
members.
3.2 Abstract Model of Allocation Problem
We attempted to identify what information impacts on building virtual associations in
a society of agents and how that information should be used, with the help of findings
in other disciplines. For this purpose, we created an abstract of a model of an allocation
problem with team formation in Section 3.1 by eliminating unnecessary specifications
of tasks and agents, and we identified what the fundamental mechanisms were in build-
ing associations in a bottom-up manner.
The abstract version of the allocation problem with team formation is called the
team formation game (henceforth referred to as TF game). It is similar to the repeated
N -person ultimatum game (N  2 is an integer) because we focus more on how teams
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should be formed by distributing the received payoffs. More precisely, this is more
similar to theN -person dictator game because member agents cannot refuse the payoffs
proposed by the leader but can refuse the solicitation to join the TF game next time.
We introduce N -agent Team Formation Game as follows: Leader l 2 A selects
N   1 agents from A n flg and solicits them to form a team. Then, the solicited agents
select zero or one solicitation (based on their own policy). If all solicited agents do not
accept them, the game is deemed a failure and ends. Otherwise (if all agents accept),
the game succeeds, and the formed team is retained for d ticks. After that, l receives the
pre-defined payoffs P > 0. l picks up some payoffs from P in return for playing as the
leader, and the remaining payoffs are distributed to all other members equally. Then,
the game ends. We assume that agents cannot accept and attend multiple games simul-
taneously. The agent currently being engaged on TF games is called active; otherwise,
it is called inactive. Every tick, vo inactive agents are randomly selected and initiate the
TF games as leaders. Then, this process is iterated. We propose a method to increase
the success rates so that the number of TF games succeeding during a certain period is
called the game performance, after this. Note that d corresponds to the processing time
for the allocated task.
The findings in (socio-)biology and experimental economy discussed in Section 2
suggest that although humans are usually motivated by self-interest, fairness is a key
feature for group-based activities; that is, people tend to behave fairly within a group.
Often, they give punishments for unfair behaviors, though punishments incur some
costs to themselves and, in this sense, do not represent rational behavior [9]. There-
fore, we attempted to find a control method for agents to build associations. We herein
show that these association can improve game performance by reducing conflicts.
4 Proposed Method: Reciprocal Agents and Associations
4.1 Reciprocal Agents
We introduce a reciprocal agent that is concerned with who are dependable, i.e., who
are likely to accept forming teams in TF games and to distribute payoffs fairly based on
the past reciprocal activities of other agents. Then, the agent tries to build associations
of mutually dependable agents. A reciprocal agent is different from a cooperative agent
in the sense that a reciprocal agent demonstrates cooperative attitudes to those that were
cooperative in the past and may ignore or understate messages from non-reciprocal and
unfair agents as punishment.
We introduce three learning parameters in reciprocal agents forN -agent TF games,
greediness, the threshold rate for dissatisfaction (TRD), and confidence degree. The
definition of confidence degree is described in the next section. The parameter of greed-
iness of i, 0  gi  2  1=N , determines that when i has worked as a leader of a suc-
cessful team, i picks up P gi, and so P (1 gi)=(N 1) is distributed equally to other
members. Agents want to earn more payoffs, so the higher gi is, the better. However,
other members may become dissatisfied. Note that the rate of even proportion is 1=N ,
so we set the maximum value of greediness to double that.
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Parameter TRD, 0  Trd i  2  1=N , denotes the threshold for i’s (dis)satisfaction
of the received payoffs from leader j if
P  (1  gj)=(N   1) < Trd i; (2)
where i expresses the dissatisfaction to leader j. How the parameters of greediness and
TRD are learned based on the game results and the received payoffs is described in
Section 4.4.
4.2 Association and its formation
Agent i can belong to a number of associations, L, which are the sets of agents includ-
ing i. Agent i knows Li the collection of the associations it belongs to. We also assume
that agents know the current state, which is active (attending another TF game) or inac-
tive, for those in the same associations. We think that this assumption is reasonable if
the number of agents in each association is low; actually, we experimentally show that
it is quite low. Initially, i has a singleton association, so Li = ffigg. We also define
L = [i2ALi; (3)
which is the collection of all associations. Note that if L2  L1, L2 is eliminated from
Li sinceL2 is redundant. Agents working as a leader first select one of their associations
and try to find the candidates of team members in it.
Reciprocal agent i has a set of parameters called a confidence degree (CD), fcij j j 2
A n fig; 0  cij  1g, to extend or reduce the member of associations. Intuitively, the
CD denotes how much agent i wants to form teams with j 2 A n fig again, and it is
learned through j’s past behavior to i using
cij = (1  c)cij + c  ij ; (4)
where 0 < c  1 is the learning rate, and ij is defined according to the process of
TF games as follows:
Case 1: If i worked as a leader and j accepted the solicitation from i, then ij = 1, and
if it refused the solicitation, ij = 0.
Next, suppose that i worked as a member of a team whose leader is j.
Case 2: If the TF game succeeded, ij = 1; otherwise, ij = 0.
Case 3: Furthermore, if the game succeeded, i raises the CD values to other members
by ik = 1 for any k(6= i; j) in the team. Conversely, i lowers the CD for agent k by
ik = 0 if k refused the solicitation from j because this is a reason for the failure of the
TF game. However, for agent k0 who accepted the invitation, cik0 remains unchanged.
The association is extended or reduced as follows according to the CD values. Agent
i started the process to invite non-associating agent j when cij > Fc, where Fc is the
threshold value for invitation to the association. Such j is called i’s dependable agent.
For 8L 2 Li s.t. j 62 L, if ci0j > Fc for more than half agent i0 2 L, j is accepted
to join L so L = L [ fjg. Then, redundant associations are eliminated. Conversely, if
9j 2 L s.t. the number of agents i 2 L whose confidence satisfies cij < Fexp , then j
is expelled from L. Note that i may have low confidence for agent j 2 Li (cij < Fexp)
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in the shared association if other member in Li have high CD values for j. Agent j is
called an undependable agent for i when cij < Fexp . Agent i can also withdraw from
association Li 2 Li when the average of the CDs of other members is lower than Fexp ,
i.e., X
j2Linfig
cij=(jLij   1) < Fexp (5)
is held.
4.3 Forming Teams Based on Associations and Confidence Degree
A reciprocal agent plays TF games using an "-greedy strategy as follows. Agent iwork-
ing as a leader first selects one association, Li, that has the most dependable inactive
agents; this is possible because agents know the states of other agents in the common
associations. If the number of dependable inactive agents in Li is greater than or equal
to N   1, i selects the N   1 agents from it according to a descending order of the CD
values of i. If the number is smaller thanN 1, the rest of the members are selected ac-
cording to i’s CD values. However, with probability ", one selected member is replaced
by another agent that is selected randomly.
Next, suppose that i is currently not a leader and has received a number of solici-
tation messages. Agent i first ignores the messages from undependable agents, even if
it has received only such messages. This ignorance may be irrational behavior because
accepting one solicitation may produce some payoffs, but we can think of it as a kind of
punishment to the sender because the low CD value is the result of past unfair behavior.
Agent i then selects one of the messages according to the CD values for senders with
probability 1  "; otherwise i selects one randomly.
4.4 Response and Payoff Distribution Strategies in Reciprocal Agents
The CD values are updated using the new value of ij after the TF game with the team
members. This value is determined according to (not only the CD values of other agents
but also) the responses to the specifications and the rates of the received payoffs. These
responses and payoffs are decided according to the parameters of greediness and TRD.
These values in agent i also learn to find the appropriate values using update functions:
gi = (1  g)  gi + g  g (6)
Trd i = (1  Trd)  Trd i + Trd  Trdi ; (7)
where g and Trd are the learning rates. We will describe when reciprocal agents
update them and how g and Trdi are decided.
The basic concept of reciprocal agents for greediness is that when the game suc-
ceeds, (1) they want to obtain larger payoffs only if no other members of the TF game
express dissatisfaction and (2) the member agents learn the value of the greediness of
the current leader because it is appropriate in this association. However, when the game
fails (at least one agent declined the solicitation), (3) its leader’s the greediness should
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drop.1. The details are as follows. If leader i succeeds in the TF game with the members
of Mi and no agents in Mi express dissatisfaction, then j 2 Mi n fig updates gj with
g = gi, and i updates gi with g = 2=N using Formula (6). If a member expressed
dissatisfaction or the game failed, i updates gi with g = 0.
Parameter TRD is used to express the dissatisfaction with the payoffs received from
the leader because agent i thinks that the payoffs are low and unfair. As mentioned pre-
viously, the dissatisfaction may lower the CD for other agents, resulting in punishments
and/or the expulsion or withdrawal from joined associations in the future. Because
agents in an association should have the same and similar TRD values, its values are ad-
justed as follows based on the response frommembers. Suppose that agent i is the leader
of a successful TF game but agent j in the team expresses dissatisfaction. If the rate of
payoffs that i distributed to j is higher than i’s TRD, i.e., Trd i < (1   gi)=(N   1),
then Trd i is updated with Trdi = (1 gi)=(N  1). Furthermore, if j is the only agent
expressing dissatisfaction, j’s TRD is high, so the currently received payoffs have to be
adjusted. Thus, Trd i is updated with Trdj = (1  gi)=(N   1). However, if i receives
no invitation for a certain period (! ticks), i assumes that other agents have low CD
values for i because its TRD must be high, so the Trd i is reduced by updating with
Trdj = 0.
4.5 Comparative agents
We introduce two types of agents, a self-interested agent and an associating self-interested
(AS) agent, for comparison in the following experiments. Self-interested agents in this
article behave so that they get more payoffs based on past game interactions and do not
intend to build associations. AS agents try to build associations by estimating which
ones are more beneficial according to past interactions, in addition to behaving to get
more payoffs like self-interested agents.
We introduce two learning parameters for self-interested agent i. The expected value
of distributed payoffs (EDP) eij for (8j 2 A n fig) is the statistical value about how
many payoffs can be expected when i accepts the solicitation from j. It is updated by
eij = (1  e)  eij + e  vj (8)
after accepting the solicitation from j, where vj is the received payoffs from j, and
0 < e < 1 is the learning rate. Note that vj = 0 if the TF game failed. The param-
eter expected acceptance rate (EAR), hij , expresses the degree of acceptance of the
solicitation by j; after leader i sends the solicitation message to j, hij is updated by
hij = (1  h)  hij + h  ; (9)
where  = 1 if j accepted the solicitation, and  = 0 otherwise. Parameter EDP is used
when self-interested agents select one solicitation to pursue more payoffs. Parameter
EAR is used to select more probable agents as members of TF games.
1 Thus, the name of ‘greediness’ may not be appropriate because reciprocal agents adjust the
values by observing the responses from other association members. However, this parameter is
also defined self-interested agents below although it is adjusted in a different way (to increase
the sharing payoffs). In the experiment, we compared how many payoffs is allocated to leaders
in different types of agents. Thus, we would like to use the greediness in this paper.
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Self-interested agent i as a leader selects members according to the descending or-
der of EAR, hij (j 2 A). When i plays as a member, i select one solicitation message
based on the EDP values. In both situations, i selects a member agent and a solicitation
message randomly with probability ". Self-interested agents also have parameter greed-
iness. However, they update the values of greediness using Formula (6) only when they
work as leaders; if the game succeeded, g = 1; otherwise, g = 0.
AS agents additionally have CD values, and they try to build associations similar
to reciprocal agents. The leader AS agent select the members from their associations,
but the member AS agents selects the solicitation messages according to the EDP, in-
stead of the CD values. Furthermore, because they are interested in which agent will
directly provide more payoffs and which have no dissatisfaction related to unfair payoff
distributions, the CD values are updated only in Cases 1 and 2 in Section 4.2.
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental Setting
We investigates how the game performance, which is the success rates of TF games,
improved over time in the society of reciprocal agents and compared the results with
those in the society of self-interested or AS agents. We also compared the number of
generated associations, their structures, and how learning parameters converged. The
number of agents was 300 (jAj = 300), and twenty N -person TF games whose game
duration d was 3 were initiated with twenty inactive agents selected randomly every
tick (vo = 20). We set N = 4, so the initial values of greediness and TRD were
randomly selected between 0 and 0.5. The initial values of CD, EDP, and EAR were set
to 0.5, 0.25, and 0.5, respectively. The threshold values were defined as Fc = 0:7 and
Fexp = 0:4. Parameter ! was fixed to 10. All learning rates, c, e, h, Trd , and g
were set to 0.05. The data indicated below are average values of 20 independent trials.
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Fig. 1. Performance improvement over time.
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5.2 Experimental Results – game performance and association structure
The number of successful TF games per 100 ticks are plotted in Fig. 1 (a). The figure
indicates that reciprocal agents can perform TF games much more effectively than other
agents. The self-interested agents pursue their own benefits. Thus, conflicts are likely
to occur because they select members only based on locally learned results. The game
performance (the number of successful TF games) of the AS agents was slightly better
than that of the self-interested agents, so the advantage of associations seems to be
limited. However, if we carefully look at Fig. 1 (a), we can see that the curve of AS
agents did not converge yet; actually, when we continued the experiment to 200,000
ticks, the number of successful TF games gradually increased, as shown in Fig. 1 (b)
but was still much lower than that of reciprocal agents. This suggested that associations
could contribute to the game performance in AS agents but were formed very slowly;
we will discuss the differences in the structures of associations. Hence, AS agents could
not build associations within a reasonable time. Note that the numbers of successful TF
games by self-interested and reciprocal agents did not vary after 10,000 ticks.
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Table 1. Association structures in societies of reciprocal and AS agents.
Agent type size = 1 2 3 4 5  6 total
Reciprocal agent (at 10,000 ticks) 12.8 7.1 0.1 69.7 1.9 0 91.6
AS agent (at 10,000 ticks) 0 176.5 11.9 0.5 0 0 188.8
AS agent (at 200,000 ticks) 0 72.6 41.8 39.2 3.0 0 155.6
We investigated the association structure of agent societies to understand how as-
sociations contributed to the improvement in the game performance. Figure 2 plots the
number of associations in the agent societies of reciprocal and AS agents. Table 1 lists
the numbers of existing associations classified by size (the number of belonging agents)
at the specified time. Initially, the number of associations was 300 because all agents
belong to their own singleton association. Then, they gradually combined and formed
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larger associations. Figure 2 indicates that for reciprocal agents, the number of associa-
tions quickly decreased. Then, they formed more associations, whose majority size was
four (Table 1), which is the most ideal size of association. AS agents could also form
associations whose size was four, but the formation was quite slow; even at 200,000
ticks, 4-size associations were only 39.2, which was only 60% of those of reciprocal
agents.
The ideal game performance should be 200 per 10 ticks, but reciprocal agents suc-
ceeded in about 180 games. This difference was in part caused by the "-greedy strategy
because four agents in each game tried to randomly select agents with probability 0.05.
Another reason was the existence of small-size (1, 2, or 3) associations; when agents in
these associations initiate TF games, they may fail at high probabilities. However, these
small size associations did not decrease after 10,000 ticks. Thus, merging these small
size associations was one of the next objectives in our study.
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5.3 Payoff Distribution
Figures 3 and 4 indicate the values of control learning parameters deciding payoff dis-
tribution and the minimum acceptable payoff without declaring dissatisfaction. Note
that greediness was defined for all types of agents. We found from Fig. 3 that the
greediness values were 0.22, 0.19, and 0.12 at 10,000 ticks for the self-interested, AS,
and reciprocal agents. Because a fair distribution is when gi = 0:25, their own al-
location seemed slightly small. The greediness in self-interested and AS agents were
slightly higher. Particularly, the greediness values in AS agents continued to increase
very slowly. For example, at 200,000 ticks, the average greediness value of AS agents
was 0.31 and still increasing. In reciprocal agents, their greediness converged to a
relatively low value (0.12). We can also see that the TRD value was approximately
0.28; these values of greediness and TRD are consistent with a small margin (because
0:28 3 + 0:12 = 0:96  1) to accept a payoff distribution without dissatisfaction.
We think that a message of dissatisfaction to leaders is very important to main-
tain associations stably. After 1500 ticks, no expulsion or withdrawal was observed,
though we cannot show the graph here due to the page limit. However, Fig. 5 indicates
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that many agents expressed dissatisfaction with payoff distributions. Particularly, their
numbers stayed high after the association structure became stable. Thus, we can spec-
ulate that dissatisfaction could keep the values of greediness such that leaders did not
increase them locally. In a society of reciprocal agents, none of the TRD and greedi-
ness values were important because all agents had the same chances to be leaders and
members. For example, high greediness values cancelled each other if their greediness
values were consistent and could be shared in the same association. The only possible
unfairness was to increase them while ignoring other association members. Continu-
ous learning of the CD values with the expression of dissatisfaction from members can
prevent unfair behavior in the TF games.
6 Discussion
We previously conducted research to allocate subtasks to appropriate agents in a busy
and large-scale distributed environment, and found that the conflicts in allocations were
a major reason for a reduction in the entire efficiency [15]. We also found that build-
ing associations within the tasks to be done is an efficient and effective solution to this
problem [15]. Teams within an association may not be the best from the viewpoint of
the optimality, but if they can complete tasks with the required quality, an association-
based team formation is acceptable, probably efficient, and practical in a large-scale
system. The purpose of this study was to clarify the basic mechanism to build associ-
ations in a bottom-up manner by using an abstract and simplified model of allocation
problems, called a TF game. We discuss what are important to build stable associations
autonomously in this section.
Our experiments revealed that association-based team formation obviously con-
tributes to the efficiency in TF games. We think two key pieces of information are
needed to facilitate building associations in a MAS. First, the agent should memorize
whom it worked with and share the information with other team members because the
success of a TF game is owed to all members in the team. Conversely, the failure of a
game is caused by an unacceptance by at least one agent, for one of two reasons: the
leader’s selection was not appropriate and/or one or more of the members was betrayed.
These correspond to the learning of CD values in Case 3 (Section 4.2). This is quite dif-
ferent from the behavior of self-interested and rational agents that act based on which
agents are likely to provide more payoffs directly.
Moreover, punishments and dissatisfaction contributed to building associations. The
punishments, which represented refusals of the solicitation messages from agents whose
confidence degree was low or expulsion of low confidence agents from associations in
our context, affected the speed of building associations; actually, it could make the
convergence faster, but it slightly reduced actual game performance. Dissatisfaction,
which can be seen as advance notices of punishment, was necessary to make established
associations stable, as mentioned previously.
Finally, we would like to discuss the convergent values of greediness and TRD.
As previously mentioned, any value of greediness does not affect the received payoff
values in reciprocal agents because they are always fair from a long-term viewpoint if
the greediness and TRD values were consistent and shared in the associations. Hence,
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if we want to distribute the payoffs fairly among team members, we can fix the value
of TRD such as Trd i = 0:25(= 1=N) instead of learning these values. We think that
reciprocal agents can converge to almost fair distribution, although this may affect the
number of small-size associations.
7 Conclusion
We described reciprocal agents that build associations for team-based tasks to avoid
possible conflicts in a large-scale, busy MAS. Our target was to perform task alloca-
tion problems efficiently. Thus, we first introduced an abstract form of this problem,
called the team formation game, to identify what information and mechanism can facil-
itate building associations. We experimentally showed that the team formation method
based on the associations the reciprocal agents belong to could successfully perform
the games more efficiently than other types of agents: self-interested agents and asso-
ciating self-interested agents. Finally, we discussed the important mechanism to build
associations of reciprocal agents quickly. We have a number of research plans related
to this paper. For example, we try to vary the team size, N , and the work load vo and
investigate how these parameters affect association structures. We also plan to explore
this mechanism to combine the number of small-size associations to reduce the number
of unworking associations.
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Abstract. Resource sharing is an important but complex problem to be
solved. The problem is exacerbated in a coalition context due to policy
constraints placed on the resources. Thus, to effectively share resources,
members of a coalition need to negotiate on policies and at times refine
them to meet the needs of the operating environment. Towards achieving
this goal, in this work we propose a novel policy negotiation mechanism
based on the interest-based negotiation paradigm. Interest-based negoti-
ation promotes collaboration when compared with more traditional ne-
gotiation approaches such as position-based negotiations.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a form of interaction usually expressed as a dialogue between two
or more parties with conflicting interests that try to achieve mutual agreement
about the exchange of scarce resources, resolve points of difference and craft
outcomes that satisfy various interests. In order to cooperate and search for
mutual agreements, the involved parties make proposals, trade options and offer
concessions. The automation of the negotiation process and its integration with
autonomic, multi-agent environments has been well-researched over the last few
decades [1, 2].
The approaches for automating negotiation can be classified into three ma-
jor categories : (1) game theoretic (2) heuristic, and (3) argumentation based
[2]. The first two approaches represent traditional bilateral negotiation protocols
wherein each negotiation party exchanges offers aiming to satisfy their own in-
terests. These are called position-based negotiations (PBN). In these approaches
the participants attack the opposing parties’ offers and try to convince them for
the suitability of their own offers. Typically these approaches are formalized as
COIN@AAMAS2015
158
2search problems in the space of possible deals by focusing on negotiation objec-
tives. Argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) has been introduced as a means
to enhance automated negotiation by exchanging richer information between ne-
gotiators. Interest-based negotiation (IBN) is a type of ABN where the agents
exchange information about the goals that motivate their negotiation [3,4]. IBN
unlike PBN tackles the problem of negotiation by focusing on why negotiate for
rather than on what to negotiate for and aims to lead negotiating parties to
win-win solutions.
Multi-party teams are formed to support collective endeavors which other-
wise would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve by a single party. In or-
der to support such activities, resources belonging to collaborating partners are
shared among the team members; mechanisms to share resources in this con-
text are actively and broadly explored in the research community. This is due to
the impact that different sharing modifications (what to share, with who, when
and under what conditions) can bring into the collaboration, with respect to
domains such as security, privacy and performance to name only a few. Consider
the following: a) crisis management situations where responders affiliated with
different national and organizational groups form coalitions and share resources
(e.g. sensors, network connectivity and data storage) in an ad-hoc manner, in
order to provide humanitarian assistance; b) resource sharing in corporate envi-
ronments such as the recent MobileFirst5 partnership between IBM and Apple
where cloud and other services are shared in a daily basis; or c) a short-lived
opportunistic mobile network comprised of a few peer members, established for
message routing or data sharing. In all these cases access control mechanisms
that specify resource sharing need to be implemented. A suitable mechanism
for managing access control on resources of such systems is the Policy-based
Management System (PBMS).
This work presents a framework for enabling authorization policy negotia-
tion in multi-party, cooperative and dynamic environments. This framework is
aimed at policy makers who are not necessarily experts in IT or negotiation
techniques, responsible for modifying policies responding to situational changes.
To the best of our knowledge there is no mature work done on policy negotia-
tion, while the vast majority of negotiation work in multi-agent environments:
a) utilizes PBN approaches and b) invariably ignores the special characteris-
tics of multi-party, collaborative environments. In this work we propose a novel,
interest-based policy negotiation framework. It is our belief that by understand-
ing the negotiating parties interests and crafting options that can meet their
requirements, IBN could provide a negotiation mechanism which promotes good
collaboration unlike PBN, which creates an adversarial negotiation atmosphere.
Moreover PBN with its fixed, opposing positions is a cumbersome negotiation
method to cope with dynamic environments [2]. The proposed negotiation frame-
work can operate in parallel to a PBMS. It considers an approach that proposes
modification of strict policies, in order to maximize overall usability of collab-
5 http://www.ibm.com/mobilefirst/us/en/
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3orating assets while remaining faithful to existing authorization policies. The
main contributions of this work are as follows:
– definition of an interest-based authorization policy negotiation model
– specification of an architecture for its integration with PBMS
– demonstration of its application on a user friendly policy representation
– presentation of a walkthrough for its execution utilizing a policy negotiation
scenario
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss
previous literature on policy negotiation approaches and in Section 3 we present
a walkthrough of a policy negotiation scenario. Section 4 describes the policy
negotiation framework, the policy language, and its interface to PBMS by means
of an architectural overview. Section 5 presents the algorithmic steps for IBN
achievement through policy refinement. We conclude the document in Section 6
by summarizing our contribution and outlining future research directions.
2 Related Work
The first computer applications for supporting bilateral negotiations were de-
veloped in late 1960s [5]. The reason for their emergence was to assist human
negotiators to overcome weaknesses related to negotiation process such as cog-
nitive biases, emotional risks, and their inability to manage complex negotiation
environments. Although there is rich literature on negotiation protocols in au-
tonomous, multi-agent environments, there is very limited and no mature work
done on policy negotiation. We see the role of policies in managing large, complex
and dynamic systems as of a high importance and the existence of sophisticated
ways to do so imperative. We believe that the integration of an effective negoti-
ation mechanism on a PBMS works towards this direction. Moreover, no work
had previously attempted to bring the IBN paradigm into policy negotiation.
The authors of [6] present requirements of policy languages which deal with
trust negotiation and focuses on the technical aspects and properties of trust
models to effectively evaluate access requests. It does not depend on any aspects
of policy negotiation and the scenarios it deals with are less dynamic compared to
our problem domain. [7] proposes an architecture that combines a policy-based
management mechanism for evaluating privacy policy rules with a policy nego-
tiation roadmap. The work is very generic and does not provide clear evidence
of any effectiveness of the proposed approach, while lacking any evaluation. [8]
is one of the first works that looks into policy negotiation and covers the area in
depth. It also looks into collaborating environments and introduces the notion
of ABN in policy negotiation. However it focuses on a very specific application
domain in which it deals with writing insurance policies while maintaining a
common and collaborative knowledge base.
The work discussed on [9] has several similarities to our work; it deals with
cooperating environments and a PBMS is employed in support of service compo-
sition in a distributed setting. The authors have used a negotiation framework to
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4effectively compose services. Its main difference with the work proposed herein
is that the objective of the negotiation performed in [9] is the services that are
managed by policies, not the policies themselves. We believe that in order to
decrease the management overhead the objective of negotiation should be the
policies. This is because policies are the core of PBMS and the logical component
where the systems management resides. Finally, [10] proposes a policy negotia-
tion approach and presents its architecture. It lacks any effectiveness evaluation
while it does not consider either multi-partner, dynamic environments or ABN
and IBN paradigms.
3 Interest-based Policy Negotiation Scenario
Below we provide illustrative scenarios to motivate the use of IBN in policy
negotiation in resource sharing situations. In Subsection 3.1 we revisit the classic
orange scenario discussed in best-selling Getting to YES [11] and then expand
it to a mobile resource sharing scenario in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 The Chefs-Orange Scenario
Two chefs who work in the same kitchen both want to use orange for their
recipes. Unfortunately there is only one orange left in the kitchen. Instead of
starting negotiating on who is going to get the orange (as in a PBN, zero-sum
approach), the two chefs opt to follow the IBN approach. Thus, they ask each
other why they need the orange. In other words they try to better understand
their underlying goals of using the orange. Answering the why question it turns
out that one chef needs only the oranges flesh (to execute a sauce recipe) while
the other needs only its peel (for executing a dessert recipe) and so they share
the orange accordingly achieving a win-win negotiation outcome.
3.2 Authorization Policy Negotiation
An individual P2 wants to access a smartphone device SMD owned by an indi-
vidual P1. However, P1 has a set of restrictions which are captured by policy
set R on how to share SMD with other people. These restrictions may reflect
privacy concerns (e.g. by accessing their smartphone one can have access to their
photos), security, and so forth. For the sake of clarity, in this example, we as-
sume that the set R contains the following policy constraint R1: do not share the
device SMD with anyone else but its owner P1. When P2 asks for permission to
use the physical device SMD, R1 prohibits this action. Ostensibly there is little
room for negotiation here, if one follows a PBN approach with the current set
of policies.
However by applying IBN and trying to understand the underlying interests
of the involving parties, we believe the situation could be handled in a satisfac-
tory manner for both parties. For example, asking the why question it turns out
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5that P2 needs a data service (as opposed to the physical device) in order to exe-
cute the task Email submission and P1 does not mind sharing a data connection
as a hotspot with a trusted party; if P1 could get to know why P2 needs the
device, the situation could be solved to the satisfaction of both parties. All an
IBN mechanism needs to do in this case is to introduce another policy – actually
a refinement of the existing policy – to R1 to say that data service can be shared
among trusted parties. Thus, we argue that in such cases by understanding the
situation and broadening the space of possible negotiation deals, one can reach
a win-win solution.
The intuition behind ABN is that the negotiating parties can improve the
way they negotiate by exchanging explicit information about their intentions.
This information exchange reveals unknown, non-shared, incomplete, and im-
precise information about the underlying attitudes of the parties involved in the
negotiation [12]. As stated earlier, IBN is a type of ABN where the negotiating
parties exchange information about their negotiation goals, which then guide the
negotiation process. Thus, the why party of the intention is of major importance
when compared with the what part. Finally, we would say that the IBN is more
of a negotiation shortcut method rather than a typical negotiation process. By
attacking the problem of negotiation, IBN skips the proposals making, the op-
tions trading and the need for negotiating parties to offer concession as in PBN
cases. In the next section, we shall introduce our IBN-based policy framework
and provide our intuition behind the approach.
4 Interest-based Policy Negotiation Framework
The design and development of frameworks for establishing negotiation needs to
achieve some desirable outcomes that are secured by meeting a set of system-
atic properties: guaranteed success (i.e., negotiation protocol that guarantees
agreement), simplicity (i.e., easy for the optimal decision to be determined by
participants), maximizing social welfare (i.e., maximization of the utilities sum
of negotiation participants) to name a few [13]. The main objective of the nego-
tiation framework we propose is to maximize social welfare.
In environments that often suffer from asset scarcity (demand exceeds sup-
ply), and many tasks may be competing for the same resource like the ones de-
scribed in Section 1, paragraph 3, the formation of coalitions offers alleviation
by bringing more resources to the table. The relationships between coalition
parties in those scenarios are mostly peer-to-peer (P2P). However, we do not
assume fully cooperative scenarios. Partners often pursue cooperation but they
do not want to share sensitive intelligence that can deliver greater value to the
opponents [14]. In the literature this kind of relationship model, where parties
have cooperative and competitive attitudes from time to time, is called coopeti-
tion [15]. The PBMS and its sets of policies is in charge here, playing a regulative
role in order to keep balance between asset sharing and asset “protection”.
The more strict the partners’ policies are, the higher the barriers towards
collaboration are set. This is where the IBN mechanism comes in, trying to
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(i.e., increase overall the number of executed tasks and thus increase the social
welfare) while maintaining the compromise from the asset owners point of view
at the same levels.
The framework presented herein allows negotiation on policies with minimal
human intervention. In traditional system management, policies associated with
PBMS are static (or rarely change); these systems, however, fail miserably in
dynamic environments where policies need to adopt according to situational
changes. We note that it is not prudent to assume human operators in these
environments can effectively be on top of every change to manage PBMS(s)
effectively; they require automated assistance.
Summarizing its contribution, the IBN negotiation framework considers a co-
operative negotiation approach which modifies strict policies aiming to a) maxi-
mize social welfare by increasing the overall usability of collaborating assets while
b) remaining faithful to existing authorization policies, maintaining their core
trends. Utilizing such a tool, a multilateral policy transformation can be achieved
considering multi-party input and criteria for the benefit of the coalition. Each
negotiation session considers sets of two negotiators (bilateral negotiation ap-
proach). The issue that needs to be settled during any negotiation process is
the granting (or not) of access to non-sharable assets. From that perspective the
framework deals with single-attribute negotiations.
4.1 Policies Under Negotiation
Several policy-based management systems that utilize different policy languages
have been proposed in the literature. KAoS is a management tool for governing
software agent behavior in grid computing using an ontological representation
encoded in OWL [16]. Ponder is an object-oriented policy language used for man-
aging systems and networks [17] while XACML is the OASIS standard access
control policy language for web services [18]. The proposed policy negotiation
framework is applied on authorization policies expressed in the Controlled En-
glish (CE) policy language [19]. CE policy language is an ontological approach
that uses a Controlled Natural Language (CNL) for defining a policy repre-
sentation that is both human-friendly (CNL representation) and unambiguous
for computers (using a CE reasoner) [20]. CE is used to define domain models
that describe the system to be managed. The domain models take the form of
concept definitions and comprise objects, their properties, and the relationships
among them. These domain model components are the building blocks of the
attribute-based CE policy language.
Each policy rule follows the if-condition(s)-then-action form and consists of
four basic grammatical blocks as shown below:
– Subject: specifies the entities (human/machine) which interpret obligation
policies or can access resources in authorization policies
– Action: what must be performed for obligations and what is permitted for
authorization
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– Target: objects on which actions are to be performed
– Constraints: boolean conditions
The utilization of CE here is two-folde. It does not only is the user friendly
formal representation of the system to be managed but also helps decision mak-
ers who lack technical expertise to understand in a more transparent way the
complexities associated with policy negotiation. Figure 1 provides a graphical
depiction of the CE-based domain model, which describes the smartphone ac-
cess scenario of Section 3.2 , while the CE representation of policy R1 is shown
below.
Policy R1
If
( there is an asset A named SMD ) and
( there is a person P named P1 )
then
( the person P canAccess the asset A )
.
4.2 The IBN in Asset Sharing process
The role of policies in managing a system is to guide its actions, towards behav-
iors that would secure optimal systems outcomes. Authorization policies man-
age actions of both, hard (sensing devices, distributed databases, smartphone
devices) and soft resources (human-in-the-loop asset owners/requestors). Differ-
ent users have different rights, relationships and interests in regards to deployed
resources. Non-owner users want to gain access to the resources in order to serve
their tasks needs, while owners want to protect their resources from unauthorized
use. There is a monopolistic asset usage case. The proposed approach consid-
ers both concerns in a single mechanism providing a framework that pursues a
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through negotiation to redefine what is a suboptimal system outcome given: a)
the currently-deployed resources and b) the tasks needs of the system that is
managed.
Fig. 2. Interest-based policy negotiation and task implementation
The finite state diagram of Figure 2 provides a depiction of the role the policy
negotiation framework plays in the tasks implementation of collective endeavors.
The human task creator, wanting to serve their appetite for information, creates
tasks, which require a utility demand. The asset-task assignment component is
in charge of optimizing the task utility by allocating the appropriate resources
(information-providing assets) to each task. The PBMS component is responsible
then for evaluating and enforcing authorization policies developed by multi-
party collaborators. In the case of a non-restrictive authorization policy the
task creator gets their task served. If the policy rule is restrictive, the policy
negotiation component takes over. It modifies the policy rule accordingly, and
passes it to the asset owner for confirmation. Depending on the asset owners
decision the task is either satisfied or unsatisfied.
4.3 IBN Enabled PBMS
The policy negotiation framework can be integrated into a PBMS as a plug-in,
enabling negotiation in policy enforcement process. A PBMS, as defined by stan-
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as shown in Figure 3: a) the policy management tool, b) the policy repository, c)
the policy enforcement point (PEP), and d) the policy decision point (PDP) [21].
The policy management tool is the entry point through which policy makers de-
fine authorization policies to be enforced by the system. The policy repository is
the component where the policies generated by the management tool are stored
(step A1). PEP is the logical component that can take actions on enforcing
the policies. Given the access request conditions, the PEP contacts PDP (step
A2), which is then responsible for fetching the necessary polices from the policy
repository (step A3, A4), evaluates them and decides which of them need to be
enforced on PEP (step A5).
Fig. 3. IBN extended PBMS
In addition to the four basic PBMS elements, Figure 3 also includes a human-
in-the-loop element, representing the roles played by the asset requestor and
owner in the negotiation process. The additional component where the IBN
framework resides is called the Policy Negotiation Point (PNP) and lies between
the PEP and PDP, interfacing also with the human-in-the-loop element. As men-
tioned before, the PNP is triggered to attempt to modify authorization policies
when a user creates a task that cannot be served due to restrictive policies. The
dashed lines show optional communication between the components which is
only established when a policy negotiation incident occurs. The red numbered
parts of the figure (flow paths which are prefixed by As) describe the PBMS
operational flow, while the green parts (flow paths which are prefixed by Bs) re-
place step A5 (red, dotted line) with the policy negotiation extension. Note that
the separation between the components can be only logical when they reside in
the same physical device. When PNP detects a restrictive policy (step B5) it
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modifies it following the steps described at the following section and passes it
to the asset owner for confirmation (step B6). If the asset owner confirms the
replacement, the proposed policy is then enforced on the PEP (step B7) and it is
also stored in the policy repository replacing its predecessor (step B8). Otherwise
step A5 is executed as before.
5 Achieving IBN through Policy Refinement
In general, negotiation protocols contain the set of rules that manage the inter-
action between negotiating parties [2]. These rules define who is permitted to
participate in the negotiation process and under what conditions (i.e. negotiating
and any non-negotiating third parties). The rules also manage the participants
actions throughout the process. In addition they define the decision of the ne-
gotiators towards the proposals.
The negotiating parties in our scenario as mentioned before are essentially
decision makers who generally lack negotiation expertise. Thus the IBN mecha-
nism tries to take, as much as possible, the negotiation weight off their shoulders
rather than providing them the means for making proposals and trade options
themselves. However, it does not exclude them completely from the negotiation
process as in fully automated models. To achieve such behavior it simply applies
the IBN principles described in Chefs-Orange scenario of Section 3.1, exploit-
ing the domain models semantics, the semantics of the polices and the seamless
relation between them as they both share the same CE representation.
The objective of the negotiation is the restrictive policies themselves. Asking
the why question like in Chefs-Orange scenario to the requestor side, the PNP
gets as a reply the reason why they need the asset for. Asking the why question
to the asset owners/policy authors side, it gets the reasons why they do not want
to grant access to their assets respectively. The prerequisite for the PNP here is
to have full and accurate knowledge of the managed system. This is achieved by
having unlimited and unconditional access to both domain model and policies.
Unlike the majority of the proposed PBN approaches, the human-in-the-loop
negotiators in our case are ignorant of the preferences of their opponents, while
their knowledge in terms of the domain model reaches only the ground of their
own expertise.
Utilizing CE for the formal representation of the environment to be managed,
and as the language for expressing policies, the IBN, human-machine commu-
nication (i.e. communication between PNP and non-IT expert negotiators) for
exchanging information regarding the negotiation is a transparently achievable
task. The CE human-machine communication has been described in previous
work [22]. However, trying to automate as much as possible the negotiation pro-
cess, the why question is rather rhetorical here. In the requestors case the answer
to the why question is quite simple and straightforward and the PNP is aware
of it just by looking at the domain model. The asset requestor clearly wants
to access the asset in order to execute their task. Hence, a desired negotiation
outcome as far as the requestor is concerned, is the derivation of a policy that
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has them included in the set of Subject policy block with positive access (i.e.,
canAccess) Action to a Target set that includes the prohibited asset capable of
serving their task’s needs.
Inferring the answer to the why question from the asset owners side for un-
derstanding their interests and broadening the negotiation space is a more chal-
lenging task. In general any application of authorization systems aims to specify
access rights to resources. Thus, a simple answer would be including the reasons
why they want to decline access rights to their own resources. Looking carefully
at the policy, these reasons are basically described from the policys Constraints
block. The policy R1 of Section 4.1 is rather a simple one referring deliberately
to a simple scenario and this might not be easily inferred. Considering other
more complex policy rules with several conditions describing constraints such as
the age of the requestor or their expertise this is easier inferred.
However this is not exactly the answer to the why question we are looking for
here. Considering the policies as the means for guiding systems actions towards
behaviors to achieve optimal outcomes, the Constraints policy block refers to
the actions level of the policy. Our focus here is on the higher level, this of the
systems behavior. Focusing on a higher level, gives us the agility to find different
policies as far as the actions is concerned, that provides the same functionality
in terms of behavior; and the different policies we are looking for are those which
serve the needs of the asset requestors as well. Achieving this goal we achieve
a win-win negotiation outcome like the one described in Chefs-Orange scenario.
The next four steps describe the process to reach such an outcome.
Fig. 4. Ontology Modification: Step one
Step 1: The simplistic domain model of Figure 1 presents only the concepts
involved in the smartphone scenario of Section 3.2 and their relationships. It
hides however their properties. Assume that the concept Asset has a property
named Provided capability and that the Assset instance named SMD has the
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Provided capability property named Tethering. Thus, the policy R1 by denying
access to SMD, it denies access to any of SMDs provided capability as well.
The IBN process starts taking as input the policy’s Target block first. Trying to
broaden the negotiation space in order to find alternative policies that satisfy
both negotiators it separates the SMD from its Provided capability property and
updates accordingly the ontology as shown in Figure 4 generating the respective
CE sentences. The concept Capability and the respective relationship between
Asset and Capability is now created.
Fig. 5. Ontology Modification: Step two
Step 2: Each Task of Figure 1 requires a set of capabilities in order to be
served. The concept Task has a property named Required capability and the
Task instance Email submission has a number of required capabilities including
that of Tethering. The second step of IBN process gets as input the Task and
separates it from its Required capability property and updates accordingly the
ontology as shown in Figure 5 generating the respective CE sentences as in Step
1.
Step 3: Often the tasks’ capability needs might span outside the capabilities
offered by one particular asset (e.g., a task might need to utilize capabilities pro-
vided by a number of assets). The IBN process, taking input from the previous
two steps makes the matching between Asset’s provided capabilities and Task’s
required capabilities. It matches this way the subset of the prohibited SMD’s
properties that are needed for the implementation of the desired Task and up-
dates accordingly the ontology as shown in Figure 6 generating the respective CE
sentences as in Step 1. The asset requestor now can access a subset/subsystem
of asset that of its provided capability.
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Fig. 6. Ontology Modification: Step four
Step 4: This step performs the policy refinement6. The asset requestor (i.e.,
P2) is the Subject block of the refined policy, which has as Action block a pos-
itive authorization action (i.e., canAccess) and its Target block contains, the
provided by the prohibited Asset and required by the desired Task Capability
(i.e., Tethering). The CE refined policy R1-Refined below is passed then to the
asset owner for approval.
Policy R1-Refined
if
( there is a capability C named Tethering ) and
( there is a person P named P2 )
then
( the person P canAccess the capability C ).
The asset owner P1 is in charge of confirming or not the replacement of policy
R1 from the proposed policy R1-Refined. In the case of confirmation the refined
policy is then enforced on SMD providing access to SMD’s tethering capability,
and is also stored in the policy repository replacing its predecessor. The successful
completion of IBN leads the negotiating parties to a win-win negotiation, with
the asset requestor getting the task of Email submission served and the asset
owner prohibiting any physical access to SMD.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In summary the proposed IBN framework provides an effective policy negotiation
mechanism for revising asset sharing policies in dynamic, multi-party environ-
ments. The framework is seamlessly interfaced with standardized PBMS and it
6 Note that the term policy refinement herein refers to a different process than the
policy refinement in [23], which describes the process of interpreting more general,
business layer policies to more specific, system layer ones.
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provides means to directly negotiate with policies. Our belief is that this is an
important feature to have as PBMS is where the core components of the sys-
tems management logic resides. Moreover the IBN approach fits in multi-party
environments where collaboration is promoted to achieve mutually satisfactory
negotiation outcomes. Finally, utilizing CE-based policies in the framework eases
the burden of the non-technical user in managing the PBMS and negotiate on
them. As for the future research, there are plans for extending the IBN steps
with regards to broadening the negotiation space considering components such
as the users and the tasks of the system to be managed. In addition we plan to
evaluate the proposed policy negotiation framework a) by conducting human-
lead experiments, and b) by running simulations and comparing the results with
respect to PBN approaches, especially in collaborative setting.
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Abstract. It is now more than 10 years since the EU FET project
ALFEBIITE finished, during which it’s researchers made pioneering con-
tributions to (inter alia) formal models of trust, model-checking, and
action logics. ALFEBIITE was also a highly inter-disciplinary project,
with partners from computer science, philosophy, cognitive science and
law. In this paper, we wish to reflect on how the interaction between the
computer scientists and the computational lawyers on the idea of the
‘open agent society’ inspired a programme of research whose trajectory
has carried it through logic-based virtual organisations, dynamic norm-
governed systems, self-organising electronic institutions, complex event
recognition, computational justice, collective awareness and design con-
tractualism. The objective of this paper is, by tracing the course of this
trajectory, to expose a number of future challenges, research issues and
other legal/ethical issues for the COIN community to consider.
Keywords: Multi-agent systems, electronic institutions, norms, self-
organising systems, complex event recognition, computers and law.
1 Introduction
It is now more than 10 years since the EU FET project ALFEBIITE1 finished:
the terms ‘infohabitants’ and ‘universal information ecosystem’ never caught on;
it’s logical framework for ethical behaviour was never fully realised; it’s domain
name was porn-napped; and it’s end-of-project collected volume, though often
referenced, was never actually published.
On the other hand, some of its researchers made pioneering contributions to
(inter alia) formal models of trust [10], model-checking [16], and logics for action
and agency [39]. It was also the starting point for the multi-agent animation and
simulation platform that became PreSage-2 [17], a formal model of forgiveness
[43], and a methodology for the design of socio-technical systems with socially
intelligent, and socially-aware, technical components [12].
1 Pronounced αβ: the acronym stood for “A Logical Framework for Ethical Behaviour
between Infohabitants in the Information Trading Economy of the Universal Infor-
mation Ecosystem”. No-one ever asked twice.
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Furthermore, ALFEBIITE was also a highly inter-disciplinary project, with
partners from computer science, philosophy, cognitive science and law. In this pa-
per, we wish to reflect on how the interaction between the computer scientists and
the computational lawyers on the idea of the ‘open agent society’ [27] inspired a
programme of research whose trajectory has carried it through logic-based vir-
tual organisations, dynamic norm-governed systems, self-organising electronic
institutions, complex event recognition, computational justice, collective aware-
ness and design contractualism.
The objective of this paper is, by tracing the course of this trajectory, to
expose a number of future challenges, research issues and other legal/ethical
issues for the COIN community to consider. Therefore, this paper is struc-
tured accordingly. Section 2 presents more detail on the background to the
ALFEBIITE project and one element of its output, an executable framework
for a kind of computational agent society. Given this starting point, the next
three sections trace the path from the ‘open agent society’ through the compu-
tational framework of dynamic norm-governed multi-agent systems (Section 3)
onto self-organising electronic institutions (Section 4) and logic-based complex
event recognition (Section 5). Section 6 presents some research challenges for
socio-technical systems, while Section 7 some further legal and ethical issues.
We conclude with some remarks on the evaluation of speculative research.
2 Background
In their paper on Institutionalised Power [11], Jones and Sergot gave the first
formal characterisation of the notion of counts as, the cornerstone of speech act
theory [37], according to which X counts-as Y in context C”. The term insti-
tutionalised power refers to that characteristic feature of institutions, whereby
designated agents, often acting in specific roles, are empowered to create or mod-
ify facts of special significance in that institution (institutional facts), through
the performance of a designated action, e.g. often a speech act.
In the same year that the Jones and Sergot paper was published, 1996, the
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents held it’s inaugural meeting. Ostensi-
bly intended to address the issue of interoperability in distributed systems with
‘intelligent’ agents (it’s unstated purpose was to de-risk a potentially disruptive
technology), one of its key technical specifications was on agent communication.
This specified an ACL (agent communication language) semantics based on an
internal ‘mentalistic’ approach. In so doing, the specification overlooked Searle’s
contention that speaking a language was to engage in a rule-governed form of
behaviour (like playing a game), and consequently the ACL ‘calculus’ omitted
the constitutive aspect of conventional communication, in particular ‘counts as’.
This meant that, for example, in the FIPA standard for a contract-net pro-
tocol, it was not clear which action established the contract (and this matters;
in different legal contexts, when the contract is recognised in law can depend
on when it is signed, when it is posted, when it is delivered it, or when it is de-
livered). To address this misrepresentation, one of the primary objectives of the
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ALFEBIITE project was to establish the logical and computational foundations
of socially-organised, norm-governed, distributed multi-agent systems: what we
came to call the ‘open agent society’ [27]
In the course of the project, an executable specification was developed for a
sub-class of computational societies that exhibited the following characteristics:
– It adopts the perspective of an external observer and views societies as in-
stances of normative systems, that is, it describes the permissions and obli-
gations of the members of the societies, considering the possibility that the
behaviour of the members may deviate from the ideal.
– It explicitly represents the institutionalised powers [25] of the member agents,
a standard feature of any norm-governed interaction. Moreover, it maintains
the long established distinction (in the study of social and legal systems)
between physical capability, institutionalised power and permission.
– It provides a declarative formalisation of the aforementioned concepts by
means of two temporal action languages with clear routes to implementation:
in particular (but not only) the Event Calculus [14]. The specification could
be executed and validated, both at design-time and run-time, by automated
systems, including the agents themselves.
This sub-class of computational society, as a computational instantiation of ‘the
open agent society’, was, over the next few years, the basis for exploring various
ideas in virtual organisations and for piecemeal formulation of various different
protocols (e.g. for voting, dispute resolution, argumentation, e-commerce, etc.),
until it coalesced in the concept of dynamic norm-governed multi-agent systems.
3 Dynamic Norm-Governed Multi-Agent Systems
The first attempt to codify more fully the abstract concept of “the open agent
society” in computational form, taking into account the requirements identified
by the ALFEBIITE project (including norms, protocols, and adaptation), was
the framework of dynamic norm-governed multi-agent systems [2].
This framework was designed to support self-modification of the rules or
protocols of a norm-governed system, by the agents themselves, at runtime.
The framework defined three components: a specification of a norm-governed
system, a protocol-stack for defining how to change the specification, and a
topological space for expressing the ‘distance’ between one specification instance
and another.
The study of legal, social and organisational systems has often been for-
malised in terms of norm-governed systems. The framework maintains the stan-
dard and long established distinction between physical capability, institution-
alised power, and permission (see e.g. [11] for illustrations of this distinction).
Accordingly, a specification of a norm-governed system expresses five aspects
of social constraint: the physical capabilities; the institutionalised powers; the
permissions, prohibitions and obligations of the agents; the sanctions and en-
forcement policies that deal with the performance of prohibited actions and
non-compliance with obligations; and the designated roles of empowered agents.
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Underpinning this specification is a communication language. This language
is used to define a set of protocols for conducting the business of the institution.
In the framework, the protocol stack is used by the agents to modify the rules or
protocols of a norm-governed system at runtime. This stack defines a set of object
level protocols, and assumes that during the execution of an object protocol the
participants could start a meta-protocol to (try to) modify the object-level pro-
tocol. The participants of the meta-protocol could initiate a meta-meta protocol
to modify the rules of the meta-protocol, and so on. In addition to object- and
meta-protocols, there are also ‘transition’ protocols. These protocols define the
conditions in which an agent may initiate a meta-protocol, who occupies which
role in the meta-protocol, and what elements (the degrees of freedom: DoF) of
an object protocol can be modified as a result of the meta-protocol execution.
Each type of method is a DoF, and with two values for each method, this
gives four possible specification instances.
Each DoF could take one out of possible range of values: a specification where
each DoF had a specific value was called a specification instance. This was the
basis for defining a specification space as a 2-tuple, where one component is the
set of all possible specification instances and the other component is a function d
which defines a ‘distance’ between any pair of elements in the set. Note that we
can imagine more access control and exclusion mechanisms, so more specification
instances, and so a larger specification space.
The framework for dynamic norm-governed multi-agent systems was the step-
ping stone to two further concepts: self-organising electronic institutions (Sec-
tion 4) and logic-based complex event recognition (Section 5).
4 Self-Governing Institutions
Electronic institutions are used to represent the structures, functions and pro-
cesses of an institution in mathematical, logical or computational form, cf. [42].
In terms of functional representation, an institution’s rules can be divided
into three levels, from lower to higher [23]: operational-choice rules (OC) are con-
cerned with the provision and appropriation of resources, as well as with member-
ship, monitoring and enforcement; social collective-choice rules (SC) drive policy
making and selection of operational-choice rules; and constitutional-choice rules
(CC) deal with eligibility and formulation of the collective-choice rules.
In terms of structural representation, a formal hierarchy is straightforward
to identify, and this needs to be associated with a specification of the remit of
each unit of the hierarchy, for example, in terms of which social-, collective or
operational-rules, and which DoF, the unit is allowed to apply and modify.
A formal representation of institutional processes can be given, which iden-
tifies their procedural, temporal and normative aspects (as stated, typically of
concern in the study of social and organisational systems) and this can be done
using, for example, the Event Calculus, a logic programming formalism for rep-
resenting and reasoning about events and their effects [14].
COIN@AAMAS2015
176
The Open Agent Society 5
One of the most frequently encountered problems in open systems is the
requirement to distribute resources which have been pooled in some ways – this
is of course a collective action problem. One solution to the problem is the theory
of Elinor Ostrom [23], who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Science
in 2009 for her work on self-governing institutions for common-pool resource
management, and how there were eight common features of such institutions
which led to stable and sustainable solutions, and one or more were missing
from those institutions which failed to do so. Ostrom then further recommended
that instead of trying to evolve such institutions, it would be better to design
them, and codified the fears instead as eight institutional design principles
By applying the sociologically-inspired computing methodology [12] to Os-
trom’s institutional design principles, using the computational framework of dy-
namic norm-governed systems as the target ‘calculus’ for the formal characteri-
sation, two significant results were achieved:
– Showing that Elinor Ostrom’s institutional design principles for enduring
self-governing institutions [23], which embody many principles of natural
and retributive justice, can be axiomatised in computational logic and then
used for specifying and implementing self-organising electronic institutions
with corresponding properties of endurance and sustained membership [31];
– Showing that Nicholas Rescher’s theory of distributive justice [35] based on
the canon of legitimate claims can also be axiomatised in computational
logic and as complement to Ostrom’s principles, used to ensure fairness in
resource distribution over time (according to a chosen fairness measure, the
Gini index) [26].
5 Complex Event Recognition & Run-Time Event
Calculus
The Event Calculus has been frequently used, as in the previous section, for
specifying and reasoning about (open) multi-agent systems (MAS) due to its
simplicity and flexibility. However, the EC also has a number of well-known
limitations. One of these is an issue of scale; that is, as the number of agents
increases, and/or the number of events in the narrative increases, then the per-
formance and efficiency deteriorate unacceptably. One approach to overcoming
such limitations is to use caching [5].
Building on some of these ideas for efficiency improvement, in order deal with
very large agent societies, we have developed the ‘Event Calculus for Run-Time
reasoning’ (RTEC) [3]. RTEC includes various optimisation techniques for an
important class of computational tasks, specifically those in which given a record
of what events have occurred (a ‘narrative’) and a set of axioms (expressing
the specification of a MAS), we compute the values of various facts (denoting
institutional powers, permissions, and other normative relations) at specified
time points. RTEC thus provides a practical means of informing the decision-
making of the agents and their users, and the system designers. In what follows
we briefly discuss the use of RTEC for specifying and executing very large MAS.
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Table 1: Main predicates of RTEC.
Predicate Meaning
happensAt(E, T ) Event E occurs at time T
holdsAt(F =V, T ) The value of fluent F is V at time T
holdsFor(F =V, I) I is the list of the maximal intervals
for which F =V holds continuously
initiatedAt(F =V, T ) At time T a period of time for which
F =V is initiated
terminatedAt(F =V, T ) At time T a period of time for which
F =V is terminated
union all(L, I ) I is the list of maximal intervals
produced by the union of the lists of
maximal intervals of list L
intersect all(L, I ) I is the list of maximal intervals
produced by the intersection of
the lists of maximal intervals of list L
relative complement all(I ′, L, I ) I is the list of maximal intervals produced
by the relative complement of the list
of maximal intervals I ′ with respect to
every list of maximal intervals of list L
An event description in RTEC includes rules that define the event instances
with the use of the happensAt predicate, the effects of events with the use of
the initiatedAt and terminatedAt predicates, and the values of the fluents with the
use of the holdsAt and holdsFor predicates, as well as other, possibly atemporal,
constraints. Table 1 summarises the RTEC predicates available to the system
specification developer.
We represent the actions of the agents and the environment by means of
happensAt, while the state of the agents and the environment are represented
as fluents. In MAS execution, therefore, the task is to compute the maximal
intervals for which a fluent representing an agent or environment variable (such
as the institutional powers of an agent) has a particular value continuously.
RTEC includes additional optimisation techniques that allow for very effi-
cient and scalable MAS execution. A form of caching stores the results of sub-
computations in the computer memory to avoid unnecessary recomputations. A
simple indexing mechanism makes RTEC robust to events that are irrelevant
to the computations we want to perform and so RTEC can operate without
data filtering modules. The set of interval manipulation constructs mentioned
in the previous section simplify MAS specifications and improve reasoning effi-
ciency. Finally, the ‘windowing’ mechanism supports real-time MAS execution.
One main motivation for RTEC is that it should remain efficient and scalable
in applications where events arrive with a (variable) delay: RTEC can update
the already computed MAS state (including for example the institutional pow-
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ers, permissions and obligations of the agents), when events arrive with a de-
lay. The code of RTEC is available at <http://users.iit.demokritos.gr/~a.
artikis/EC.html>.
The anticipated scale of future multi-agent systems requires the capability to
process many thousands of events per second. This is beyond the computational
practicality of simple versions of the Event Calculus, a new dialect, such as
RTEC, is required in order to support computational tasks such as scalable,
pro-active, event-driven decision-making and complex event recognition.
6 Research Challenges
In this section, we outline a quartet of research challenges for which the concepts
of self-organising electronic institutions and logic-based complex event recogni-
tion are critical for socio-techncal systems. These challenges are:
– computational justice, as the study of some form of ‘correctness’ in the
outcomes from qualitative algorithmic deliberation and decision-making;
– (interoceptive) collective awareness, as an attribute (internal sense of well-
being) of communities that helps solve collective action problems;
– (electronic) social capital, as a complexity-reducing short-cut in cooper-
ation dilemmas that have multiple equilibria or are computationally in-
tractable (e.g. n-player games);
– polycentric self-governance, reconciling potentially conflicting interests
by giving consideration to “common purposes” within multiple centres of
decision-making.
6.1 Computational Justice
Computational justice [30] is an interdisciplinary investigation at the interface
of computer science and philosophy, economics, psychology and jurisprudence,
enabling and promoting an exchange of ideas and results in both directions. One
of its main goals is to introduce notions borrowed from Social Sciences, such
as fairness, equity, transparency and openness into computational settings. It is
also concerned with exporting the developed mechanisms back to Social Sciences,
both to better understand their role in social settings, as well as to leverage the
knowledge gained in computational settings and transport it to the social one.
Although ‘justice’ is a concept open to many definitions, the study of com-
putational justice focuses on the following ‘qualifiers’, which have been used in
the social sciences:
– Natural or social justice is concerned with the right of inclusion and partic-
ipation in the decision making processes affecting oneself.
– Distributive justice deals with fairly allocating resources (e.g. goods, tasks,
benefits) amongst a set of agents.
– Retributive justice addresses the issue of sanctioning non-compliant behaviour.
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– Procedural justice considers evaluating whether procedures are ‘fit-for-purpose’
(e.g. for achieving inclusivity, transparency, and balance (in terms of trading-
off cost-effectiveness vs. efficiency, for example)).
– Interactional justice is concerned with the subjective view of the agents and
whether they feel they are being treated fairly by the decision makers.
All these qualifiers are important in socio-cognitive technical systems, since
they address different issues that require ‘conditioning’ in such situations. For
example, when distributing collectivised resources, it might be tempting to go
for an optimal allocation in terms of maximising some overall utility. While
such an utilitarian view might be the most appropriate in some cases, in socio-
cognitive technical systems (or any other system where participants can somehow
evaluate their satisfaction and act depending on it) it might be better to seek
allocations that may be sub-optimal but that take into account the notion of
fairness, thereby increasing sustainability in the longer-term at the expense of
optimality in the short-term.
Similarly, if a participant violates some norm or rule, it could be subject
to some kind of punishment, penalty or sanction. This can be seen either as
a direct consequence of the wrong-doing (retributivism view) or as a deterrent
for future wrong-doing by the agent being punished as well as by the agents
observing the punishment (utilitarianism view). However, the punishment should
be proportional to the offence including both the extent of the violation, as
well as recidivism (i.e. repeated offences by the same agent). The punishing
entity can either be some authorised body (e.g. judicial system, elected board)
or the participants themselves if they have the capability of punishing each
other. However, note the role of forgiveness (as discussed earlier) is an important
element of retributive justice.
Natural or social justice is concerned with issues such as the inclusivity of
participants in decision-making, for instance to decide how resources are allo-
cated (e.g. choose the allocation mechanism), or how a decision should be made
(e.g. which voting protocols are to be used). Inclusive participation of this kind
would provide the system with the feature of self-organisation, in the sense of
self-governing the resources, and ensure that those who are subject to.
Procedural justice is required to provide governance mechanisms which are
‘fit for purpose’ [29], i.e. addressing the following sorts of question. Are the rights
of members of the institution to participate in collective-choice arrangement ad-
equately represented and protected? Is an institution where decisions are made
by one actor who justifies its decision ‘preferable’ to an institution where the
decision is made by a committee that does not offer such justification? Is an in-
stitution which expends significant resources on determining the most equitable
distribution ‘preferable’ to one that uses a cheaper method to produce a less fair
outcome, but has more resources to distribute as a consequence?
Interactional justice allows the participants to make a subjective assessment
of whether they are being treated fairly, that the decision makers should provide
enough information to them (e.g. justification of allocation). For instance, in a
case of scarcity of resources, if the participants were informed about this scarcity,
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they would probably better understand not being allocated any resources. Con-
trarily, if they are not informed about this issue, they might think that they are
not being allocated resources because the decision makers are biased towards
other participants.
6.2 Collective Awareness
The development of collective awareness has been advocated as enhancing the
choice of sustainable strategies by the members of a community and therefore en-
suring the successful adaptation process [40]. In communities in which collective
awareness is barely present individuals may experience a diminished apprecia-
tion of the global situation and present constrained flexibility in adjustment to
change because they do not share the same comprehension of situation with oth-
ers. They are also less willing to obey the norms and rules set by the community
because they do not feel themselves as members of community and are not aware
of others seeing them as ones. They understand the situation they are in from a
micro-level perception and might additionally recognize the macro-level descrip-
tion of the situation, however, they might not be aware of interactions occurring
at the meso level. As a result, individuals make decisions that are sub-optimal
from the perspective of the whole system making it less fair, more inefficient and
so vulnerable to collapse through instability. Therefore, collective awareness is
critical to the formation of socio-cognitive technical systems.
It has been argued that collective awareness occurs “when two or more people
are aware of the same context and each is aware that the others are aware of
it” [13]. This awareness of others awareness has been indicated as a critical
element of collaboration within the communities, especially virtual ones such
as computer-mediated communities [6]. In socio-cognitive technical systems, an
alternative approach might be sought by moving away from mutual knowledge
and taking a multi-modal approach [10], and define collective awareness of some
proposition φ as a two part relation: firstly a belief that there is a group, and
secondly an expectation that if someone is a member of that group, then they
believe the proposition φ.
Collective awareness is “an attribute of communities that helps them solve
collective action problem”, i.e. analogous to the way that social capital is defined
by Ostrom and Ahn [21] as “an attribute of individuals that helps them solve
collective action problems”. Without this community attribute, individuals may
take actions that are sub- optimal from a community-wide perspective, leading to
diminished utility and sustainability. Individuals may understand the situation
they are in from a micro-level perspective (e.g. in a power system, reducing
individual energy consumption) and might additionally recognise the macro-level
requirement (e.g. meeting national carbon dioxide emission pledges); however,
they might not be aware of interactions occurring at the meso-level which are
critical for mapping one to the other.
Therefore, collective awareness has a critical role in the formation of elec-
tronic institutions, the regulation of behaviour within the context of an insti-
tution, and the direction (or selection) of actions intended to achieve a com-
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mon purpose. If we consider collective awareness as being different from mutual
knowledge, and base it on expectations for resolving collective action problems
instead, then from the human-participant perspective we identify certain require-
ments as necessary conditions for achieving collective awareness as a precursor
to collective action in socio-cognitive technical systems. These requirements are:
• Interface cues for collective action, i.e. that participants are engaged in a
collective action situation;
• Visualisation: appropriate presentation and representation of data, making
what is conceptually significant perceptually prominent;
• Social networking: fast, convenient and cheap communication channels to
support the propagation of data;
• Feedback: individuals need to know that their (‘small’, individual) action X
contributed to some (‘large’, collective) action Y which achieved beneficial
outcome Z;
• Incentives: typically in the form of social capital [21], itself identified as an
attribute of individuals that helps to solve collective action problems.
However, preliminary experiments have shown that people have insufficient
attention to be sufficiently pro-active in monitoring and responding to all the
changes in their environment. Complex event recognition is clearly going to be a
critical technology in being able to detect situations that genuinely require user
attention, from which the appropriate interface cues and visualisation methods
can be drawn.
6.3 Electronic Social Capital
In social systems, it has been observed that social capital is an attribute of
individuals that enhances their ability to solve collective action problems [21].
Social capital takes different forms, for example trustworthiness, social networks
and institutions. Each of these forms is a subjective indicator of one individual’s
expectations of how another individual will behave in a strategic game: i.e., if
the individual has a high reputation (trustworthiness) for honouring agreements
and commitments, or it is known personally to be reliable (social network), or a
belief there is a set of (institutional) rules (triggering expectations that someone
else’s behaviour will conform to those rules, and that they will be punished if
they do not) (cf. [10]).
Therefore, we propose that an electronic form of social capital could be used
as an attribute of participants in a socio-cognitive technical system, to enhance
their ability to solve collective action problems, by reducing the costs and com-
plexity in joint decision-making in repeated pairwise interactions [25]. Two key
features of this framework are firstly, the use of institutions as one social capital
attribute, and secondly, the use of the Event Calculus to process events which
update all the social capital attributes.
We note, en passant, that as a further direction of research, the role of elec-
tronic social capital and its relation to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and
Venn, for example in the creation of incentives and alternative market arrange-
ments, needs to be fully explored.
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6.4 Polycentric (Self-)Governance
It is well-known that managing critical infrastructure, like a national energy
generation, transmission and distribution network, will necessarily involve mul-
tiple agencies with differing (possibly competing or even conflicting) interests,
effectively creating an “overlay” network of relational dynamics which also needs
to be resolved. Furthermore, there is some, not always well-understood, inter-
connection of public and private ownership that makes the overall system both
stable and sustainable.
Therefore, in analysing any such complex system, it is critical to identify
the agencies and determine its institutional common purpose, what the agency
(through its institution) is trying to achieve or maintain, by coordination with
other institutions and by the decision-making of its members. Such analysis
makes it possible to understand the ‘ecosystem’ of institutions and how they fit
together as collaborators or competitors, based on the nature of their purposes
and the scope of their influence.
It is then an open question if the ecosystem of institutions can be repre-
sented using holonic systems architectures, which are capable of achieving large-
scale multi-criteria optimisation [7]. The key concept here is the idea of holonic
institutions, whereby each institution is represented as a holon, which can be
aggregated or decomposed into supra- and sub-holons respectively.
The outcome of a positive answer to this question would be twofold. Firstly,
that would support polycentric self-governance at all scales of the system (i.e.
multiple centres of autonomous decision-making), and in particular would sup-
port subsidiarity (the idea that problems are solved as close to the local source
as possible). Secondly, it would encourage the institutions to recognise their role
in the “scheme of things” in relation to institutions at the same, higher and
lower levels. This is an essential requirement for adaptive institutions [33] and
this establishment of “systems thinking” as a commonplace practice.
7 Some Legal and Ethical Issues
Finally, we note that the idea of collective intelligence, including both humans
and software agents, and agents as an enabling technology for added-value ser-
vices, was a key part of the original vision: the open agent society for the user-
friendly digital society. In this section, we consider some legal and ethical issues
that arise when the concept of the open agent society, with its computational
instantiations and associated technologies, converges with other technological
developments like ubiquitous computing, implant devices and sensor networks.
7.1 Big Data and Knowledge Commons
[9] was concerned with treating knowledge as a shared resource, motivated by the
increase in open access science journals, digital libraries, and mass-participation
user-generated content management platforms. It then addressed the question
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of whether it was possible to manage and sustain a knowledge commons, using
the same principles used to manage ecological systems with natural resources. A
significant challenge in the democratisation of Big Data is the extent to which
formal representations of intellectual property rights, access rights, copy-rights,
etc. of different stakeholders can be represented in a system of computational
justice and encoded in Ostrom’s principles for knowledge commons. As observed
in [41], the power of Big Data and associated tools for analytical modelling: “. . .
should not remain the preserve of restricted government, scientific or corporate
e´lites, but be opened up for societal engagement and critique. To democratise
such assets as a public good, requires a sustainable ecosystem enabling different
kinds of stakeholder in society”.
It could be argued that Ostrom’s institutional design principles reflect a
pre-World Wide Web era of scholarship and content creation, and despite their
original insightful work [22], these developments make it difficult to apply the
principles to non-physical shared sources such as data or knowledge commons,
and a further extension of the theory is required to develop applications based
on participatory sensing for the information-sharing economy [18].
7.2 Privacy and Ubersurveillance
The issue here is whether intelligent agents will exacerbate a perceived trend
from pervasive computing to persuasive computing and ultimately to coercive
computing. The threat is sufficient for the central premise of Dave Eggers’ science
fiction novel The Circle (McSweeney’s, 2013), that opting out from providing
personal data is tantamount to theft, to appear plausible.
It is in this context that programmes for Privacy by Design [4], imposing
limits on uberveillance [20] and the ethical issues of wearable, bearable and im-
plant technology in the context of Big Data and the Internet of Things (IoT) [19,
24] are set. Designers should heed “the principles incorporated in the European
Union and international treaties as well as the laws of EU member states: the
precautionary principle, purpose specification principle, data minimization prin-
ciple, proportionality principle, and the principle of integrity and inviolability of
the body, and dignity” [24].
7.3 Design Contractualism
This requirement is based on the observation that affective and pervasive appli-
cations are implemented in terms of a sense/respond cycle, called the affective
loop [8] or the biocybernetic loop [38]. The actual responses are determined
by decision-making algorithms, which should in turn be grounded within the
framework of a mutual agreement, or a social contract [32]. This contract should
specify how individuals, government, and commercial organizations should in-
teract in a digital, and digitized, world.
In the context of affective computing, this contractual obligation has been
called design contractualism by Reynolds and Picard [36]. Under this principle,
the designer makes moral or ethical judgements, and encodes them in the system.
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In fact, there are already several prototypical examples of this, from the copyleft
approach to using and modifying intellectual property, to the IEEE Code of
Ethics and the ACM Code of Conduct, to and TrUSTe self-certifying privacy
seal. In some sense, these examples are a reflection of ideas of Lessig that Code
is Law [15], or rather in this case, Code is Moral Judgement.
Returning to the security implications of user-generated content and Big
Data (see above), design contractualism [28] also underpins the idea of using
implicitly-generated data as input streams for Big Data, and treating that data
as a knowledge commons [9, 18]. Using the principles of self- governing institu-
tions for managing common pool resources identified by Ostrom [23], we advocate
managing Big Data from the perspective of a knowledge commons. Design con-
tractualism, from this perspective, effectively defines an analytical framework for
collecting and processing user-generated con-tent input to Big Data as a shared
resource with both normative and social dimensions. The normative dimension
is the existence of institutional rules embodying the social contract. The social
dimension is the belief that there are these rules and that others behaviour will
conform to these rules, as a trust shortcut [10].
7.4 The New Economic Model
Reich [34] suggests that we are moving towards a economy in which all routine,
predictable work is automated or performed by robots, and the profits go to
the owners of the robots; and all less predictable work is performed by human
beings, and all the profits got to the owners of the middleware (i.e. in a peer-to-
peer economy, while the intelligence is at the edge, the value is in the network.
This model affects not just taxi drivers, plumbers and hotel owners, but will
increasingly effect professions such as law, medicine and academia, given the
rise of online legal services (such as dispute resolution), health provision, and
MOOCs (massive open online courses), and (in the UK) the rise of zero-hour
contracts to service those courses.
7.5 Summary
This discussion of some legal and ethical issues is necessarily limited in this con-
text, and the interaction of technology with society also has ‘political’, ‘cultural’
and even ‘generational’ dimensions that need to be addressed. For example, it
could be argued that conflicts of objective interests cannot necessarily be re-
solved by collective awareness, collective intelligence and collective action. In
addressing climate change, there is a complex interaction between (at least) loss
aversion bias (people’s preference for avoiding losses over acquiring gains, es-
pecially when the loss is incurred by themselves and the gains are accrued by
others) and political ‘framing’.
Similarly, the symbiotic partnership of people and technology might not be as
benign as might be imagined. The idea of ‘designing’ institutions for ‘fairer’ so-
cieties arguably presents serious ideological, political (and even moral [1]) prob-
lems. The issue of Artificial Intelligence dominating society has been a staple
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premise of science fiction, and attracts the attention of leading scientists from
other fields.2 However, with the ever increasing power of data mining and both
predictive and prescriptive analytics, it is arguably the case that we should still
be more wary of the programmers than the programs.
8 Summary and Conclusions
In summary, we have traced the development of the concept of the ‘open agent
society’ from its origins and early formalisation in ALFEBIITE to its reification
as dynamic norm-governed systems, and its metamorphosis into electronic insti-
tutions for fair and sustainable resource management and run-time cacluli for
logic-based complex event recognition.
In this paper, we have necessarily focussed on the institutional aspects that
resulted from the collaboration between the computer scientists and lawyers and
philosophers, in particular Jon Bing and Andrew Jones. A separate paper could
be written on the outcomes of the collaboration between the computer scien-
tists and the cognitive scientists, in particular Cristiano Castelfranchi, whose
original work inspired formal models of trust and economic reasoning, emotions,
forgiveness and anticipation.
It was strictly not the objective of this paper to catalogue the authors’ own
contributions, the objectives of this paper were:
– to highlight and emphasise the importance of inter-disciplinary research, and
acknowledge the beneficial collaborations: it is likely that none of this would
have been possible without the insights and understanding that stemmed
from the fields of law and legal information systems;
– to consider the research programme looking back but in particulate look-
ing forwards, and trying to raise a number of research challenges and le-
gal/ethical/political issues considered to be relevant to COIN: COIN research
is increasingly having transformative social impact and the precautionary
principle needs to be taken into account; and
– to demonstrate the difficulty of evaluating the impact of basic research.
On this last point, the current trend of demanding that basic research projects
should specify ‘pathways to impact’, or that research papers should be evaluated
according to their ‘impact statements’ within some fixed and arbitrary period,
should be treated with some caution and no little skepticism. The fact remains
that the pathway to impact is probably even less predictable or manageable
than the research programme itself; and as for the ‘impact statement’, this is so
time-dependent as to require continual re-assessment, not just at a fixed point.
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Abstract. Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team
of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing
a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design
agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of
agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents
that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained
by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents
with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions,
while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in
general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time;
and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.
Keywords: Collaboration, Distributed AI, Team Formation
1 Introduction
Teams of voting agents are a power tool for finding the optimal solution in many
applications [15, 1, 16, 18, 10], as there are theoretical guarantees in finding one
optimal choice [5]. For design problems, however, finding one optimal solution is
not enough, and we actually want to find as many optimal solutions as possible,
allowing a human to choose according to her aesthetical taste. Even if a user
does not want to consider too many solutions, they can be filtered and clustered
[7], allowing her to easily make an aesthetical choice. Hence, a system of voting
agents that produces a unique optimal solution is insufficient; and we propose
the novel social choice problem of maximizing the number of optimal alternatives
found by a voting system. As ranked voting may suffer from noisy rankings when
using existing agents [11], we study multiple voting iterations.
Traditionally, social choice studies the optimality of voting rules, assuming
certain noise models for the agents, and rankings composed of a linear order
over alternatives [5, 4, 14]. Hence, there is a single optimal choice, and a system
is successful if it can return that optimal choice with high probability. More
recently, several works have been considering cases where there is a partial or-
der over alternatives [22, 19], or when the agents output pairwise comparisons
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instead of rankings [6]. However, these works still focus on finding an optimal
alternative, or a fixed-sized set of optimal alternatives (where the size is known
beforehand). Therefore, they still provide no help in finding the maximum set of
optimal solutions. Moreover, they assume agents that are able to output com-
parisons among all actions with fairly good precision, and the use of multiple
voting iterations has never been studied. When considering agents with different
preferences, the field is focused on verifying if voting rules satisfy a set of axioms
that are considered to be important to achieve fairness [17].
In this work we offer a completely different perspective: we show that, unless
we have an idealized agent, we only maximize the number of optimal solutions
if we have agents with different preferences. Motivated by the need of selecting
agents from an open system, for greater applicability we only consider agents
that output a single action. We present a theoretical study of which teams are
desirable for design problems, and how their size may effect optimality. We show
that, contrary to traditional social choice models, increasing the team size may
significantly harm performance; and that a diverse team of agents with different
preferences is highly desirable for achieving optimality. In doing so, we draw a
novel connection between social choice and number theory ; allowing us to show,
for example, that the optimal diverse team size is constant with high probabil-
ity, and a prime number of optimal actions may impose problems. We present
synthetic experiments to further study our model, providing realistic insights
into what happens with bounded computational time. Finally, we present exper-
iments in a highly relevant domain: architecture design, where we show teams
of agents that vote to design energy-efficient buildings. Hence, this is the first
work exploring and showing the potential of voting systems in being creative, by
actually creating new alternatives from the opinions of existing agents.
2 Related Work
As mentioned, traditional works in social choice concern finding a correct ranking
in domains where there is a unique optimal decision [5, 4, 14, 20]. Recent works,
however, are considering more complex domains. Xia and Conitzer (2001) [22]
study the problem of finding k optimal solutions, where k is known beforehand,
by aggregating rankings from each agent. However, not only do they need strong
assumptions about the quality of the rankings of such agents, but they also show
that calculating the MLE from the rankings is an NP-hard problem.
Procaccia et al. [19] study a similar perspective, where the objective is to
find the top k options given rankings from each agent, where, again, k is known
in advance. However, in their case, they assume there still exists one unique
truly optimal choice, hidden among these top k alternatives. Elkind and Shah
(2014) [6] study the case where instead of rankings, the voters output pairwise
comparisons among all actions, which may not follow transitivity. However, their
final objective is still to pick a single winner.
Finally, outputting a full comparison among all actions can be a burden for
an agent [3]. Jiang et al. (2014) [11] show that actual agents can have very noisy
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rankings, and therefore do not follow the assumptions of previous works in social
choice. Hence, as any agent is able to output at least one action (i.e., a single
vote), we study here systems where agents vote across multiple iterations.
3 Design Domains
We consider in this work domains where the objective is to find the highest
number of optimal solutions. We show that design is one of such domains. One of
the most common computational design approaches is to use parametric designs
[21, 9, 7], where a human designer creates an initial design of a product using
computer-aided design tools. However, instead of manually deciding all aspects of
the product, she leaves free parameters, whose values can be modified to change
the design. This approach is used because the number of different possibilities
that a human can manually create while looking for optimality is limited, so a
computer system is used to refine the design and find optimal solutions.
Design problems are in general multi-objective [12], since a product normally
must be optimized across different factors. For example, a product should have a
low cost, but at the same time high quality, two highly-contradictory objectives.
Hence, there are a large number of optimal solutions, all tied in a pareto fron-
tier. For the computational system, these optimal solutions are all equivalent.
However, a human may dynamically decide to value some factor over another,
and/or pick the option that most pleases her own aesthetical taste or the one of
the target public/client.
Note that choosing a design according to aesthetics is an undefined problem,
since there are no formal definitions to compare among different options. Hence,
the best that a system can do is to provide a human with a large number of
optimal solutions (according to other measurable factors), allowing her to freely
decide among equally optimal solutions — but most probably with not equal
aesthetical qualities.
Therefore, it is natural that in design problems we are going to have many
possible solutions, and we want to find as many optimal ones as possible. In fact,
there are many benefits in discovering a large number of optimal solutions:
Knowledge Does not Hurt: Having more optimal solutions to choose
from is never worse than having less. For example, if a designer has enough
time to analyze only x solutions, she can do so with a system that provides
more than x optimal solutions by sampling the exact amount that she desires.
However, she will never be able to do so with a system that provides less than
x optimal solutions. Moreover, we can easily identify and eliminate solutions
that are similar by applying clustering and analysis techniques [7], so that every
solution that the human looks at is meaningful.
Knowledge Increases Confidence in Optimality: In general design
problems, the true pareto frontier is unknown. Genetic Algorithms are widely
used in order to estimate it. The only knowledge available for the system to
evaluate the optimality is in comparison with the other solutions that are also
being evaluated during the optimization process [13]. Many apparently “opti-
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mal” solutions are actually discovered to be sub-optimal as we find more solu-
tions. Hence, finding a higher number of optimal solutions decreases the risk of
a designer picking a wrong choice that was initially outputted as “optimal”.
Knowledge Increases Aesthetical Qualities: If a human has a larger set
of optimal solutions to choose from, there is a greater likelihood that at least
one of these solutions is going to be of high aesthetical quality according to her
preferences, or the ones of the target public.
Knowledge Increases Diversity of Options: In general, when a system
x has more optimal solutions available than a system y, it does not necessarily
imply that the solutions in the system x are more similar, while the optimal
solutions in y are more different/diverse. In fact, all things equal, the greater
the amount of optimal solutions, the higher the likelihood that we have more
diverse solutions available.
4 Agent Teams
We present our theory of agent teams for design problems. Consider a team
that vote together at each possible decision point of the design of a product (for
example, they may vote for the value of each parameter, in a parametric design).
Hence, let Φ be a set of agents φ, and Ω a set of world states ω. Each ω has an
associated set of possible actions Aω. At each world state, each agent φi outputs
an action aj , an optimal action according to the agent’s imperfect evaluation –
which may or may not be a true optimal action. Hence, there is a probability pj
that the agent outputs a certain action aj . The teams take the action decided
by plurality voting (ties are broken randomly). We assume that the world states
are independent, and by taking an optimal action at all world states we find an
optimal solution for the entire problem.
In this paper our objective goes beyond finding one optimal solution, we want
to maximize the number of optimal solutions that we can find. For greater appli-
cability, we consider here agents that output a single action. Hence, we generate
multiple solutions by re-applying the voting procedure across all world states
multiple times (which are called voting iterations – one iteration goes across all
world states, forming one solution). Formally, let S be the set of (unique) optimal
solutions that we find by re-applying the voting procedure through z iterations.
Our objective is to maximize |S|. We will show that, under some conditions, we
can achieve that when z →∞ (we study bounded time in Section 5).
We consider that at each world state ω there is a subset Goodω ⊂ Aω of
optimal actions in ω. An optimal solution is going to be composed by assign-
ing any aj ∈ Goodω in world state ω – for all world states. Conversely, we
consider the complementary subset Badω ⊂ Aω, such that Goodω ∪ Badω =
Aω,Goodω ∩Badω = ∅. We drop the subscripts ω when it is clear that we are
referring to a certain world state.
One fundamental problem is selecting which agents should form a team. By
the classical voting theories, one would expect the best teams to be uniform
teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent [5, 14]. Here we show, how-
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ever, that for design problems uniform teams need very strong assumptions to
be optimal, and in most cases they actually converge to always outputting a
single solution – an undesirable outcome. However, diverse teams are optimal as
long as the team’s size grows carefully, as we explain below in Theorem 1.
We call a team optimal when |S| →∏ω |Goodω| as z →∞, and all optimal
actions are chosen by the team with the same probability. Otherwise, even though
the team still produces all optimal solutions, it would tend to repeat already
generated solutions whose probability is higher. Since in practice there are time
bounds, such condition is fundamental to have as many solutions as possible in
limited time.
We first consider agents that are independent and identically distributed. Let
pGoodj be the probability of voting for aj ∈ Good, and pBadk be the probability of
voting for ak ∈ Bad. Let n = |Φ| be the size of the team, and Nl be the number
of agents that vote for al in a certain voting iteration. If ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad,
pGoodj > p
Bad
k , the team is going to find one optimal solution with probability 1
as n→∞, as we show in the following observation:
Observation 1 The probability of a team outputting one optimal solution goes
to 1 as n→∞, if pGoodj > pBadk , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad.
Proof. Note that as the agents are independent and identically distributed, we
can model the process of pooling the opinions of n agents as a multinomial
distribution with n trials (and the probability of any class k of the multinomial
corresponds to the probability pk of voting for an action ak).
Hence, for each action al, the expected number of votes is given by E[Nl] =
n×pl. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, if pGoodj > pBadk ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈
Bad, we have that Nj > Nk. Hence, the team will pick an action aj ∈ Good,
in all world states, if n is large enough (i.e., n→∞). 
However, with a team made of copies of the same agent, the system is likely
to lose the ability to generate new solutions as n increases. If, for each ω, we
have an action aωm such that p
Good
m > p
Good
j ∀aωm 6= aωj , the team converges to
picking only action aωm (Proposition 1 below). Hence, |S| = 1, which is a very
negative result. Therefore, contrary to traditional social choice, here it is not the
case that increasing the team size always improves performance.
Let pGood =
∑
j p
Good
j be the probability of picking any action in Good.
We re-write the probability of an action aGoodj as: p
Good
j =
pGood
|Good| + λj , where∑
j λj = 0. Let λ
+ be the set of λj > 0. Let λ
High be the maximum possible
value for λj ∈ λ+, such that the relation pGoodj > pBadk , ∀aj ∈ Good, ak ∈ Bad
is preserved. We show that when z →∞, |S| is the highest as maxλ+ → 0, and
the lowest (i.e., one) as minλ+ → λHigh.
Proposition 1. The maximum value for |S| is ∏ω |Goodω|. When z, n→∞,
as maxλ+ → 0, |S| →∏ω |Goodω|. Conversely, as minλ+ → λHigh, |S| → 1.
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Proof. As maxλ+ → 0, λj → 0, ∀aj . Hence, E[Nj ]→ n× pGood|Good| , ∀aj ∈ Good.
Because ties are broken randomly, at each world state ω, each aj ∈ Goodω is
selected by the team with equal probability 1|Goodω| . As E[Nj ] = E[Nk] ∀aj , ak ∈
Good, we have that at each ω it is possible to choose |Goodω| different actions.
Hence, there are
∏
ω |Goodω| possible combinations of solutions. At each voting
iteration, ties are broken at each ω randomly, and one possible combination
is generated. As z → ∞, eventually we cover all possible combinations, and
|S| →∏ω |Goodω|.
Conversely, as minλ+ → λHigh, E[Nj ] → n × pGoodj for one fixed aj such
that pGoodj > p
Good
k ,∀aj 6= ak ∈ Good (and, consequently, E[Nj ] > E[Nk]), at
each ω. Hence, there is no tie in any world state, and the team picks a fixed aj
at each world state. Therefore, even if z →∞, |S| → 1. 
Therefore, uniform teams need a very strong assumption to be optimal: the
probability of voting for optimal actions must be uniformly distributed over all
optimal actions (maxλ+ → 0). We show that, alternatively, we can use agents
with different “preferences” (i.e., “diverse” agents), to maximize |S|. We consider
here agents that have about the same ability in problem-solving, but they prefer
different optimal actions. As the agents have similar ability, in order to simplify
the analysis we consider the probabilities to be the same across agents, except for
the actions in Good, as each agent φi has a subset Good
i ⊂ Good consisting
of its preferred actions (which are more likely to be chosen than other actions).
We denote by pij the probability of agent φi voting for action aj . ∀aj ∈ Goodi,
let pGoodi =
∑
j pij , pij =
pGoodi
|Goodi| , and pij > pik,∀ak /∈ Goodi. Goodi∩Goodl
(of agents φi and φl) is not necessarily ∅. Consider we can draw diverse agents
from a distribution F . Each agent φi has r < |Good| actions in its Goodi,
and we assume that all actions in Good are equally likely to be selected to
form Goodi (since they are all equally optimal). Note that each agent can even
prefer a single action (r = 1), so this is a realistic assumption. We show that by
drawing n agents from F , the team is optimal for large n with probability 1, as
long as n is a multiple of a divisor (> 1) of each |Goodω|. We also show that
the minimum necessary optimal team size is constant with high probability as
the number of world states grows. We start with the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If a team of size n is optimal at a world state, then gcd(n, |Good|) >
1 (n and |Good| are not co-prime).
Proof. Prove by contradiction. By the optimality requirements we must have
nr = k|Good|, where k is a constant ∈ N>0 representing the number of agents
that have a given action aj in its Good
i – note that it must be the same for all
optimal actions. If n and |Good| are co-prime, then it must be the case that r
is divisible by |Good|. However, this yields r ≥ |Good|, which contradicts our
assumption. Therefore, n and |Good| are not co-prime.
This implies hard restrictions for world states where |Good| is prime, or for
teams with prime size n: if n is prime, |Good| must be a multiple of n; and if
|Good| is prime, n must be a multiple of |Good|.
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Now we consider all world states Ω. For a team of fixed size n, Proposition
2 applies across all world states. Hence, the team’s size must be a multiple of a
divisor (> 1) of each |Goodω|. Note that the pdfs of the agents (and also r) may
change according to ω. Let D be a set containing one divisor of each world state
(if two or more world states have a common divisor x, it will be representable
by only one x ∈ D). Hence, ∀ω, ∃d ∈ D, such that d ∣∣ |Goodω|; and ∀d ∈ D,
∃Goodω, such that d
∣∣ |Goodω|. There are multiple possible D sets, from the
superset of all possibilities D .
Therefore, we can now study the minimum size necessary for an optimal
team. Applying Proposition 2 at each world state ω, we have that the minimum
size necessary for an optimal team is n = minD∈D
∏
d∈D d. Hence, our worst
case is when each |Goodω| is a unique prime, as the team will have to be a
product of each (unique) optimal action space sizes. This means that:
Proposition 3. In the worst case, the minimum team size is exponential in the
size of the world states |Ω|. In the best case, the minimum necessary team size
is a constant with |Ω|.
Proof. In the worst case, each added world state ω has a unique prime optimal
action space size. Hence, the minimum team size is at least the product of the
first |Ω| primes, which, by the prime number theorem, has growth rate exp((1 +
o(1))|Ω| log |Ω|). In the best case, each added Goodω has a common divisor
with previous ones, and the minimum necessary team size does not change. 
However, we show that the worst case happens with low probability, and the
best case with high probability. Let N be the maximum possible |Good|, and
assume that each new world state ωj will have a uniformly randomly drawn
number of optimal actions, denoted as mj , for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
Proposition 4. The probability that the minimum necessary team size grows
exponentially tends to 0, and the probability that it is constant tends to 1, as
M,N →∞.
Proof. We need to show that the probability that m1, . . . ,mM−1 are all co-prime
with mM tends to 0 as M,N →∞. Assume N →∞, then given any prime p,
the probability that at least one of any independently randomly generated M−1
numbers m1, ...,mM−1 has factor p is 1− (1− 1p)M−1, while the probability that
one independently randomly generated number mM has factor p is
1
p . Therefore,
the probability mM shares common factor p with at least one of m1, . . . ,mM−1
is
1−(1−1p)M−1
p . The probability that mM is co-prime with all m1, . . . ,mM−1 is∏
all primes p[1−
1−(1−1p)M−1
p ]; which tends to
∏
all primes p(1− 1p) = 1ζ(1) = 0, where
ζ(s) is the Riemann zeta function, ζ(1) =
∏
all primes p
1
1−p−1 =
∑∞
i=1
1
i →∞ (as
shown by Euler). Hence, with high probability, when adding a new world state
ωj , |Goodωj | will share a common factor with a world state already in Ω. 
Finally, we show that a diverse team of agents is always optimal as the team
grows, as long as it grows carefully :
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Theorem 1. Let D ∈ D be a set containing one factor from each Goodω.
For arbitrary n, the probability that we can generate an optimal team of size n
converges to 0 as |Ω| → ∞. However, if n = c∏d∈D d, then the probability that
the team is optimal tends to 1 as c→∞.
Proof. For arbitrary n, let P be the set of its prime factors. Given one p ∈ P, the
probability that p is not a factor of |Goodω| is 1− 1/p. The probability that all
p ∈ P are not factors is: ∏p(1− 1/p). As 0 < ∏p(1− 1/p) < 1, the probability
that at least one p ∈ P is a factor of |Goodω| is 1−
∏
p(1−1/p) < 1. For |Ω| tests,
the probability that at least one p is a factor in all of them is: (1−∏p(1−1/p))|Ω|,
which→ 0, as |Ω| → ∞. Hence, the probability that gcd(n, |Goodω|) = 1 for at
least one ω tends to 1, and the probability that the team can be optimal tends to
0. However, if n = c
∏
d∈D d, then gcd(n, |Goodω|) 6= 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω. Let Nj be the
number of agents φi that have aj in its Good
i. As each aj has equal probability
of being selected to be in a Goodi, for a large number of drawings (c→∞),
P (Ni = Nj)→ 1,∀ai, aj ∈ Goodω,∀ω (law of large numbers). 
If it is expensive to test values for n such that Theorem 1 is satisfied, we
can choose n = c
∏
ω |Goodω|, as it immediately follows the conditions of the
theorem. Moreover, if we know the size of all |Goodω|, we can check if n and
|Goodω| are co-prime in O(h) time (where h is the number of digits in the
smaller number), using the Euclidean algorithm. Hence, we can test all world
states in O(|Ω|h) time.
4.1 Generalizations
We first show that Theorem 1 still applies for agents φi with different probabili-
ties over optimal actions pGoodi . We consider a more general definition of optimal
team: the difference between the probabilities of picking each optimal action must
be as small as possible; i.e., let pΦj be the probability of team Φ picking optimal
action aj , the optimal team is such that∆ :=
∑
ak
∑
al
|pΦk − pΦl |,∀ak, al ∈ Good
is minimized (hence in the previous case ∆ = 0).
Proposition 5. Theorem 1 still applies when |pGoodi − pGoodj | ≤ , ∀φi, φj, for
small enough  > 0.
Proof. Let Φ be an optimal team, where pGoodi is the same for all agents φi.
Hence, the probability of all actions in Good being selected by the team is the
same. I.e., pΦk = p
Φ
l ,∀ak, al ∈ Good, and ∆ = 0.
We prove by mathematical induction. Assume we change the pGoodi of x
agents φi, and ∆ is as small as possible. Now we will change x+ 1 agents. Let’s
pick one agent φi and increase its pGoodi by δ ≤ . It follows that pΦk > pΦl ,∀ak ∈
Goodi, al /∈ Goodi, and the new ∆′ :=
∑
ak∈Good
∑
al∈Good |pΦk − pΦl | > ∆.
If we add one more agent φj , such that Good
j ∩Goodi = ∅, the probabil-
ity of voting for actions am ∈ Goodj increases. For small enough , pGoodj
will be too large to precisely equalize the probabilities, and it follows that
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pΦm > p
Φ
k > p
Φ
l ,∀am ∈ Goodj, ak ∈ Goodi, al /∈ Goodi ∪Goodj, and ∆′′ :=∑
ak∈Good
∑
al∈Good |pΦk − pΦl | > ∆′. The same applies for each newly added
agent, until we have a new team such that n = c
∏
d∈D d (again, satisfying the
conditions of the theorem).
The base case follows trivially. If we did not change the probability of any
agent (i.e., x = 0), and we now increase pGoodi of a single agent φi, p
Φ
k >
pΦl ,∀ak ∈ Goodi, al /∈ Goodi, and ∆′ > ∆. By the same argument as before,
adding more agents will only increase ∆′, until n = c
∏
d∈D d. 
We also generalize to the case where the number of preferred actions r changes
for each agent. Let the number of actions in the Goodi of agent φi (r
i) be decided
according to a uniform distribution in the interval [1, r′].
Proposition 6. If n = r′ × c∏d∈D d, the probability that the team is optimal
→ 1 as c→∞.
Proof. For large n, the number of agents with ri = 1, . . . , r′ is the same. There-
fore, if for each subset Φi ⊂ Φ, such that rφ = i,∀φ ∈ Φi, we have that pΦik = pΦil ,
∀ak, al ∈ Good, we will have that pΦk = pΦl ,∀ak, al ∈ Good. Given an optimal
team of size n, we have r′ subsets Φi of size n/r′ each. It follows by Theorem 1
that n/r′ = c
∏
d∈D d, and n = r′ × n/r′ = r′ × c
∏
d∈D d. 
In the next section we perform experiments with agents whose pdfs differ,
and diverse teams still significantly outperform uniform teams.
5 Experiments
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as max λ+ grows.
We run experiments with diverse and uniform teams
(henceforth diverse and uniform). First, we run syn-
thetic experiments, where we randomly create pdfs for
the agents, and simulate voting iterations across a series
of world states. We repeat all our experiments 100 times,
and in the graphs we plot the average and the confidence
interval of our results (with p = 0.01). We run 1000 voting
iterations (z), and measure how many optimal solutions
the team is able to find. We study a scenario where the
number of actions (|A|) = 100, and the number of op-
timal actions per world state (|Goodω|) is, respectively:
< 2, 3, 5, 5, 5 >, in a total of 750 optimal solutions.
At each repetition of our experiment, we randomly create a pdf for the agents.
We start by studying the impact of maxλ+ in uniform. When creating the
uniform team, the total probability of playing any of the optimal actions (i.e.,
pGood) is randomly assigned (uniform distribution) between 0.6 and 0.8. We fix
the size of the team (25) and evaluate different maxλ+ (Figure 1). As expected
from Proposition 1, for maxλ+ = 0 the system finds the highest number of
optimal solutions; and as maxλ+ increases, it quickly drops.
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We then study the impact of increasing the
number of agents, for uniform and diverse. To gen-
erate a diverse team, we draw randomly a rω in
an interval U for each world state, that will be
the size of |Goodi|. We study three variants: di-
verse*, where U = (0, |Goodω|]; diverse, where
U = (0, |Goodω|), and diverse∆, where we al-
low agents to have different riω, also drawn from
(0, |Goodω|). We independently create pdfs ran-
domly for each agent φi. For each agent we draw
a number between 0.6 and 0.8 to distribute over
the set of optimal actions, and randomly decide rω
actions to compose its Goodi set. We distribute
equally 80% of the probability of voting over optimal actions on the actions of
that set.
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Fig. 3: Percentage for larger
teams.
As we can see (Figure 2), the number of so-
lutions decreases for uniform as the number of
agents grows. Normally, in social choice, we ex-
pect the performance to improve, so this is a novel
result. It is, however, expected from our Proposi-
tion 1. Diverse, on the other hand, improves in
performance for all 3 versions, as predicted by our
theory. However, the system seems to converge for
a fixed z, as the performance does not increase
much after around 20 agents. Hence, in Figure
3 we study larger diverse (continuous line) and
diverse∆ teams (dashed line), going all the way
up to 1800 agents. We also study four different
number of voting iterations (z, shown in the figure by different lines): 1000,
2000, 3000, 4000. As we can see, although adding more agents was not really
improving the performance in the experimental scenario under study, there is
clearly a statistically significant improvement by increasing the number of voting
iterations, with the system improving from around 53% of the optimal solutions,
all the way up to finding more than 80% of them. However, there is a dimin-
ishing returns effect, as the impact of adding more iterations decreases as the
actual number of iterations grows larger. We also note that diverse∆ is better
than diverse, and the difference increases as z grows.
5.1 Experiments in Architecture Design
We study a real system for architectural building design. This is a fundamen-
tal domain, since the design of a building impacts its energy usage during its
whole life-span [2, 13]. We use Beagle [8], a multi-objective design optimization
software that assists users in the early stage design of buildings. Hence, the ex-
periments presented here were run in an actual system, that performs expensive
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energy evaluations over complex architectural designs, and represent months of
experimental work.
(a) Base (b) Office Park (c) Contemporary
Fig. 4: Parametric designs with increasing complexity used in our experiments.
First, the designer creates a parametric design, containing (as discussed in
Section 3) a set of parameters that can be modified within a specified range,
allowing the creation of many variations. We use designs from Gerber and
Lin (2013) [8]: base, a simple building type with uniform program (i.e., ten-
ant type); office park, a multi-tenant grouping of towers; and contemporary, a
double “twisted” tower that includes multiple occupancy types, relevant to con-
temporary architectural practices. We show the designs in Figure 4.
Beagle uses a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to optimize the building design based
on three objectives: energy efficiency, financial performance and area require-
ments. In detail, the objective functions are: Sobj : maxSPCS; Eobj : minEUI;
Fobj : maxNPV . SPCS is the Spatial Programming Compliance Score, EUI is
the Energy Use Intensity and NPV is the Net Present Value, defined as follows.
SPCS defines how well a building conforms to the project requirements
(by measuring how close the area dedicated to different activities is to a given
specification). Let L be a list of activities (in our designs, L=<Office, Hotel,
Retail, Parking>), area(l) be the total area in a building dedicated to activity
l and requirement(l) be the area for activity l given in a project specification.
SPCS is defined as: SPCS = 100 ∗
(
1−
∑
l∈L |area(l)−requirement(l)|
|L|
)
EUI regulates the overall energy performance of the building. This is an
estimated overall building energy consumption in relation to the overall building
floor area. The process to obtain the energy analysis result is automated in Beagle
through Autodesk Green Building Studio (GBS) web service.
Finally, NPV is a commonly used financial evaluation. It measures the finan-
cial performance for the whole building life cycle, given by:NPV =
(∑T
t=1
ct
(1+r)t
)
−
c0, where T is the Cash Flow Time Span, r is the Annual Rate of Return, c0 is
the construction cost, and ct = Revenue−Operation Cost.
Many options affect the execution of the GA, including: initial population
size, size of the population, selection size, crossover ratio, mutation ratio, maxi-
mum iteration. Further details about Beagle are at Gerber and Lin (2013) [8].
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In the end of the optimization process, the GA outputs a set of solutions.
These are considered “optimal”, according to the internal evaluation of the GA,
but are not necessarily so. As in our theory, for each parameter the assigned
value is going to be one of the optimal ones with a certain probability. In fact,
most of the solutions outputted by the GAs are later identified as sub-optimal
and eliminated in comparison with better ones found by the teams.
We model each run of the GA as an agent φ. Each parameter of the para-
metric design is a world state ω, where the agents decide among different actions
A (i.e., possible values for the current parameter). Our model assumes indepen-
dent multiple voting iterations across all world states. However, as in general it
could be expensive to pool agents for votes in a large number of iterations, we
test a more realistic scenario by pooling only 3 solutions per agent, but running
multiple voting iterations by aggregating over all possible combinations of them,
in a total of 81 voting iterations.
Agent PZ SZ CR MR
Agent 1 12 10 0.8 0.1
Agent 2 18 8 0.6 0.2
Agent 3 24 16 0.55 0.15
Agent 4 30 20 0.4 0.25
Table 1: GA parameters for the diverse team. Initial Population and Maximum
Iteration were kept as constants: 10 and 5, respectively. PZ = Population Size,
SZ = Selection Size, CR = Crossover Ratio, MR = Mutation Ratio.
We create 4 different agents, using different options for the GA (as shown
in Table 1). Contrary to the previous synthetic experiments, we are dealing
here with real (and consequently complex) design problems. Hence, the true set
of optimal solutions is unknown. We approach the problem in a comparative
fashion: when evaluating different systems, we consider the union of the set of
solutions of all of them. That is, let Hx be the set of solutions of system x;
we consider the set H = ⋃x Hx. We compare all solutions in H, and consider
as optimal the best solutions in H, forming the set of optimal solutions O. We
use the concept of pareto dominance: the best solutions in H are the ones that
dominate all other solutions (i.e., they are better in all 3 factors). As we know
which system generated each solution o ∈ O, we estimate the set of optimal
solutions Sx of each system.
Although our theory focuses on plurality voting as the aggregation method-
ology, we also present results using the mean and the median of the opinions
of the agents. That is, given one combination (a set of one solution from each
agent), we also generate a new solution by calculating the mean/median across
all parameters.
Concerning uniform, we evaluate a team composed of copies of the “best”
agent. By “best”, we mean the agent that finds the highest number of optimal
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solutions. According to Proposition 1, such an agent should be the one with
the lowest maxλ+, and we can predict that voting among copies of that agent
generates a large number of optimal actions. Hence, for each design, we first
compare all solutions of all agents (i.e., construct H as the union of the solutions
of all agents), to estimate which one has the largest set of optimal solutions
S. We, then, run that agent multiple times, creating uniform. For diverse, we
consider one copy of each agent.
We aggregate the solutions of diverse and uniform. We run 81 aggregation
iterations (across all parameters/world states), by selecting 3 solutions from each
agent φi, in its set of solutions Hi, and aggregating all possible combinations of
these solutions. We evaluate together the solutions of all agents and all teams
(i.e., we construct H with the solutions of all systems), in order to estimate the
size of Sx of each system.
In Figure 5 (a), we show the percentage of optimal solutions for all systems,
in relation to |O|. For clarity, we represent the result of the individual agents
by the one that had the highest percentage. As we can see, in all parametric
designs the teams find a significantly larger percentage of optimal solutions than
the individual agents. The agents find less than 1% of the solutions, while the
teams are in general always close to or above 15%. In total (considering all
aggregation methods and all agents), for all three parametric designs the agents
find only about 1% of the optimal solutions, while uniform finds around 51%
and diverse 47%. Looking at vote, in base diverse finds a larger percentage
of optimal solutions than uniform (around 9.4% for uniform, while 11.6% for
diverse). In office park and contemporary, however, uniform finds more solutions
than diverse. Based on Proposition 1, we expect that this is caused by the best
agent having a lower maxλ+ in office park and contemporary than in base.
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Fig. 5: Percentage of optimal solutions of each system.
Figure 5 (b) shows the percentage of optimal solutions found, in relation to
the size of the set of evaluated solutions of each system. That is, let Ox be the set
of optimal solutions of system x, in O. We show |Ox||Hx| . Concerning vote, the teams
are able to find a new optimal solution around 20% of the time for base, around
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73% of the time for office park and around 36% of the time for contemporary.
Meanwhile, for the individual agents it is close to 0%. We can see that teams
have a great potential in generating new optimal solutions, as expected from our
theory. However, as studied in our synthetic experiments, we can expect some
diminishing returns when increasing the number of voting iterations. We show
examples of solutions created by the teams in Figure 6.
(a) Base. Shaded area shows variance of
building’s footprint in relation to site.
Dashed line indicates height variance.
(b) Office Park. Dashed line shows vari-
ance in volume.
(c) Contemporary. Line shows variance
in orientation.
Fig. 6: Some building designs generated by the teams.
We also plot in Figure 7 (a) the percentage of solutions that were reported
to be optimal by each agent, but were later discovered to be suboptimal by
evaluatingH. A large amount of solutions are eliminated (close to 100%), helping
the designer to avoid making a poor decision, and increasing her confidence
that the set of optimal solutions found represent well the “true” pareto frontier.
Moreover, we test for duplicated solutions across different aggregation methods,
different teams and different agents. The number is small: only 4 in contemporary,
and none in base and office park. Hence, we are providing a high coverage of the
pareto frontier for the designer. We show the total number of optimal solutions
in Figure 7 (b). Finally, to better study the solutions proposed by the agents
and teams, we plot all the optimal solutions in the factors space in Figure 8,
where we show that the solutions give a good coverage of the pareto frontier.
6 Conclusion
Design imposes a novel problem to social choice: maximize the number of optimal
solutions. We present a novel model for agent teams, that shows the potential of
a system of voting agents to be creative, by generating a large number of opti-
mal solutions to the designer. Our analysis, which builds a new connection with
number theory, presents several novel results: (i) uniform teams are in general
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Fig. 8: All the optimal solutions in the factor space.
suboptimal, and converge to a unique solution; (ii) diverse teams are optimal as
long as the team’s size grows carefully ; (iii) the minimum optimal team size is
constant with high probability; (iv) the worst case for teams is a prime number
of optimal actions. Our experiments consider bounded time and relaxed assump-
tions, and diverse teams still perform well. We show results in architecture, where
teams find a large number of solutions for designing energy-efficient buildings.
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Abstract. This paper builds on an existing notion of group responsibil-
ity and proposes two ways to define the degree of group responsibility:
structural and functional degrees of responsibility. These notions mea-
sure potential responsibilities of agent groups for avoiding a state of af-
fairs. According to these notions, a degree of responsibility for a state of
affairs can be assigned to a group of agents if, and to the extent that, the
group of the agents have potential to preclude the state of affairs. These
notions will be formally specified and their properties will be analyzed.
1 Introduction
The concept of responsibility has been extensively investigated in philosophy
and computer science. Each proposal focuses on specific aspects of responsibil-
ity. For example, [1] focuses on the causal aspect of responsibility and defines a
notion of graded responsibility, [2] focuses on the organizational aspect of respon-
sibility, [3] argues that group responsibility should be distributed to individual
responsibility, [4] focuses on the interaction aspect of responsibility and defines
an agent’s responsibility in terms of the agent’s causal contribution, and [5] fo-
cuses on the strategic aspect of group responsibility and defines various notions
of group responsibility. In some of these proposals, the concept of responsibility
is defined with respect to a realized event “in past” while in other approaches it
is defined as the responsibility for the realization of some event “in future”. This
introduces a major dimension of responsibility, namely backward-looking and
forward-looking responsibility [6]. Backward-looking approaches reason about
level of causality or contribution of agents in the occurrence of an already re-
alized outcome while forward-looking notions are focused on the capacities of
agents towards a state of affairs.
Although some of the existing approaches are designed to measure the degree
of responsibility, they either constitute a backward-looking (instead of forward-
looking) notion of responsibility [1], provide qualitative (instead of quantitative)
levels of responsibility [7, 8], or focus on individual (instead of group) respon-
sibility [4]. To our knowledge, there is no forward-looking approach that could
measure the degree of group responsibility quantitatively. Such notion would en-
able reasoning on the potential responsibility of an agent group towards a state
of affairs in strategic settings, e.g., collective decision making scenarios. In this
paper, we build on a forward-looking approach to group responsibility and define
two notions of responsibility degrees. The first concept is based on the partial or
complete power of an agent group to preclude a state of affairs while the second
concept is based on the potentiality of an agent group to reach a state where the
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agent group possesses the complete power to preclude the state of affairs. This
results in a distinction between what we will call the “structural responsibility”
versus the “functional responsibility” of an agent group. In our proposal, an
agent group has the full responsibility, if it has an action profile to preclude the
state of affairs. All other agent groups that do not have full responsibility, but
may have contribution to responsible agent groups, will be assigned a partial
degree of responsibility.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief analysis of
the concept of group responsibility from a power-based point of view. Section 3
presents the framework in which our proposed notions will be formally character-
ized. In Sections 4 and 5 we introduce the notions that capture our conception of
degree of group responsibility with respect to a given state of affairs and analyse
their properties. Finally, concluding remarks and future work directions will be
presented in Section 6.
2 Group Responsibility: A Power-based Analysis
In order to illustrate our conception of group responsibility and the nuances in
degrees of responsibility, we follow [1] and use a voting scenario to explain the
degree of responsibility of agents’ groups for voting outcomes. The voting sce-
nario considers a small congress with ten members consisting of five Democrats
(D), three Republicans (R), and two Greens (G). We assume that there is a
voting in progress on a specific bill (B). Without losing generality and to reduce
the combinatorial complexity of the setting, we assume that all members of a
party vote either in favour of or against the bill B. Table 1 illustrates the eight
possible voting outcomes. Note that in this scenario, six positive votes are suffi-
cient for the approval of B. For example, row 4 shows the case where R and D
vote against B and the bill is disapproved. For this case we say that the coalition
(group) of R and D vote against B. It should also be noted that our assumption
reduces parties to individual agents with specific weights such that the question
raises as why we use this party setting instead of a simple voting of three agents
whose votes have different weights. The motivation is that this setting is realistic
and makes the weighted votes of each agent (party) more intuitive.
Table 1. Voting results
G(2) R(3) D(5) Result
0 − − − −
1 − − + −
2 − + − −
3 − + + +
4 + − − −
5 + − + +
6 + + − −
7 + + + +
Table 2. War incidence
Congress President War
0 − − −
1 − + −
2 + − −
3 + + +
Following [5] we believe that it is reasonable to assign the responsibility for
a specific state of affairs to a group of agents if they jointly have the power to
avoid the state of affairs1. According to [9], the preclusive power is a ability of
1 See [5] for a detailed discussion on why to focus on avoiding instead of enforcing a
state of affair.
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a coalition to preclude a given state of affairs which entails that a coalition with
preclusive power, has the potential but might not practice the preclusion of a
given state of affairs. For our voting scenario, this suggests to assign responsibil-
ity to the coalition consisting of parties R and D since they can jointly disapprove
B. Note that the state of affair to be avoided can also be the state of affairs where
B is disapproved. In this case, the coalition can be assigned the responsibility
to avoid disproving B. Similarly, coalitions GD and GRD have preclusive power
with respect to the approval of B as they have sufficient members (weights) to
avoid the approval of B. Note that none of the other four coalitions, i.e., G, R,
D, and GR, could preclude the approval of B independently. Hence, we consider
GD, RD, and GRD as being responsible coalitions for the approval of B. The
intuition for this concept of responsibility is supported by the fact that the lobby
groups are willing (i.e., it is economically rational) to invest resources in parties
that have the power to avoid a specific state of affairs.
We build on the ideas in [5] and propose two orthogonal approaches to cap-
ture our conception of degree of group responsibility towards a state of affairs.
Our intuition suggests that the degree of responsibility of a group of agents to-
wards a state of affairs should reflect the extent they structurally or functionally
can contribute to the coalitions that have preclusive power with respect to the
state of affairs. In the sequel, we will explain the conception of degree of responsi-
bility according to the structural and functional approaches, and illustrate both
approaches by means of our voting scenario example.
Our conception of structural responsibility degree is based on the following
observation in the voting scenario. We deem that regarding the approval of B,
although the coalitionsG,R,D, andGR have no preclusive power independently,
they nevertheless have a share in the composition of coalitions GD, RD and
GRD with preclusive power with respect to the approval of B. Hence, we say
that any coalition that shares members with responsible coalitions, should be
assigned a degree of responsibility that reflects its proportional contribution to
the coalitions with preclusive power. For example, coalition D with five members,
has larger share in GD than the coalition G has. Moreover, coalition D has a
larger share in GD than in RD and GRD. Therefore, we believe that the relative
size of a coalition and its share in the coalitions with the preclusive power are
substantial parameters in formulation of the notion of responsibility degree. In
this case, the larger share of D in GD in comparison with the share of G in GD
will be positively reflected in D’s responsibility degree, and the inequality of
shares of D in three coalitions GD, RD and GRD, will be taken into account in
formulating the responsibility degree of D. These parameters will be explained
in details later. We would like to emphasize that this concept of responsibility
degree is supported by the fact that the lobby groups do proportionally support
the parties that can play a role in some key decisions.
The second approach in capturing the notion of functional responsibility de-
gree addresses the dynamics of preclusive power of a specific coalition. Suppose
that the bill B was about declaration of the congress to the President (P ) which
enables P to start a war (Table 2). Roughly speaking, P will be in charge only
after the approval of the congress. When we are reasoning at the moment when
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the voting is in progress in the congress, it is reasonable to assume that coali-
tions GD, RD, and GRD are responsible as they have preclusive power to avoid
the war. Moreover, after the approval of B, the President P is the only coalition
with preclusive power to avoid the war. Hence, we believe that although P alone
would not have the preclusive power before the approval of B in the congress, it
is rationally justifiable for an anti-war campaign to invest resources on P , even
before the approval voting of the congress, simply because there exists possibil-
ities where P will have the preclusive power to avoid the war. Accordingly, a
reasonable differentiation could be made between the coalitions which do have
the chance of acquiring the preclusive power and those they do not have any
chance of power acquisition. This functional notion of responsibility degree ad-
dresses the eventuality of a state in which an agent group possesses the preclusive
power regarding a given state of affairs.
Note that following [5], our notions of group responsibility are locally bounded
as they will be defined with respect to some source state. Hence, a coalition might
be responsible in a specific state and not responsible in the other states regard-
ing a given state of affairs. Additionally, our proposed notions for responsibility
degree have dependency to the global setting. In the voting scenario, the global
setting that ten voters are situated in three parties of G (2 members), R (3
members) and D (5 members), is crucial for the responsibility degrees that are
assigned to various coalitions. Any change in the global setting may alter the
responsibility degree of various coalitions. For example, when two members of
the Republican party secede from R and form a new Tea Party T , we face a
different global setting, which in turn causes the responsibility degrees assigned
to various coalition to change. This is due to the fact that the new setting intro-
duces new coalitions such as TD with preclusive power regarding the approval
of B. Our analysis is not limited to the voting scenarios, but can be applied to
other situations as shown later in this paper.
3 Preliminaries: Coalitional Responsibility
The behaviour of a multi-agent system is often modelled by concurrent game
structures (CGS) [10]. A concurrent game structure is a tupleM = (N,Q,Act, d, o),
where N = {1, ..., k} is a nonempty finite set of agents, Q is a nonempty set of
system states, Act is a nonempty and finite set of atomic actions, d : N ×Q→
P(Act) is a function that identifies the set of available actions for each agent
i ∈ N at each state q ∈ Q, and o is a deterministic and partial transition func-
tion that assigns a state q′ = o(q, α1, ..., αk) to a state q and an action profile
(α1, ..., αk) such all k agents in N choose actions in the action profile respec-
tively. An action profile α¯ = (α1, ..., αk) is a sequence that consists of actions
αi ∈ d(i, q) for all players in N . In addition, in case o(q, α1, ..., αk) is undefined
then o(q, α′1, ..., α
′
k) is undefined for each action profile (α
′
1, ..., α
′
k). For the sake
of notation simplicity, d(i, q) will be written as di(q) and dC(q) :=
∏
i∈C di(q).
Finally, in the rest of this paper a state of affairs refers to a set S ⊆ Q, S¯ de-
notes the set Q \ S, and (αC , αN\C) denotes the action profile, where αC is the
actions of the agents in coalition C and αN\C denotes the actions of the rest of
the agents.
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Following the settings of [5], for a CGS M , a specific state q and a state of
affairs S, we recall the definitions of q-enforce, q-avoid, q-responsible and weakly
q-responsible (See [5] for details and properties of these notions).
– Coalition C can q-enforce S in M iff there is a joint action αC ∈ dC(q) such
that for all joint actions αN\C ∈ dN\C(q), o(q, (αC , αN\C)) ∈ S.
– Coalition C can q-avoid S in M iff for all αN\C ∈ dN\C(q) there is αC ∈
dC(q) such that o(q, (αC , αN\C)) ∈ Q\S.
– Coalition C ⊆ N is q-responsible for S in M iff C can q-enforce S¯ and for
all other coalitions C ′ that can q-enforce S¯, we have that C ⊆ C ′.
– A coalition C ⊆ N is weakly q-responsible for S in M 2 iff C is a minimal
coalition that can q-enforce S¯.
Considering the voting scenario from the Section 2, coalitions GD, RD and
GRD can both qs-enforce and qs-avoid the approval of B where qs denotes the
starting moment of the voting progress. Note that the notions of q-enforce and
q-avoid correlate with the notions of, respectively, α-effectivity and β-effectivity
in [11]. In this scenario, we have no qs-responsible coalition for approval of B
and two coalitions of GD and RD are weakly qs-responsible for the approval of
B. Note that the coalition GRD is not weakly qs-responsible for the approval of
B as it is not minimal. The concept of (weakly) q-responsible coalition, assigns
responsibility to only coalitions with preclusive power and considers all other
coalitions as not being responsible. As we have argued in section 2, we believe
that responsibility can be assigned to all coalitions, even those without preclusive
power, though to a certain degree including zero degree. In order to define our
notions of responsibility degree, we first introduce two notions of structural power
difference and power acquisition sequence. Given an arbitrary coalition C, a state
q, and a state of affair S, the first notion concerns the number of missing elements
in C that when added to C makes it a (weakly) q-responsible coalitions for a S,
and the second notion concerns a sequence of action profiles from state q that
leads to a state q′ where C is (weakly) q′-responsible for S. According to the
first notion, coalition C can gain preclusive power for S if supported by some
additional members, and according to the second notion C can gain preclusive
power for S in some potentially reachable state.
Definition 1 (Power measures) Let M be a multi-agent system, S a state of
affairs in M , C an arbitrary coalition, and Cˆ be a q-responsible coalition for S in
M . We say that the structural power difference of C and Cˆ in state q of M with
respect to S, denoted by ΘS,Mq (Cˆ, C), is equal to cardinality of Cˆ\C. Moreover,
we say that C has a power acquisition sequence 〈α¯1, ..., α¯n〉 in q for S in M iff
o(qi, α¯i) = qi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that q = q1 and qn+1 = q′ and C is (weakly)
q′-responsible for S in M .
Consider the war approval declaration of the Congress to the President (P ) in
Section 2. Here, we can see that the structural power difference of the coalition D
and the weakly qs-responsible coalition GD is equal to 2. Moreover, the singleton
coalition P that is not responsible in qs has the opportunity of being responsible
2 In further references, “in M” might be omitted wherever it is clear from the context.
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for the war in states other than qs. Note that power acquisition sequence does
not necessarily need to be unique. If the coalition C is not (weakly) responsible in
q, the existence of any power acquisition sequence with a length higher than zero
implies that the coalition could potentially reach a state q′ (from the current state
of q) where C is (weakly) q′-responsible for S. This notion also covers the cases
where C is already in a (weakly) responsible state where the minimum length
of power acquisition sequence is taken to be zero. In this case, the coalition
is already (weakly) q-responsible for S. For example, in the voting scenario,
coalition GD is weakly responsible for the state of affairs and therefore, the
minimum length of a power acquisition sequence is zero. When we are reasoning
in a source state of q, the notion of power acquisition sequence, enables us to
differentiate between the non (weakly) q-responsible coalitions that do have the
opportunity of becoming (weakly) q′-responsible for a given state of affairs (q 6=
q′) and those they do not. Moreover, we emphasise that the availability of a
power acquisition sequence for an arbitrary coalition C from a source state q to
a state q′ in which C is (weakly) q-responsible for the state of affairs, does not
necessitate the existence of an independent strategy for C to reach q′ from q.
4 Structural Degree of Responsibility
Structural degree of responsibility addresses the preclusive power of a coalition for
a given state of affairs by means of the maximum contribution that the coalition
has in a (weakly) responsible coalition for the state of affairs. To illustrate the
intuition behind this notion, consider again the voting scenario in the section 2.
If an anti-war campaign wants to invest its limited resources to prevent the bill
to go to a war, we deem that it is reasonable to invest more on D than G, if
the resources admit such a choice. Although neither D nor G could prevent the
war individually, larger contribution of D in coalitions with preclusive power, i.e.
GD, RD and GRD, entitles D to be assigned with larger degree of responsibility
than G. This intuition will be reflected in the formulation of structural degree of
responsibility.
Definition 2 (Structural degree of responsibility) Let WS,Mq denote the
set of all (weakly) q-responsible coalitions for S in M and C be an arbitrary
coalition. The structural degree of q-responsibility of C for S in M , denoted
SDRS,Mq (C), is defined as follows:
SDRS,Mq (C) = max({1− Θ
S,M
q (Cˆ,C)
|Cˆ| | Cˆ ∈WS,Mq }).
Intuitively, SDRS,Mq (C) measures the highest contribution of a coalition C
in a (weakly) q-responsible Cˆ for S. Hence, for all possible coalitions, structural
degree of responsibility is in range of [0, 1]. In sequel, we write SDRSq (C) and
WSq instead of SDRS,Mq (C) and WS,Mq , respectively.
Proposition 1 (Full structural responsibility). The structural degree of q-
responsibility of coalition C for S is equal to 1 iff C is either a (weakly) q-
responsible coalition for S or C ⊇ Cˆ such that Cˆ is (weakly) q-responsible for
S.
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Proof. Follows directly from Definition 2 and definition of (weak) responsibility
in [5]. uunionsq
Example 1. Consider again the voting scenario from Section 2 (Figure 1). In
this scenario, we have an initial state qs in which all voters can use their votes
in favour or against the approval of the bill B (no abstention or null vote is
allowed). The majority of six votes (or more) in favour of B will be considered
as the state of affairs consisting of states q7, q5 and q3. This multi-agent system
can be modelled as CGS M = (N,Q,Act, d, o), where N = {1, ..., 10}, Q =
{qs, q0, ..., q7}, Act = {0, 1, wait}, di(qs) = {0, 1} and di(q) = {wait} for all
i ∈ N and q ∈ Q\{qs}. Voters are situated in three parties such that G = {1, 2},
R = {3, 4, 5} and D = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. For notation convenience, actions of party
members will be written collectively in the action profiles, e.g., we write (0, 1, 0)
to denote the action profile (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). The outcome function is
as illustrated in Figure 1 (e.g., o(qs, (0, 0, 1)) = q1 is illustrated by the arrow
from qs to q1). Moreover, the simplifying assumption that all party members
vote collectively is implemented by o(qs, α¯
′) = qs for all possible action profiles
α¯′ in which party members act differently. We observe that the set of weakly
qs-responsible coalitions in this example is {GD,RD}. Using Definition 2, the
structural degree of qs-responsibility of GR will be equal to max({2/7, 3/8}) =
3/8. A similar calculation leads to the conclusion that the structural degree of
qs-responsibility for all (weakly) qs-responsible coalitions and the coalition GRD
is equal to 1. The structural degree of qs-responsibility of empty coalition (∅)
is equal to 0 as the structural power difference of the empty coalition with all
(weakly) qs-responsible coalitions Cˆ is equal to the cardinality of Cˆ. The coalition
D shares members with both coalitions of GD and RD where D has its largest
share in GD. So, SDRSqs(D) = max({5/7, 3/8}) = 5/7. A similar calculation
shows that SDRSqs(R) = 3/8 and SDRSqs(G) = 2/7.
qs
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Fig. 1. Voting scenario
As illustrated, a coalition C might share members with various (weakly) q-
responsible coalitions, therefore the largest structural share of C in (weakly)
q-responsible coalitions for S, will be considered to form the SDRSq (C). We
would like to stress that our notions for responsibility degrees are formulated
based on the maximum expected power of a coalition to preclude a state of
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affairs. While we believe that in legal theory, and with respect to its backward-
looking approach, the minimum preclusive power of a coalition need be taken
into account for assessing culpability, our focus as a forward-looking approach
will be on maximum expected preclusive power of a coalition regarding a given
state of affairs.
The following lemma introduces a responsibility paradox case in which our
presented notion of structural degree of responsibility is not applicable as a notion
for reasoning about responsibility of groups of agents.
Lemma 1 (Applicability constraint: responsibility paradox). The empty
coalition is (unique) q-responsible for S iff the structural degree of q-responsibility
of all possible coalitions C for S is equal to 1.
Proof. “⇒”: Based on Proposition 1, if the empty coalition (∅) is q-responsible
for S, the structural degree of q-responsibility of the empty coalition and all its
super-coalitions, i.e., all possible coalitions, is equal to 1.
“⇐”: According to Proposition 1, and because the empty coalition is only
a super-coalition of itself, the premise entails that the empty coalition must be
either a weakly q-responsible coalition for S or the unique q-responsible coalition
for S. Based on [5], if the empty coalition is weakly q-responsible for S, then it
is the q-responsible coalition for S. uunionsq
The common avoidability of S implies that the occurrence of S is impossible
by means of any action profile in q. In other words, given the specification of a
CGS modelM , a state of of affairs S and a source state q inM , no action profile α¯
leads to a state qs ∈ S. Common avoidability of a state of affairs, correlates with
the impossibility notion ¬♦S in modal logic [12]. An impossible state of affairs
S in q, entitles all possible coalitions to be “fully responsible”. The impossibility
of S neutralizes the space of coalitions with respect to their structural degree
of q-responsibility for S. Therefore, we believe that in cases where the empty
coalition is responsible for a given state of affairs, as S is impossible, full degree of
structural responsibility of a coalition is not an apt measure, does not imply the
preclusive power of any coalition, and hence, not an applicable reasoning notion
for one who is willing to invest resources in the groups of agents that have the
preclusive power over S. Note that in case the empty set is not responsible for S,
its structural degree of responsibility is equal to 0 because its structural power
difference with all (weakly) responsible coalitions Cˆ is equal to the cardinality
of Cˆ.
The next theorem illustrates a case in which a singleton coalition posses the
preclusive power over a state of affairs. The existence of such a dictator agent
in a state q, polarizes the space of all possible coalitions with respect to their
structural degree of q-responsibility for the state of affairs.
Theorem 1 (Polarizing dictatorship). Let Cˆ be a singleton coalition, q an
arbitrary state and S a possible state of affairs (in sense of Lemma 1). Then,
Cˆ is a (unique) q-responsible coalition for S iff for any arbitrary coalition C,
SDRSq (C) ∈ {0, 1}, where SDRSq (C ∈ I) = 1 and SDRSq (C ∈ O) = 0 for
I = {C|C ⊇ Cˆ} and O = {C|C + Cˆ}.
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Proof. “⇒”: Based on Proposition 1, the structural degree of q-responsibility
of any coalition C ⊇ Cˆ is equal to 1. In other cases, the structural degree of
q-responsibility of C + Cˆ is equal to 0 because C shares no element with Cˆ,
which is the singleton (unique) q-responsible coalition for S.
“⇐”: Here we have a partition W = {I,O} of all possible coalitions. As S is
not an impossible state of affair in sense of Lemma 1, the empty coalition is not
q-responsible for S but has the structural degree of q-responsibility equal to 0;
and therefore a member of O. I as a set of all coalitions with structural degree of
responsibility equal to 1, is a non-empty set either; because there exists at least
one coalition in I which is Cˆ. Hence, SDRSq (Cˆ ∈ I) = 1 and necessarily there
exists at least one non-empty weakly q-responsible coalition for S, i.e., WSq 6= ∅.
Accordingly, based on Proposition 1, and as Cˆ is a singleton, Cˆ ∈WSq . Moreover,
based on Proposition 1, we have that WSq ⊆ I. As Cˆ is a subset of all coalitions
in I, we conclude that Cˆ ⊆WSq . Thus, Cˆ is a weakly q-responsible coalition and
is a subset of all possible weakly q-responsible coalitions for S. Therefore, Cˆ is
the unique singleton q-responsible coalition or the q-dictator for S. uunionsq
Example 2 (Operating room scenario). Consider a surgery operation room where
a patient is going to be operated. In this surgery operation a surgeonD, a surgeon
assistant A and an anesthesiologist N are involved. In this scenario, each agent,
i.e., D, A and N , can decide to perform her role in health-care delivery or to
refuse. If the anesthesiologist chooses to refuse or if both the surgeon and the as-
sistant decide to refuse, the patient will die. When all three agents choose to per-
form their tasks, the patient will recover in the state of good health. Finally, an ex-
clusive refusal of the assistant or the surgeon, results in medium health or infirm
health, respectively. This multi-agent scenario can be modelled as a CGS M , as
shown in Figure 2. This CGS is specified as M = ({D,A,N}, {qs, q1, q2, q3, q4},
{perform, refuse, wait}, d, o) where di(qs) = {perform, refuse} and di(q) =
{wait} for all i ∈ {D,A,N} and q ∈ {q1, q2, q3, q4}. The outcome function o is
shown in the Figure 2, e.g. o(qs, (perform, refuse, perform)) = q2. The star
? represents any available action, i.e. ? ∈ {perform, refuse}. In this example
the weakly qs-responsible coalitions for death of the patient (q4) are DN and
AN . Hence, in the structural degree of qs-responsibility of all possible coalitions,
i.e., D, A, N , DA, DN , AN , and DAN , for q4, could be measured based on
their maximum contribution in DN and AN . Accordingly, the structural degree
of qs-responsibility of coalitions D, A, N and DA will be 1/2. All coalitions of
DN , AN and DAN have the structural degree of qs-responsibility equal to 1
which reflects their preclusive power to avoid the death of P .
As our concept of group responsibility is based on the preclusive power of a
coalition over a given state of affairs, the following monotonicity property shows
that increasing the size of a coalition by adding new elements, does not have
a negative effect on the preclusive power. This property, as formulated below,
correlates with the monotonicity of power and power indices [13, 14].
Proposition 2 (Structural monotonicity). Let C and C ′ be two arbitrary
coalitions such that C ⊆ C ′. Then, SDRSq (C) ≤ SDRSq (C ′).
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Fig. 2. Operating room scenario
Proof. By definition, structural degree of q-responsibility of C for S, reflects
the maximum share of C in all possible (weakly) q-responsible coalitions for S.
Hence, as the structural degree of q-responsibility has a value in range [0, 1], the
elements in C ′ \ C could have no negative effect on this degree. uunionsq
Note that the other way does not hold in general; because the structural
degree of q-responsibility of the coalitions C and C ′, might be formulated based
on their maximum contribution in two distinct weakly q-responsible coalitions.
Consider the operating room scenario in Example 2. As presented, SDRSqs(A)
= 1/2 ≤ SDRSqs(DN) = 1 but A * DN .
The following theorem shows that in case of existence of a unique nonempty q-
responsible coalition for a state of affairs, the structural degree of q-responsibility
of any coalition could be calculated cumulatively based on the degrees of disjoint
subsets. In this case, for any two arbitrary coalitions C1 and C2, the summation
of their structural degree of q-responsibility will be equal to the degree of the
unified coalition.
Theorem 2 (Conditional cumulativity). If there exists a nonempty (unique)
q-responsible coalition for S, then for any arbitrary coalition C and partition
P = {C1, ..., Cn} of C, we have
∑n
i=1 SDRSq (Ci) = SDRSq (C).
Proof. Suppose Cˆ is the q-responsible coalition for S. Then, as Cˆ is unique,
the structural degree of q-responsibility of any coalition Ci ∈ P , could be re-
formulated based on its contribution to Cˆ. Thus,
∑n
i=1 SDRSq (Ci) is equal to∑n
i=1
|Cˆ∩Ci|
|Cˆ| . The whole equation is equal to
1
|Cˆ|
∑n
i=1 |Cˆ ∩ Ci|. Hence, as P is
a partition of C, we have |Cˆ∩C||Cˆ| which is equal to SDR
S
q (C). uunionsq
Note that in general, the other way does not hold. Consider the cases that the
state of affairs is not avoidable by any coalition. Thus, no (weakly) q-responsible
coalition does exist and the structural degree of q-responsibility for all possible
coalitions is equal to 0. This situation satisfies the premise that for any arbi-
trary coalition C and partition P of C, summation of structural q-responsibility
degrees of coalitions Ci is equal to the structural degree of q-responsibility of C;
but no (weakly) q-responsible coalition for S do exists.
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Example 3. Consider a variation of the operating room scenario in Example 2.
Here we audit the structural degree of qs-responsibility of coalitions for the state
of affairs S = {good−health,medium−health, infirm−health, death}. Hence,
no coalition has the preclusive power over S and therefore the structural degree
of qs-responsibility of all possible coalitions is equal to 0. For example, although
the summation of structural degrees of qs-responsibility of coalitions AD and N
is equal to 0 and equal to structural degree of qs-responsibility of ADN , there
exists no (weakly) qs-responsible coalition for S.
5 Functional Degree of Responsibility
Functional degree of responsibility addresses the dynamics of preclusive power
of a specific coalition with respect to a given state of affairs. We remind the
example from Section 2 where the President will be in charge, regarding the
war decision, only after the approval of the Congress. It is our understanding
that the existence of a sequence of action profiles that leads to a state where the
President becomes responsible for the war decision rationalizes the investment of
an anti-war campaign on the President, even before the approval of the Congress.
The functional degree of responsibility of a coalition C in a state q will be
calculated based on the notion of power acquisition sequence by tracing the
number of necessary state transitions from q, in order to reach a state q′ in
which the coalition C is (weakly) q′-responsible for S. The length of a shortest
power acquisition sequence form q to q′, illustrates the potentiality of preclusive
power of the coalition C. If two coalitions have the capacity of reaching a state
in which they have the preclusive power over the state of affairs S, we say that
a coalition which has the shorter path has a higher potential preclusive power
and thus gets the larger functional degree of responsibility. Accordingly, the
coalition which is already in a responsible state, has full potential to avoid a
state of affairs. Hence, it will be assigned with maximum functional degree of
responsibility equal to one.
Definition 3 (Functional degree of responsibility) Let PS,Mq (C) denote the
set of all power acquisition sequences of coalition C in q for S in M . Let also `
= min({length(k) | k ∈ PS,Mq (C)}) be the length of a shortest power acquisition
sequence. The functional degree of q-responsibility of C for S in M , denoted by
FDRS,Mq (C), is defined as follows:
FDRS,Mq (C) =
{
0 if PS,Mq (C) = ∅
1
(`+1) otherwise
The notion of FDRS,Mq (C) is formulated based on the minimum length of
power acquisition sequences , which taken to be 0 if C is a (weakly) q-responsible
coalition for S. In such a case, C has already an action profile to avoid S in q,
and hence, the functional degree of q-responsibility of C for S will be equal
to 1. If no power acquisition sequence k does exist for C (i.e., PS,Mq (C) = ∅),
then the minimum length of power acquisition sequences is taken to be ∞ such
that the functional degree of q-responsibility of C for S becomes 0. In other
cases FDRS,Mq (C) will be strictly between zero and one. In sequel, we write
FDRSq (C) and PSq (C) instead of FDRS,Mq (C) and PS,Mq (C), respectively.
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Proposition 3 (Full functionality implies full responsibility). Let Cˆ be
any coalition, q an arbitrary state and S a given state of affairs. If FDRSq (Cˆ)
= 1, then the structural degree of q-responsibility of Cˆ for S is equal to 1.
Proof. According to Definition 3, for any non (weakly) q-responsible coalition
C, FDRSq (C) 6= 1. Hence, based on Proposition 1, for the coalition Cˆ with
functional degree of q-responsibility equal to 1, SDRSq (Cˆ) = 1. uunionsq
Note that the other side does not hold in general because SDRSq (C) = 1 also
includes the cases in which C is a proper super-set of a responsible coalition.
Example 4 (War powers resolution). Consider again the voting scenario in the
congress, as explained in Section 2, but now extended with a new President
agent P . The decision of starting a war W should first be approved by a ma-
jority of the congress members (six votes or more in favour of W ) after which
the President makes the final decision. Hence, P has the preclusive power which
is conditioned on the approval of the congress members. Moreover, we have a
simplifying assumption that no party member acts independently and thus as-
sume that all members of a party vote in favor of or against the W . In this
scenario, which is illustrated in Figure 3, we have an initial state qs in which
all the congress members could use their votes in favour or against the ap-
proval of W (no abstention or null vote is allowed). In this example, W will
be considered as the state of affairs consisting of states of q11, q12, and q13.
This multi-agent scenario can be modelled by the CGS M = (N,Q,Act, d, o),
where N = {1, ..., 11} (the first ten agents are the voters in the congress fol-
lowed by the President), Q = {qs, q0, ..., q13}, Act = {0, 1, wait}, di(qs) = {0, 1}
for all i ∈ {1, ..., 10}, d11(qs) = {wait}, di(q) = {wait} for all i ∈ {1, ..., 10}
and q ∈ {q0, ..., q13}, d11(r) = {wait} for r ∈ ({q0, q1, q2, q4, q6} ∪ {q8, ..., q13}),
and d11(t) = {0, 1} for t ∈ {q3, q5, q7}. The outcome function o is illustrated in
Figure 3 where for example o(qs, (1, 0, 0, ?)) = q4 in which the war W will not
take place because of the disapproval of the congress (? represents any avail-
able action). For notation convenience, actions of party members will be written
collectively in the action profiles, e.g., we write (0, 1, 0, ?) to denote the action
profile (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ?). Moreover, the simplifying assumption that all
party members vote collectively is implemented by o(qs, α¯
′) = qs for all possible
action profiles α¯′ in which a party member acts independently.
The set of all (weakly) qs-responsible coalitions WWqs consists of two coalitions
of GD and RD. These two and the coalition GRD, are the coalitions with
the preclusive power over W in qs. If an anti-war campaign wants to negotiate
and invest its limited resources in order to avoid the war W , convincing any
of coalitions in WWqs , as minimal coalitions with power to preclude the war,
could avoid the war. However, we can see that convincing the President is also
adequate. Although the President has no preclusive power in qs over W , there
exists some accessible states from qs (i.e., q3, q5, and q7), in which P is responsible
for the state of affairs. This potential capacity of P , will be addressed, by means
of the introduced notion of functional degree of responsibility. Two weakly qs-
responsible coalitionsGD and RD, have the functional degree of qs-responsibility
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of 1 for W because they already have sufficient power to avoid W in source state
of qs. Coalitions ∅, G, R, D, GR and GRD are not (weakly) qs-responsible for W
and no power acquisition sequence exists for these coalitions. Accordingly, their
functional degree of qs-responsibility for W is 0. Coalitions PG, PR, PD, PGR,
PGD, PRD and PGRD, have the potentiality of possessing the preclusive power
in other states, i.e., q3, q5, and q7, but none of them will be minimal coalition
with preclusive power over W , as minimality is a requirement for being (weakly)
responsible coalition [5]. Hence, the functional degree of qs-responsibility for
all these coalitions will be 0. The coalition which has a chance of becoming a
(weakly) responsible coalition in states other than qs (i.e., q3, q5, and q7) is P .
In fact, the President is the (unique) responsible coalition for W in states q3,
q5, and q7. As the minimum length of power acquisition sequence for P is 1,
the functional degree of qs-responsibility of P for W is 1/2. Although, P has
no independent action profile to avoid W in qs, there exists a power acquisition
sequence for P through which P acquires the preclusive power over W .
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Fig. 3. War powers resolution
The next proposition illustrates that through a shortest power acquisition
sequence, the potentiality that the coalition is responsible for the state of affairs,
increases strictly. This potential reaches its highest possible value where the
coalition “really” has the preclusive power over the state of affairs as a (weakly)
responsible coalition. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
any power acquisition sequence P = 〈α¯1, ..., α¯n〉 in q for a coalition C for S and
the sequence of states 〈q1 = q, ..., qn+1〉 due to the deterministic nature of the
action profiles α¯i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., o(qi, α¯i) = qi+1 and q = q1 and q′ = qn+1
and C is (weakly) q′-responsible for S. Hence, in the following, we write P =
〈q1, ..., qn+1〉 and interchangeably use it instead of P = 〈α¯1, ..., α¯n〉. Therefore,
we simply refer to any state qi as a state “in” the power acquisition sequence P .
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Proposition 4 (Strictly increasing functionality). Let P = 〈q1, ..., qn+1〉
(n ≥ 1) be a power acquisition sequence in q = q1 for a coalition C for S. Then,
for any tuple of states (qi, qi+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, FDRSqi(C) < FDRSqi+1(C) iff P is
a shortest power acquisition sequence in q for C for S.
Proof. “⇒”: Suppose the claim is false. Then, although the functional degree of
responsibility of C for S is strictly increasing from q1 to qn+1 in P , there exists
a shorter power acquisition sequence P ′ = 〈q′1, ..., q′m+1〉 (n > m ≥ 0) in q = q′1
for C for S. Note that as degrees are strictly increasing, for any states qa and
qb in P (qa 6= qb) we have that FDRSqa(C) 6= FDRSqb(C). Both P and P ′ end
in a state in which C is (weakly) responsible for S. Thus, for states qn+1 and
q′m+1 we have that FDRSqn+1∈P (C) = FDRSq′m+1∈P ′(C) = 1. If we trace back
step by step through both sequences, the functional degree of responsibility of C
for S is equal in corresponding states in P and P ′. For example, for the states qn
and q′m, we have that FDRSqn(C) = FDRSq′m(C) = 1/2 (m ≥ 1). By continuing
the stepwise process of matching all states in P ′ with corresponding states in
P , as number of states in P ′ is strictly less than P and both sequences start
in same state of q = q1 = q
′
1, we reach the corresponding states qn+1−k and
q′m+1−k for 0 ≤ k ≤ m where FDRSqn+1−k(C) = FDRSq′m+1−k(C) and qn+1−k 6=
q′m+1−k and both states of qn+1−k and q
′
m+1−k are in P . This contradicts with
the assumption that for any states qa and qb in P , if qa 6= qb, we have that
FDRSqa(C) 6= FDRSqb(C).
“⇐”: Suppose the sequence P is a shortest power acquisition sequence in
q for C for S. According to Definitions 1 and 3, the functional degree of qi-
responsibility of C for S must be formulated based on the sequence Pi = 〈α¯i, ..., α¯n〉
as a sub-sequence of P . Accordingly, length of Pi is equal to `i = n−i+1. Hence,
in each state qi+1, the length of a shortest power acquisition sequence for C for
S, `i+1, will be one unit shorter than `i. Finally, as ` ≥ 0, the functional degree
of responsibility of C for S in each state qi+1 in P is strictly larger than in the
state qi in P . uunionsq
The following propositions focus on the cases in which a coalition has partial
degrees of functional and structural responsibility in a specific state. In former,
we can reason about the degree of responsibility of the coalition in some states
other than the current sate while in the latter, we can reason about the degree
of responsibility of some other coalitions in the current state.
Proposition 5 (Global signalling of partial functional degree). Let C
be a coalition with functional degree of q-responsibility 1/k for S where k is a
natural number. Then, it is guaranteed that there exists at least k − 1 states qˆ
such that FDRSqˆ (C) > FDRSq (C) and at least one state q′ such that FDRSq′(C)
= SDRSq′(C) = 1.
Proof. According to Proposition 4, the functional degree of responsibility of C
for S is strictly increasing during a shortest power acquisition sequence in q for
C for S. This sequence passes k − 2 states and reaches a state q′. Hence, the
existence of at least k−1 states in which C has functional degree of responsibility
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larger than 1/k for S, and one state in which the functional and structural degree
of responsibility of C is equal to 1 for S is guaranteed. uunionsq
Note that based on Definition 3, the functional degree of responsibility could
always be written in form of 1/k (k ∈ N) unless it is equal to 0.
Proposition 6 (Local signalling of partial structural degree). Let C be a
coalition with structural degree of q-responsibility of k for S such that 0 < k < 1.
Then, there exists at least a coalition Cˆ with structural and functional degree of
q-responsibility of 1 for S.
Proof. Based on Definition 2, k is assigned to C based on its contribution in a
(weakly) q-responsible coalition which has the structural and functional degree
of q-responsibility of 1 for S. uunionsq
In general, the existence of a coalition Cˆ with the structural and the func-
tional degree of q-responsibility of 1, could not guarantee the existence of a
coalition with structural degree of q-responsibility of k such that 0 < k < 1.
As explained in Theorem 1, cases in which we have a singleton q-responsible
coalition for S are counterexamples for such a claim.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a forward-looking approach to measure the degree of
group responsibility. The proposed notions can be used as a tool for analysing
the potential responsibility of agent coalitions towards a state of affairs. In our
approach, full structural and functional degrees of responsibility towards a state
of affairs are assigned to agent coalitions, if they can preclude the state of af-
fairs. All other coalitions that may contribute to such responsible coalitions
receive a partial structural degree of responsibility. Also, all other coalitions for
which there exists a path to a state in which they possesses the preclusive power
receives a partial functional degree of responsibility. The structural degree of
responsibility captures the responsibility of a coalition based on accumulated
preclusive power of included agents, while the functional degree of responsibility
captures the responsibility of a coalition due to the potentiality of reaching a
state in which it has the preclusive power.
These notions follow the responsibility notions in [5] and are in coherence
with the concept of preclusive power in [9]. Our notion of functional degree of
responsibility of an agent group is based on the minimum length of a sequence
from a source state towards a state in which the agent group has power over
a given state of affairs. This stepwise formulation was put forward by [1] in a
quantified degree of responsibility as a backward-looking approach. However, [1]
traces the steps in a causal network and studies the degree of causality, whereas
we define our notions in strategic settings by means of a similar formulation.
The other connection is to the [4] in which the notion of avoidance potential is
central. There are two main differences between our approach and [4]. First, our
notion of preclusion of a state of affairs is a property of a coalition, whereas in
[4] the avoidance potential for a state of affairs is a property of a strategy of
an individual agent. Second, the notion of preclusion in our case considers the
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power of a coalition while avoidance potential in [4] considers the probability of
other agents to choose a strategy such that the strategy of the agent in question
has no contribution to the establishment of the state of affairs.
We plan to apply our presented methodology for analysing forward-looking
responsibility to backward-looking responsibility. We believe that integrating the
responsibility notions as proposed in [1, 4] with our methodology could lead to a
graded notion for backward-looking responsibility in strategic settings. In such
extension, one could reason from a realized outcome state and assign a degree
of blameworthiness to coalitions in liability determination principles from legal
domain such as contributory negligence. We also plan to relate our notions to
existing power indices such as Banzhaf index from cooperative game theory (see
[15]). Finally, we aim at extending our framework with logical characterizations
of the proposed notions based on the coalitional logic with quantification [16, 5,
17].
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